There is enclosed for the Department’s information a memorandum of
conversation which I had recently with Dr. Mozaffar Baqai who has been the leading open
critic of the Zahedi Government.
While the memorandum of conversation is self-explanatory, my purposes in
the course of the meeting were to ascertain Dr. Baqai’s point of view toward the
Zahedi Government and toward
the United States and Great Britain, on the one hand, and to make clear
to him the policies and view of the United States, on the other.
Attachment
Memorandum of Conversation
Tehran, October 23, 1953.
PARTICIPANTS
- Loy W. Henderson,
Ambassador
- Dr. Mozaffar Baqai,
Deputy to the 17th Majlis
- Mr. Roy M. Melbourne,
First Secretary of Embassy
- Mr. Joseph H.
Cunningham, Third Secretary
Dr. Baqai came to tea at the
Residence at the invitation of the Ambassador about 6 p.m. on
October 23. After the Ambassador and Baqai had exchanged assurances that they would speak
with complete candor regarding their views on Iran’s problems, the
Ambassador asked Baqai to
outline his estimate of and attitude toward the Zahedi Government and its
performance to date.
As a preface to his remarks, Dr. Baqai observed that his political fate was
inevitably closely allied to that of the new Government. He had a
long record of opposition to Mosadeq, had supported Zahedi for some time, had defended him publicly at
the time of his arrest in 1952, and had helped bring the General to
power. Thus, regardless of the fact that he had not sought or been
offered influence or position in the new Government, its success
would redound in the public mind to his credit and its failure would
be considered in some measure his failure.
Dr. Baqai said that he was
frankly disturbed and disappointed by the General’s record so far.
He explained that whereas Zahedi could have picked for his Cabinet trustworthy
though politically unknown officials or military men in whom he had
confidence, he had instead appointed a group of politicians of long
standing, whose inefficiency and corruption and whose records as
tools of Great Britain or Soviet Russia were known to all. As a
result, the people who brought Zahedi to power in a violent reaction against the
Mosadeq Government and
who had hoped for a new and more honest regime were disturbed and
indignant at the General’s choice of ministers.
Baqai pointed out that
Mosadeq had come to power
on a wave of popularity unmatched in Iran’s history and had begun
his term of office with virtually no opposition. In two years,
however, his ineptitude and the misdeeds of his ministers and
subordinates had incited the people to the violent overthrow of his
regime. Zahedi, on the other hand, came to power with three
ready-made foci of opposition: the Tudeh party, which as the core of
Communist sentiment in Iran necessarily attacks his every movement;
the Mosadeq partisans, who
are in
[Page 815]
evitably trying to
frustrate and discredit the man who overthrew their leader; and the
elements who oppose in principle any Government headed by a military
man.2
Dr. Baqai commented in passing
that in normal times he would oppose the selection of a military man
as premier. In view of the present crisis, however, and in view of
the fact that he himself had no desire to assume the reins of
Government and could see at present no alternative to Zahedi, he had
supported the General in his bid for power. Now, however, he found
himself in a very embarrassing situation, as he could neither
support, oppose, nor remain indifferent to the Zahedi regime. He could not grant
it support because it was acting contrary to his expressed
principles, was returning to power long-discredited politicians and
was committing all over again the mistakes of the Mosadeq Government. He could not
oppose it, because he had helped bring it to power and could only
turn against it at the cost of admitting he had made a mistake in
preferring Zahedi to
Mosadeq; furthermore,
opposition to Zahedi would
merely play into Communist hands. Finally, he could not remain
silent and profess indifference to the Zahedi Government because his followers would ask
him why he failed to criticize the new Government when it repeated
the mistakes of the old.
Dr. Baqai went on to say that
Iranian and United States policies coincided most closely in the
matter of their identical opposition to Communism and Communistic
infiltration. Unfortunately, in this regard as in others, the
Zahedi Government’s
performance has been worse than poor. Of the 4,000 persons
imprisoned as suspected Communists, some 30 per cent are entirely
innocent. Furthermore, the remainder who are either Tudeh party
members or Communist sympathizers include only rank and file members
and insignificant minor functionaries; not a single member of the
Central Committee of the Party,3 not a single important Communist writer or
pamphleteer, not a single leading party organizer has been
imprisoned. Instead of weakening the Communist party in Iran, the
Government’s inept performance is actually strengthening it; so long
as the leaders remain free they can always attract new dupes and
sympathizers to replace those whom the Government imprisons, while
many of the innocent men arrested on one pretext or another by the
security forces become embittered by the injustice of their
treatment and turn to Communism for revenge.
Baqai emphasized that
Communism, being an ideology, could not be overcome by force alone,
and pointed out that the Government was even using force, its only
weapon, incorrectly. While innocent men are
[Page 816]
arrested at the whim of a police officer or
Government functionary or in the hope that they might pay a ransom
for their release, the guilty are all too often securing release or
immunity from arrest by bribery or by influence. In some cases
politicians apparently seek to prepare for the eventuality of a
Communist regime in Iran by protecting from imprisonment Communist
party functionaries. These men obviously fail to realize that,
without exception, politicians who followed their example in
countries now behind the Iron Curtain have been liquidated along
with the rest by the Communist regime.
At this point Baqai said that
he could if necessary cite numerous examples to support his
allegations. He mentioned the case of Ali Ashgar Hekmat, Minister in
the Zahedi Government
Cabinet, who has a long record of service to the British cause and
who in recent years has become increasingly involved in Iran’s
Soviet cultural activities. Hekmat’s brother, a professor at Tehran University
and an active Tudeh party member, is and will remain immune from
arrest because of his brother’s position. There have been, in fact,
only three important party functionaries arrested since the
inauguration of the Zahedi
regime and all three of them were released within 48 hours of their
arrest.4
At this point Ambassador Henderson asked Dr. Baqai if his dissatisfaction with the Zahedi Government resulted from
fundamental disagreement on policy grounds or merely from
disappointment in Zahedi’s
implementation of his policies. He went on to point out that in
order to correct abuses and errors which Baqai had detailed, the Government would need an
honest and efficient police force, which it did not at present have
and which would be difficult and time-consuming to develop. The
Ambassador asked Baqai just
what he would do to improve the situation and wondered whether he
felt that the Zahedi
Government was willfully mishandling its anti-Communist campaign or
merely falling into error through ineptitude and inexperience.
Baqai affirmed his support of
Zahedi’s announced
policies but stated that what really counted was the way these
policies were being carried out and that it was in this connection
that he differed with General
Zahedi. He conceded that Zahedi’s personal aims were undoubtedly commendable
and that he was attempting to pursue an effective anti-Communist
campaign, but contended that such attempts were
[Page 817]
largely vitiated by the corrupt and
venal politicians who surround him. He felt that, since his own
Workers’ Party had extensive information regarding the Communist
organization leadership and activities in Iran, the Security Forces
undoubtedly had much more complete information, as well as the means
to use this information in suppressing the party and disrupting its
organization. Citing his five years of active opposition to
Communism, Baqai stated that
this experience made him one of the best qualified men in Iran to
discuss Communist activities and the best ways of combating them.
Several times in this presentation, Baqai affirmed that he had made his position clear
to General Zahedi and that
the General agreed with his estimate of the situation but was
prevented by his entourage from acting effectively.
When Baqai had completed his
commentary on the Zahedi
Government, the Ambassador asked him for his views on the recent
statement by Foreign Minister Anthony
Eden of Great Britain regarding the necessity for
free intercourse between Iran and Britain and the desirability of
re-establishing diplomatic relations.5 The
Ambassador pointed out that General
Zahedi had emphasized Iran’s desire to be on friendly
terms with all countries, and asked Dr. Baqai’s reaction to this statement. Baqai said that he certainly agreed
in principle6 with Zahedi’s stand and felt that
diplomatic relations with Great Britain should by all means be
re-established. However such recognition must be proceeded by at
least the beginnings of an oil settlement in order to prevent the
British from using their diplomatic mission to foist upon Iran an
unfair settlement and to exercise again improper
influence on the internal affairs of the country.
