Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Iran, 1951–1954

336. Information Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

CS–22878

Washington, October 20, 1953.

SUBJECT

• 1. Pledges made by Qashqai Khans to Zahedi Government
• 2. Intention of Government to Demand Capitulation of Qashqai Khans

SOURCE

• [3 lines not declassified]

1. The Qashqai Khans and the chiefs of all the individual Qashqai sub-tribes met with Ali Hayat, Zahedi Government representative and the Governor of Fars, and with General Mir-Jahangir (fnu), Commander of the Shiraz Garrison, at Shiraz on the evening of 14 October 1953.

2. At the meeting, the Tribal Council members pledged unanimously that their tribes would not attack Shiraz, and stated that the Qashqais had no hostile intentions of any kind. The Council also proposed to continue an orderly tribal migration to winter quarters.

3. Nasr Khan Qashqai rejected a proposal made ten days ago by Hayat that Nasr Khan go to Tehran and pledge his loyalty to the Shah. (Nasr Khan, suspecting a plot against his life, does not trust the Shah.)

4. The Qashqais are rejecting Tudeh Party overtures for an anti-Zahedi coalition.²

5. The reported refusal of Nasr Khan Qashqai to come to Tehran to see the Shah and Prime Minister Zahedi has precipitated a decision by the Zahedi Government, as of 15 October 1953, to force the Qashqai leaders to capitulate or flee.

6. Major General Seyfollah Hemat,³ an old enemy of the Qashqais, has been designated Commanding General of the Shiraz military forces. He is to confer with Zahedi on 17 October.

7. Zahedi intends to reinforce the Shiraz Garrison to a total strength of 40,000. Small groups from four southern divisions are now being moved into Shiraz.

8. Ten Thunderbolt planes are ready to be flown, except for batteries. Zahedi requested the United States Army Mission in Tehran to query Dhahran for batteries. Approximately 13 Hurricanes are immobilized because of a lack of propellers. Zahedi sent priority orders to the Hawker Company in England for 13 propellers and asked the United States Embassy in Tehran to help expedite their shipment.

9. Zahedi led a discussion on the evening of 14 October 1953 among Generals Abdullah Hedayat, Nadr Batmangelich, Hedayatollah Guilanshah, Dadsetan (fnu), Bakhtiar (fnu),⁴ Reza Azimi, Morteza Akhavi, and Deihimi (fnu). Zahedi “laid down” the strategy while the Generals listened. Zahedi plans to take heights surrounding the Qashqais’ southern location and to demand their capitulation. He does not expect the Qashqais to fight.

10. Two important Qashqai sub-tribal leaders who are now in Tehran told Zahedi that they will lead opposition within the Qashqais against Nasr Khan Qashqai if Zahedi will promise to furnish the Shiraz Garrison with forces capable of overwhelming the Qashqais. On 14 October Zahedi gave his promise to furnish the forces.

11. Zahedi is quite calm concerning this situation, and he does not anticipate a shooting conflict.

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 80–00810A, Box 26, Folder 87, CS Information Reports 22870–22879. Secret; Security Information; Control—U.S. Officials Only.
2. Washington Comment: According to a report from a well-qualified source [less than 1 line not declassified] date of information 28 September 1953, two Tudeh Party spokesmen visited Nasr Khan on approximately 9 September 1953 to propose a Tudeh–Qashqai armed coalition. Nasr Khan declined, stating that he would fight for Mossadeq but not for communism or the Tudeh Party. See CS–21404. For further information concerning liaison between the Qashqais and the Tudeh Party, see CS–21346. [Footnote is in the original. CS–21404 is ibid., Box 25, Folder 51, CS Information Reports 21400–21409. CS–21346 is ibid., Folder 45, CS Information Reports 21340–21349.]
3. Washington Comment: According to a report from a well-qualified but prejudiced source (F–3) date of information February 1952, influential individuals were collaborating under the direction of General Seyfollah Hemat, Sixth Divisional Commander in Fars from 1944 to 1947 and later attached to this Division as its tribal expert, to weaken the political influence of the Qashqais and to strengthen the position of the Shah. See SO–82200. According to a report to another Government agency, Hemat retired from the Army in April 1953, at his own request. For further information on Hemat’s tribal activities, see SO’s–90925, –92656, –92783, and –94689. [Footnote is in the original. SOs–82200, –90925, –92656, –92783, and –94689 were not found.]
4. Washington Comment: Probably Brigadier Bakhtiar (fnu), who was named Commander of the Tehran Armored Division by the Shah on 29 September 1953. [Footnote is in the original.]