Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795.00/11–2450: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

top secret
priority

Washington, November 24, 1950—8 p. m.

2752. Please deliver to Mr. Bevin immediately following personal message from the Secretary:

“I have just received word from our London Embassy that you have agreed not to present the proposal for a demilitarized zone in Korea before the arrival in New York of the Chi Commie Del on the understanding that the six-power res is not to be voted on before then. Since the del arrived today and since there will probably be a meeting of the SC early next week, I wish to lay before you in more detail than was possible in the brief message transmitted through Sir Oliver Franks on Nov 21 why I have the gravest apprehensions regarding the presentation of any such proposal pending such clarification and reconsideration of the situation following Gen Mac Arthurs offensive. My reasons are as follows:

1. Your proposal contemplates the creation of a very considerable demilitarized zone in NK. Your message of Nov 13 suggested that it would include an area running roughly from Hungnam to Chongju in the west. Gen MacArthur’s forces in the west are taking off from positions which at many points are already north of this line in an endeavor to defeat the enemy and drive them from the proposed demilitarized area in the west. In the east a substantial part of his forces are already considerably to the north of this line both along the coast and inland. Therefore, to make such a proposal at any time in the near future in the UN would be suggesting that we abandon considerable areas and population in the east which had already been brought within UN protection and in the west that we should abandon positions which may be of very considerable military importance to secure, and for which Gen MacArthur’s forces would at the very moment be putting forth a great effort under adverse circumstances and undoubtedly heavy losses. The effect of such a proposal on the conduct of military operations upon the morale of the troops, upon the morale of the Koreans and upon public opinion in the US which has furnished the great bulk of the troops would, in my opinion, be disastrous. I do not think that it is possible to fight a war or to maintain the support of the population in Korea under these circumstances.

2. Furthermore, I do not think that it is possible at this time to say that the proposal if adopted would have the benefits claimed for it. The idea of a demilitarized zone is to remove contending forces from it and interpose a buffer between them. Your message of the 13th indicates the gravest doubts as to whether the NK forces can be removed from the demilitarized territory under your proposal. So long as there is no assurance about continued organized NK resistance, I do not see how we can have any real assurance as to how the Chi, even if withdrawn from NK, can be kept from returning under such a proposal as you make. If our own forces are withdrawn from the territory and enemy forces continue to occupy it, all that we would have done under the proposal, as suggested, would be to remove the frontier considerably to the south and hamper operations without resulting benefit.

3. It also seems to me that the effect of the proposal at this time and of this nature upon the Commie Del and its Govt would be unfortunate. I believe it would be taken by them as a starting point for negotiations to obtain something much more favorable to them and as an indication of the greatest weakness upon our part. I think that we will hurt rather than advance the prospect of aiding the situation by negotiation if at this time and in this way we put forward the proposal you suggest.

4. Under these circumstances, it seems to me of the greatest importance that Gen Mac Arthurs operation be given every support by the UN and by the countries contributing forces. The results of his operation will make much more clear many matters which are now obscure, the strength and effectiveness of the Chi forces, the intention and capacity of the Commie authorities to support and reinforce them, etc. If these matters become clearer, a number of alternatives will emerge, among which we would now not wish finally to choose. By taking present military requirements as a starting point, we may be able to stabilize the political situation by proposals which originate from a position of strength and which will help to end the fighting and achieve the results of the UN on a more permanent basis.

5. I do not think I need to dwell upon the possible divisive effects of making such a proposal under the circumstances, as outlined above. I think it is an understatement to say that the reaction to it in this country at the moment that our troops are making a great effort would be most violent.

6. I think we are all trying to do the same thing—that is, to devise ways in which political action and negotiation help in the most effective way to bring about the end of the fighting and the unification of Korea under circumstances which will amply assure its neighbors that neither the UN nor any of its members have the faintest hostile intention toward them, We are, as you know, working on possible measures which would keep western forces away from direct contact with Chi or Russian forces at the Korean frontier and which would clearly demonstrate that UN forces in Korea have no purposes beyond those set by the UN. I do believe most strongly, however, that the putting forward of any proposal at this particular time would do the greatest damage.

I have given, you all my thoughts on this subject because I am deeply conscious of the gravity of the ensuing days and of the far-reaching consequences of any misstep. I shall continue, as I have in the past, to keep in the closest touch with Sir Oliver Franks and through him with, you.”

Dept. believes it might be useful for you to discuss the general lines of the above with Salisbury and Eden¹ without indicating that you had delivered formal message to Bevin on subject.

Acheson

1. The Marquess of Salisbury and Anthony Eden were respectively Leader of the Opposition in the House of Lords and Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons.