795.00/12–550
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)
Subject: Truman–Attlee Talks
Participants:
| United Kingdom | United States |
| Sir Oliver Franks | The Secretary of State |
| Mr. Kenneth Younger | Mr. Averell Harriman |
| [Sir] Roger Makins | Mr. Dean Rusk |
| Mr. Robert Scott | Mr. Philip C. Jessup |
| Mr. Jack Hickerson |
Sir Oliver said that they had had a talk with the Prime Minister on the conversation in the Secretary’s office yesterday evening. His conclusion was that the President and the Prime Minister this afternoon should devote themselves first to some of the short-range problems. He understood the proposal was to lay the 6-power resolution before the General Assembly. Someone else then might be prompted to introduce a cease-fire resolution. We would attempt to push through to a vote. The Prime Minister would be happy to get these points decided this afternoon.
As a procedural matter for the meeting this afternoon, he hoped that the discussion could be kept vigorous and alive, Mr. [Sir Roger] Makins said that there was another point about holding the bridgeheads about which Field Marshal Slim wished to speak. The British understand that it is our policy to hold as long as possible and they agree generally with this but there are various things which need to be done. The Secretary agreed with what had been suggested.
There was then discussion between Mr. Rusk and Mr. Younger regarding the parliamentary procedure in the United Nations. Mr. Younger said it would be hard to let the matter lie too long unless we were inclined to think this was necessary. Mr. Rusk thought some debate on the 6-power resolution would be useful before the cease-fire resolution were introduced. Mr. Scott urged that the soundings of the Chinese Communists should take place before people make speeches on the 6-power resolution. This suggested the desirability of some interval.
There was discussion as to whether the Chinese would be present. It was pointed out that, if the matter were handled in the Political Committee, the Chinese would be there since the Committee had already agreed to have them present for the discussion of any question in which they were interested. On the other hand, there is no procedure for inviting outsiders to the Plenary in the General Assembly, and it would be difficult to do this. The Secretary thought it was not too important to sound out the Chinese. As a matter of fact, this had [Page 1391] already been done by Sir B. N. Rau who was to receive an answer on the sixth. The tone of the debate ought to be sober and would not be affected by the Chinese view just as it would not affect them or their attitude. If we get the item on the agenda today, the debate could begin tomorrow and then someone could put in the cease-fire resolution.
There was also discussion of the possible necessity of a resolution in the Security Council to take the item off the agenda. Mr. Hickerson pointed out with Tsiang as President this month this might get us into a long and unfortunate debate in the Security Council and this should be avoided. It was agreed that Mr. Hickerson and Mr. Younger would sound out the views of the French and the Norwegians in New York and see whether this technicality could be dispensed with.
Mr. Younger pointed out it was possible to begin the debate in the General Assembly regardless of Security Council action. He, however, expressed some doubt as to whether the resolution should be filed today. He suggested that certain changes ought to be made. He thought the part of it relating to the Chinese border now would seem rather silly although it was applicable to the question of bombing. Mr. Hickerson thought it desirable to leave it alone except for a few editorial changes and Sir Oliver supported this to show that we had not altered the attitude which we had already taken in the Security Council.
Sir Oliver suggested that, in the discussion of the Far Eastern question this afternoon, we should face the fundamental difficulties of view. The attitudes of the two governments on current action are conditioned by their long-range views on China. These views are different. We needn’t try to find a complete accommodation on the long-range results, but at least the United States should make the United Kingdom say what they think about China and then the United States should point out any fallacies. The United Kingdom view is that nationalism is virulent in China, that it has been transferred from Chiang to the Chinese Communists. They believe that they are both communists and Chinese, just as Tito is both a Yugoslav and a communist. The Russians were very clever in cloaking their aid to the Chinese Communists so that they have had the impression that they achieved their power by themselves. The Chinese are expansionists and have been for a long time. They now have the power to carry out this aim, and they are using it. Our main effort must be to direct that expansion in one way or another. It was therefore very important to determine our attitudes and actions toward the Chinese. If you put up a gallant fight ending up in a Chinese victory in Korea and then go on promoting friction with them by economic sanctions, etc., we don’t see where we come out. He stressed British opinion, not in terms of the wilder views appearing in the press, but the sounder judgment on the future of China. This British opinion felt that there was coincidence between Chinese and Russian views rather [Page 1392] than Chinese subservience to Russian views. If we could talk these things out, it might lead to real accommodation. The Secretary said this was correct, but we must also consider the effect of immediate actions on our long-range views. He did not think the United Kingdom would find there was a vast difference in our views regarding the result of the policy of friction. The first point is what is the cost in terms of our security in the island chain, which is very important. The second point is the whole attitude of approval of our current action. We have nursed them for 50 years of friendliness and now find them bitter against us. We feel that we want to see the Chinese Communists prove that they are our friends. Their enmity would in the long run hurt them more than it would us.
The significance of a cease-fire is the cessation of hostilities, a fact from which many other things grow. Under those circumstances, we could not carry hostilities against them.
It was agreed that Mr. Hickerson and Mr. Younger would make a brief Minute which the President and the Prime Minister could approve this afternoon.