The Ambassador then turned to the concept of an oilless economy for
Iran, which Dr. Baqai’s
newspaper Shahed has advocated editorially on
a number of occasions. He asked the Deputy if he really believed
that in present circumstances such an economy was desirable or even
feasible. Obtaining the Ambassador’s permission to explain his stand
in some detail, Baqai
launched into an explanation of the history and background of his
advocacy of an oilless economy.
When the 16th Majlis was elected some four years ago and the national
movement first came into prominence, one of the movement’s major
objectives as listed in Shahed was the
settlement of the oil question. By this, Baqai explained, he meant the reaching of an
understanding with the AIOC if
that company were willing to grant Iran a fair share of the proceeds
from its oil; otherwise, he advocated eviction of the British and
nationalization of the oil industry. British intransigence
unfortunately aroused public anger in Iran to such a pitch that
[Page 818]
many people came to feel
that they wanted no part either of the AIOC or of the oil industry; in other words, they
wanted to be rid of the oil question completely. In line with this
public feeling, Baqai had
advocated and still defended the oilless economy as an alternative
to the surrender of Iran’s legitimate rights and the compromising of
her national honor. Although he felt that if possible Iran should
profit from her oil resources, he feared that the only way that
Britain would allow it to do so would be on the basis of a 50–50
division of profits, which would be completely unacceptable to the
Iranian people. Rather than accept such a shameful settlement, he
believed Iran should forget her oil and turn to other sources of
revenue.7
The Ambassador thanked Dr. Baqai for his frank and detailed presentation of his
views and said that his comments had been most helpful and
revealing. He then stated his intention to explain with equal
frankness and in some detail his own estimate, and what he believed
to be the United States Government’s estimate, of Iran’s situation
with regard to the oil problem. Prefacing his remarks with a
summation of the long-standing struggle among the Great Powers for
influence in Iran, the Ambassador pointed out that the United
States, in contrast, wanted nothing from Iran and desired merely to
preserve the independence and promote the prosperity of its people.
Although certainly activated in part by self-interest in this
matter, the United States desired neither territory nor profit nor
political influence in Iran. It was no longer possible in the
present world situation for Iran to seek advantages by playing one
great power against another as it had done so long in the past. At
this rather pointed comment on the traditional Iranian policy which
Baqai’s party has often
advocated, the Deputy made no reply.
Ambassador Henderson then
went on to outline the world petroleum situation as it is today,
emphasizing that present production was more than adequate to meet
world needs and that only through cooperation among a number of the
major oil companies of the globe could Iran’s oil be distributed in
appreciable quantities. He emphasized that the sale of any Iranian
oil would necessitate a corresponding reduction in the production of
other Middle Eastern countries, any one of which could produce
enough petroleum to satisfy the entire world demand for Middle
Eastern oil.
The Ambassador emphasized that, in view of these facts, Iran could
not expect to obtain a better price for its oil than the other
countries of the region. In his view, the best solution would
involve a provision akin to a most-favored-nation clause whereby
Iran would be sure
[Page 819]
to
receive as high a proportionate revenue from its petroleum as would
the other oil-producing countries. Pointing out that Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, and Iraq had all increased their production of oil in recent
years, the Ambassador suggested that such a most-favored-nation
clause would permit Iran to increase her revenue from oil at the
same pace as her sister nations. Were such a provision to go into
effect, it was likely that both the AIOC and Iran itself might lose much of their interest
in the question of compensation.
