Subject: Yugoslav Proposals for Forthcoming General
Assembly Action
1. Proposed Yugoslav Item on
Soviet Bloc Aggressive Policies Against Yugoslavia
I explained to the Ambassador that we had given very careful
consideration to the Yugoslav request of our views on the
advisability of submitting for the Sixth General Assembly an item on
the aggressive
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policies of
the Soviet bloc directed against Yugoslavia. Noting that our
comments were solely in the nature of advice, and that the Yugoslav
Government must of course make its own decision in the matter, I
read to the Ambassador the attached memorandum. The Ambassador
expressed his appreciation for the thorough consideration which we
had given to the matter and indicated that his government would take
our views into account in whatever action it might now take.
[Annex]
Memorandum
1. It would appear desirable for Yugoslavia to bring the threats
to its security to the attention of the General Assembly at the
Sixth Session, provided
-
a.
- the case presented by Yugoslavia is carefully
documented and will convince the Members of the United
Nations and world opinion, and
-
b.
- the measures proposed by Yugoslavia in the General
Assembly command the general support of the
members.
2. Obviously the Yugoslav Government wishes to proceed in the
Assembly in such a way as to produce the most striking and
effective results. For this purpose it would be important that
the Yugoslavs should not press for the hasty adoption of a
resolution phrased in drastic condemnatory terms, before it has
been possible to persuade the greatest possible number of
non-Soviet delegations of the strength and justice of their
case. Indeed, it would be in the interest of Yugoslavia to
extend the proceedings over a considerable period of time,
reaping the utmost advantage in moral pressure upon the Soviet
bloc and in propaganda effect.
Accordingly, it might be desirable for the Yugoslavs to present
initially a strong case, backed by full evidence, and to seek,
not an immediate condemnation of the Soviet bloc, but an
expression of the Assembly’s concern with the situation
disclosed by Yugoslavia and a sober and unbiased inquiry into
the facts. This would involve the establishment by the General
Assembly of machinery which would examine the facts carefully
and impartially. Yugoslavia would, of course, cooperate in every
way to make such an inquiry possible. This would make it easier
to obtain subsequent findings by the Assembly that the Cominform
States have threatened and are threatening Yugoslavia and would
also give much greater weight to these findings.
Perhaps the most important objective of General Assembly action
and of the machinery which it would establish should be to
enhance
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the security
of Yugoslavia by deterring the Cominform States from aggession
against it.
If aggression should occur there would be available to the United
Nations and to the judgment of the world impartial and
authoritative reports which could be the basis of prompt and
effective United Nations action.
The most desirable and most acceptable action by the General
Assembly, and one which could command the full and active
support of leading delegations, would be a resolution which
would:
-
a.
- Note with grave concern the serious charges brought
and the evidence adduced by the Government of Yugoslavia
against the Governments of the Soviet Union, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria.
-
b.
- Request the Peace Observation Commission to despatch a
subcommittee and/or observers, who, with the consent of
the states concerned, should observe on a continuing
basis the situation charged by the Yugoslav Government,
and to report to the General Assembly as
appropriate.
Observers designated by the Peace Observation Commission would be
carefully chosen to assure that pro-Cominform personnel are
excluded.
The effectiveness of this plan would be far greater if Yugoslavia
were to indicate that it is prepared to admit such observers
even if the Cominform States do not. If Yugoslavia is reluctant
at the outset to declare its willingness to admit observers
unconditionally, it can postpone the decision and minimize the
political disadvantages by indicating consent conditional on the
consent of the other States involved.
4. Other courses of action which would meet the objectives of the
Yugoslav Government and might receive the necessary support,
depending on the strength of the Yugoslav case, are:
-
a.
- The Assembly, in addition to expressing its grave
concern, could appoint a special committee to receive
and consider the evidence offered by Yugoslavia and any
defensive material which the Cominform States may offer.
This Committee could report back to the Assembly when
its studies are completed.
-
b.
- One of the main political committees of the Assembly,
perhaps by a sub-committee, might consider the case on
its merits, on the basis of statements before the
Committee and documentary evidence circulated to all the
delegations. While this might make possible findings by
the Assembly during the Sixth Session, it is less likely
to bring about a careful examination of the facts which
would satisfy the various governments and world opinion.
Also this program would not provide machinery for
keeping the case under continued surveillance by the
Assembly.
- Either of these two courses would be more acceptable
if, in addition, the General Assembly were to despatch a
sub-commission or observers
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from the Peace Observation
Commission to observe the situation on a continuing
basis.
5. The Yugoslav Government should present a new item for the
agenda of the Sixth Session, if possible before October 6 when
the supplemental list closes. To put the case on the agenda
later would, under the Assembly’s Rules, require the Yugoslav
Government to satisfy other countries that the case is of “an
important and urgent character,” although most of the evidence
has been available for many months.
The agenda item might be entitled “Threats and Hostile Acts
against Yugoslavia by the Soviet Union and other States”. The
explanatory memorandum supporting the inclusion of the item
should be brief, factual and as dispassionate as possible. There
is no need to prove the case or even to state it in detail in
this memorandum.
6. The Yugoslav Government should lay the groundwork for Assembly
action in the Sixth Session by discussion with key delegations
of the free world. It should be careful to emphasize that its
purpose is not merely propaganda but that it is seriously
concerned for its security; and that it will present a full case
and expect a thorough consideration of this matter which
seriously affects the security of Yugoslavia and relations with
the Cominform States and, therefore, falls within the
jurisdiction of the Assembly under Articles 10, 11 and 14 of the
Charter.
