795.00/12–650
Memorandum by Mr. Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, of a Meeting Held on December 5, 1950
In a meeting yesterday afternoon following the meeting with Mr. Attlee, the Secretary, Mr. Jessup, Mr. Rusk, Mr. Matthews, Mr. Nitze and Mr. Perkins discussed several matters that were involved in the meetings with Mr. Attlee. Most of the discussion was general, vague and without conclusion.
At the close of discussion, however, the Secretary asked for a study which Mr. Hickerson and Mr. Rusk agreed to do with the assistance of their people.1 The Secretary said that we must do some very careful thinking about the position we are in with the British in regard to Korea. He said we talked to the British about two lines of action. First, we take up the cease fire and if the Chinese Communists agree to that, we stop the shooting and begin to talk about Korea and the UN. What about the six power resolution? Does it make sense to continue or should we start negotiation on the issues behind the scenes? The Chinese Communists say they want to discuss the problem but only in the Security Council and only if they are in the Security Council. What is our attitude on that? Do we say that we won’t be hammered into seating them? Should we set up a meeting [Page 1411] with the same people in the Security Council and with the veto and conduct them in that form?
If the British do not agree and say they will vote to seat the Chinese Communists, what then? Do we walk out or do we still talk? It is foolish to say any decision will be reached in the Security Council with the television going and the whole world listening.
What kind of settlement do we envisage? Do we accept something which is roughly comparable to the present situation in Korea, agree on some sort of front government with the North Koreans running it?
If we get some settlement, do we let the Chinese Communists bring it into the UN, if they are seated, and get UN blessing on it?
With regard to Formosa, the Chinese Communists say that it must be part of the deal. We will not agree. What about Security Council action on it? (At this point, Mr. Jessup suggested that we might go back to the old plan of putting it in the General Assembly. Mr. Rusk said that if the Chinese Communists try to tie in Formosa, we might tie in Indochina, Tibet.)
The Secretary continued by saying that whatever the settlement is, should we let it go through? This is on the theory that we had a cease fire, were still in Korea, and that there was a settlement. Also, on the assumption that we have to get out of Korea. Do we at that time try to block a settlement, or don’t we?
What if at some point the Chinese Communists say they have had enough of the cease fire, if it is ever agreed to, and declare the cease fire over? What do we do then?
These are all things which we should think out. The Secretary said that we spoke of there being two roads, one based on the principle of negotiation, and the other on the principle of evacuation. He said that perhaps, in reality, there was only one road or that they both led the same direction.