Underlining the extreme urgency of the situation, the Ambassador
stated that either foreign economic aid such as now proffered by the
United States or sizable oil revenues were absolutely essential to
the Iranian economy if it was to avoid complete bankruptcy. The
emergency aid program now under way had five more months to run; at
the end of that time Iran must find some other source of
revenue.8 Although personally willing if necessary to ask
his Government for additional aid for Iran, the Ambassador felt very
sure that, unless important steps had been taken in the direction of
an oil settlement, the United States Congress would refuse to extend
further assistance. Rightly or wrongly, the American people would
feel that a country which apparently did nothing to utilize its own
resources did not deserve support from abroad.9
At the close of the Ambassador’s presentation, Dr. Baqai said that he thanked the
Ambassador for his frankness and agreed in substance with his
estimate of the situation. However, he felt it necessary to point
out that the people of Iran must be psychologically prepared for an
oil agreement with Great Britain and that the real economic and
political reasons for such an agreement would have to be
sugar-coated in order to make them palatable to an uninformed
public. He suggested that when the United States decided for reasons
of political or military necessity to intervene in Korea it had had
to profess high-sounding and possibly fictitious reasons for its
action; in the same manner, the Iranian Government could not be
completely frank with its people as to the necessity for and the
reasons behind an oil settlement.10
The Ambassador took sharp issue with Baqai’s comments regarding the Korean intervention
and emphasized that the United States had acted solely in order to
resist Communist aggression and to keep its word to the free world.
Baqai then modified his
statement some
[Page 820]
what,
conceding that possibly the United States Government’s explanation
of its action had not been given proper publicity in Iran, but
reiterated his contention that in his country and particularly in
the case of the oil question considerable psychological preparation
of the people was necessary.
Further detailing his position, Baqai stated that his party served as a screen
between the Communist Party and Iranians dissatisfied with their
country’s present situation. This was because the Worker’s Party
advocates many of the reforms demanded by the Tudeh without
insisting that they be carried out within the framework of
Communism. Many Iranian intellectuals, however, stood somewhere
between the Worker’s Party and the Communists, and in order to
attract these individuals towards him and away from the Tudeh,
Baqai had found it
necessary to profess on occasions a neutralism which he did not
feel.11 Pointing out that these intellectuals, if forced
to chose between Britain and Russia, would invariably turn toward
the Soviet Union, and that American policy in recent years had led
them to suspect the United States of collusion with British
interests, Baqai stated that
he was forced to oppose the United States in print from time to time
in order to avoid the accusation of pro-Americanism and to preserve
his hold over the intellectual element, which he considered to be of
the highest importance.
The Ambassador commented that he would have no grounds to complain if
Baqai out of honest
conviction would criticize the United States or United States
policies. He thought, however, it would be unworthy of a statesman
to criticize a country trying to help Iran merely for the purpose of
trying to strengthen his political party.12 At this critical
period of Iran’s history, it behooved such leaders of public opinion
as Dr. Baqai to assert their
leadership to the fullest on behalf of Iran’s interests and to
explain the situation fully and frankly to their supporters and
constituents. By professing for reasons of political convenience
opinions which he did not hold, Dr. Baqai made it impossible for the members of his
party and their sympathizers to know precisely where he stood;
furthermore, he deprived them of the benefit of his informed
judgment and leadership.
To these remarks Baqai merely
reiterated his opinion that the Iranian people could not be
dragooned into supporting an oil settlement and must be prepared
psychologically over a period of time for any
[Page 821]
agreement. He pointed out that General
Zahedi, an honest but
idealistic and therefore dangerous13 military man, seemed to believe it possible
to obtain by means of rigged elections a Majlis which would approve
any oil settlement which he might propose. This, he felt, was a
great mistake, since the only way that approval of a lasting oil
settlement could be obtained was by electing in a free and legal
manner a truly representative Majlis once the country had been
properly prepared for this move. To the Ambassador’s observation
that regardless of the feeling of the Iranian people there were only
five months left in which to act, Baqai had no rejoinder.
The interview terminated with the Ambassador and Dr. Baqai exchanging thanks for each
party’s frank and complete presentation. Before leaving at
approximately 9 p.m., Dr. Baqai professed his readiness to discuss the oil
question further with the Ambassador at the latter’s
convenience.
