310.2/11–851
Memorandum by Mr. David W. Wainhouse, Adviser, United States Delegation to the Sixth Regular Session of the General Assembly1
Italian Membership Question
The Italian Aide-Mémoire
The Plan: A General Assembly decision by two-thirds to admit Italy to membership. All that is necessary is the political will of the [Page 370] Three Powers to surmount the stalemate caused by the Soviets; the Soviet veto is contrary to the law of the Charter.
The Difficulties With It: A recommendation by Security Council is an indispensable requirement for the admission of new members. This was confirmed by an advisory opinion of the Court (March 3, 1950). To be sure attaching conditions other than those contained in the Charter are invalid, and Court so ruled on May 28, 1948. But Soviets can change reason or give no reason at all. It cannot be argued therefore, as does the Italian Aide-Mémoire, that Soviet vetoes are null and void and that the General Assembly is in position to take action implying this.
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The Belaunde Initiative
The Plan: (1) General Assembly advise Security Council to revise rules to permit applicants for membership present proof of qualifications under Article 4 of Charter; (2) Such proof of Italy’s qualifications would be studied by Commission of Security Council; (3) If there were objection to Commission’s report (threat of Soviet veto), General Assembly would ask Court for opinion on value of proof offered; (4) If Court ruled favorably, Security Council would have to apply strictly sense of Article 4; (5) Matter would not be vetoable because Charter leaves no option or choice.
The Difficulties With It:
No merit in asking Court for opinion on applicant’s qualifications. Since advisory opinion not binding USSR could still veto application. Furthermore, we have serious doubts whether Court would consider itself competent to determine whether an applicant is qualified in view of Court’s statement in its opinion of May 28, 1948 that of the factors to be taken into account in considering conditions in Article “No relevant political factor … connected with conditions of admission is excluded.”
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The Schuman2 Tactic
The Plan: General Assembly might point up the issues in the Italian membership case by requesting Security Council to reconsider Italy’s application.
We can go along with this, since it is in line with our position.
The Difficulties With It: The Italians see no merit in this, and feel that another veto would not help. Without Italian approval or acquiescence, we should not press this.
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The United States Position
(This is set forth in Gadel 43 of November 1, 1951.)
Special reasons for handling Italy’s application in view of its trusteeship responsibilities. USDel should arrange for consideration question of Italy’s membership by Fourth Committee under question of full participation of Italy in Trusteeship Council. We are prepared to sponsor or support resolution by which General Assembly would request Security Council reconsideration of Italy’s application as special case. If this course not feasible, we can support special Security Council reconsideration without prior General Assembly consideration. (This is also what M. Schuman has in mind.)
Neither of the above courses should be pursued by us unless agreed to by Italy.
We can, if efforts to obtain Italy’s admission fail, support an amendment to Article 86 to give Italy full membership in Trusteeship Council if desired by Italy, and should also consult with other Delegates and with Italy regarding possibility of arrangements giving her right to participate, without vote, in General Assembly Committees if she so desires.
- With regard to specific assignments given to the U.S. Delegation Advisory Staff, Wainhouse was functioning as Executive Officer for Political and Security Matters in Committee I.↩
- Robert Schuman, French Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Department of State was informed of this French démarche in a French Embassy aide-mémoire of November 1 which has not been found in the Department of State files.↩