Office of the Historian

795.00/11–2150

The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to Colonel Marshall S. Carter, Executive to the Secretary of Defense

top secret
Washington, November 21, 1950.

Colonel Carter: At the meeting this afternoon Secretary Acheson expects to discuss informally the way in which our present problem in Korea shapes up as he sees it. He will not be speaking from a formal memorandum covering the subject of his remarks.

In conclusion, Secretary Acheson will suggest to the Secretary of Defense and the JCS certain points which represent our broad political objectives in Korea in the present situation. These points are listed in the attached paper. They are intended to be suggestive and are, of course, subject to further consideration. Secretary Acheson will raise with the Secretary of Defense whether it might be desirable for the JCS to consider these points and to determine what bearing they might have upon the course of our military operations in Korea and, specifically, whether General Mac Arthur’s present directives should be expanded or modified.

Dean Rusk
[Page 1204]
[Enclosure]

List of Points Prepared by the Secretary of State for Discussion With the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff

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1.
To permit UNCURK to enter North Korean provinces as soon as the security situation in each province would permit UNCURK to carry out its political functions under the October 7 Resolution of the General Assembly looking toward the unification of the country.
2.
To provide adequate security arrangements for provinces in which UNCURK is operating in order to prevent hostile attack or large-scale guerrilla disorder from blocking UNCURK’s functions.
3.
To support UN and US political action directed toward the withdrawal of the Chinese from Korea, and the surrender of North Korean remnants by military operations against enemy forces remaining in North Korea.
4.
To conserve UN, and particularly US, manpower.
5.
To establish as soon as possible ROK forces in position to take over all military responsibility for Korea, with first priority on anti-guerrilla operations and security missions along the northern frontiers.
6.
To restrict the fighting to Korea; specifically, to avoid being drawn by the Korean situation into major hostilities against Communist China.