320/12–650: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received December 7—12:26 a. m.]
Delga 384. Re Korea: Gross and Ross had two-hour discussion late this afternoon with Younger, Jebb, Chauvel and Lacoste on current phase Korean case in UN. Subjects covered were handling Six-Power resolution and cease-fire.
Having agreed to file joint resolution at noon today British in particular, but strongly assisted by French, were strongly disinclined to proceed further in Committee 1 for time being. They thought it mistake that Committee 1 meeting had been called for Thursday,1 seeing no particular reason why few days delay in committee procedure would make much difference. On British side principal objections were necessity awaiting outcome Attlee–Truman talks and substance of resolution itself. On first point Younger said he was absolutely without instruction and would be unable say anything on substance of resolution until he knew outcome Washington talks. On substance of resolution Jebb in particular referred to resolution as an absurdity, ironical and ludicrous in present situation.
[Page 1433]Chauvel, although concerned with outcome Attlee–Truman talks, apparently did not feel resolution itself amounted to very much but lie was principally concerned with question of where resolution might lead us if it were passed. In contrast with June 25 resolution which contemplated action if North Koreans failed comply with provisions of resolution, Chauvel could not see that anyone had a course clearly plotted for action in event failure Chinese Communists to comply with present resolution. He felt strongly we should know where we were going before committing ourselves too deeply to Six-Power Resolution.
We argued strongly that Six-Power resolution was both an action (withdrawal of Chinese Communists forces) resolution and resolution of principle which represented minimum which we felt great majority membership would insist upon to uphold UN principles. Passage of this resolution would in turn, unless we should decide upon some other course, be important factor as demonstration UN solidarity against Communist aggression. British in particular, but also French did not accept our estimate of majority desire, indicating strong Commonwealth and European as well as other dislike of Six-Power resolution. We also argued that it was essential to maintain momentum in handling charge Chinese Communist intervention and unity UN membership in order maximize bargaining position vis-à-vis Russians and Chinese Communists.
We also argued that with friendly chairman and friendly majority we could control future proceedings in light of developing circumstances, future proceedings being debate on procedural motion to take up Communist intervention item ahead of Soviet charge of aggression against US, debate on substance of Six-Power resolution and vote. British and French were most strongly opposed to bringing resolution to vote within predictable future.
After lengthy discussion along foregoing lines British and French finally agreed to have Committee 1 meet on schedule Thursday morning provided day’s proceedings were limited to procedural question order of items and that there would be no debate on substance beginning tomorrow.
We then had lengthy discussion cease-fire question. We made clear throughout this discussion in variety ways that we were not soliciting directly or indirectly any initiative by anybody with regard to ceasefire. Referring to suggestion he had made earlier in day Chauvel wondered whether it would not be desirable for him or someone to seek Entezam’s advice. In this connection Chauvel outlined rather [Page 1434] elaborate program of details of possible cease-fire which might be discussed with Entezam. Jebb could not envisage what form possible GA resolution re cease-fire would take. He felt that cease-fire was essentially matter of negotiation.
We indicated did not seem feasible for UN to get involved in ceasefire details. The most we felt Assembly could do would be along lines Rau’s proposal in light Asian appeal last night, namely, (a) ceasefire, (b) withdrawal of Communists beyond Yalu and withdrawal UN forces to 38th parallel, and (c) machinery to work out details. British particularly, but French also, felt that Communists would never agree to cease-fire involving their withdrawal beyond Yalu except at price of political conditions. We made clear we were not interested in cease-fire with political strings attached.
Younger, taking at face value our statements re not soliciting directly or indirectly any initiative by anybody, said he supposed that they would have to consider whether to take initiative or suggest that others take initiative. Said first question that would be asked would be whether US would support cease-fire proposal. In order to convince others that such proposal would be taken seriously he felt it would be necessary inform others in light Truman–Attlee understanding that US would support (or favor) a cease-fire proposal. We argued this would be tactically very unwise and that tactically it would be much better not to commit our position but rather to indicate assumption that 53 members of UN supporting UN effort in Korea would without exception want cessation of killing in Korea.
British and French all agreed that there was no particular hurry about developing cease-fire proposal since this was essentially a process of negotiation which thus far had moved very slowly and could not reasonably be expected move much faster in next few days. Our conversation ended on this note with understanding discussion would be resumed tomorrow.
After French had left meeting we told Jebb and Younger, on basis earlier Hickerson–Gross telecon that we felt we had to be most careful in discussing matter in presence of French but that we assumed British realized that we thought a cease-fire would be militarily desirable, although we thought it very important that British give absolutely no indication to others that this was our position.
- December 7.↩