795.00/6–2650: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
niact
[Received June 26—8:09 a. m.]
1734. Embassy has considered carefully Deptel 538, June 25 and in light information available to us up to this hour on Korean situation ventures to solicit the Department’s further study of the tactical desirability of the approach requested therein at this time. As set forth Embtel 1726, June 25, the Embassy assesses the invasion in its broadest implications as a direct challenge to the free world and US leadership thereof, but believes that determined countermeasures will deter the Soviets who are not prepared to risk the possibility of global war. Whether that appraisal is or is hot confirmed by developments, it would seem essential that tactically we handle the matter in such way as to focus our formal action on the local Korean situation and avoid formal engagement of the USSR with the North Koreans to an extent which might make it difficult for the Soviets to disassociate themselves from the North Koreans in the face of successful free world counter-action. We question whether our “bringing the matter directly to the attention of the USSR Government” and placing on the record “the universally known fact of the USSR’s controlling influence over the North Korean regime” does not tend to identify the USSR formally with the invasion forces to a degree contrary to tactical desirability.
We are inclined to feel that for the time being it might be the course of wisdom to postpone a direct approach to the Soviets on the [Page 170] merits of the issue confining our action toward Soviet participation in a settlement to the routine procedures of notification and information to which the USSR is entitled as a member of the UN (for example the procedure envisaged Depcirtel June 24, 2 p. m.).1 However, if the Department feels strongly that some direct representation should be made, we would recommend that it be confined to urging Soviet cooperation, which is of course unrealistic but might serve as a basis for appropriate Soviet withdrawal when effective counter-action will have convinced them the risks of perseverance are no longer worth taking.
I am sufficiently persuaded of the validity of the foregoing to request the Department’s further consideration. If nevertheless, the Department feels immediate approach should be made, either on the modified line above suggested or as set forth Deptel 538, I will request appointment for purpose this evening.
Department pass London, Paris, USUN, repeated info London niact 361, Paris niact 247, USUN Niact 40. Department pass Tokyo and Seoul, if desired.