320/12–2251: Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Secretary of State

secret

Delga 799. Re Italian membership. Against background SC discussion Ital membership (Delga 733, December 18),1 Hyde of USGADel with Thompson and Sale of Emb Rome had frank and thorough discussion with Guidotti and his staff of present impasse and future possibilities membership question. Guidotti had requested mtg as means clarify respective positions and if possible agree on future tactics most likely achieve positive results. Agreed that discussions informal and exploratory and not necessarily representative respective govt positions.

First possibility discussed was that Sov submission new blanket res. recommending admission thirteen applicants (all pending applications excepting Korea and Vietnam, latter having not been circulated at time SC mtg) offered possible solution worthy careful consideration. Essential prerequisites wld be (1) abstention US, (2) affirmative vote or abstention all other permanent members, (3) seven affirmative votes. Re (1) we pointed out this presents great difficulties in view our past strong position re separate consideration each applicant on own merits as well as US internal political considerations connection condemnation most recent actions Sov satellite applicants. However, we did not exclude possibility Dept might reconcile position and make strong statement clarifying policy in explanation vote after favorable SC action. We said possibility wld be given most careful consideration by USGADel and Dept. Re (2) above, we pointed out that though apparently Sovs wld undoubtedly have to vote favorably on own res or suffer serious psychological defeat their whole membership thesis, position of UK and France not clear and position China presents real difficulties connection Outer Mongolia whose membership China so [Page 419] strongly opposes. It might not be possible persuade China refrain veto whole res for this reason. Re (3), position new council members difficult to assess and it by no means certain that seven affirmative votes cld be mustered agreed most careful planning and preparatory work required.

Above solution wld involve something along fol tactics:

(a)
Passage Sov res, presumably after Sov veto of French res on Italy alone. Comment: It is assumed that Sovs wld accept no amendment whatsoever (including any attempt to add Korea and Vietnam or delete Outer Mongolia or any other Sov candidate).
(b)
Statements of explanation of votes (after SC action) to clarify respective members policies and set stage for assembly action.
(c)
Assembly action on SC recommendation to be on individual applicants separately. It wld be hoped that GA wld approve those applicants previously recommended by GA and that Sov candidates wld fail to receive necessary votes. Comment: It is recognized that there wld be strong tendency in GA to accept all candidates (1) on moral grounds that SC action represented a “deal” and that GA morally committed to pass on all applicants as “package”; also, (2) those members favoring universal membership wld be expected vote favorably on at least some Sov applicants; and (3) some, as suggested by Quevedo in last SC mtg, might believe that even nonqualified states shld be brought into UN in hope that by participation in organization their future conduct might improve. Thus there is some danger that undesirable applicants might conceivable receive two-thirds approval, and on other hand that applicants already approved by GA wld not pass unless others also admitted at same time. In recognizing these difficulties it was agreed that if the Dept were to go ahead with this scheme, and made necessary preparation, there was still a good chance of success in obtaining admittance desirable applicants and at same time exclude unqualified Sov candidates.

Other possibilities discussed, such as action by GA (with or without prior further ICJ rulings) despite “illegal” Sov veto. Guidotti felt that action under Sov res presented best possibilities. Both sides will continue consult on all possibilities and Itals agreed wld not proceed with any particular program without prior consultation with us.

Roosevelt
  1. Not printed.