795.00/11–1950: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received November 19—1:21 p. m.]
1051. Bevin’s proposal for “fresh approach” to Korean problem to include establishment of demilitarized area (Department infotel November 17, 2 a.m.1) presumably will be unpalatable to Soviets. Continuance hostilities engaging major portion US and some UN forces in Far East would seem to be of considerable importance to Politburo in their current world strategy and that they envisage continuance of struggle by “people of Korea” for indefinite period has been theme of all their recent pronouncements re Korea. Further, in general Soviets are disinclined to negotiate losses.
Proposal also on face unacceptable to UN as envisaging less than complete achievement UN objectives Korea, and in implying possible weakness tending encourage Communist enemy.
However, it is manifestly undesirable continue indefinitely commitment UN (particularly major portion US forces) in Far East and advantages which would accrue from effective cessation hostilities Korea should, of course, be given major consideration in determining US and UN attitude.
In any event, it would seem inadvisable, in light of seriousness of risks involved in present situation, to close the door to negotiation and we presumably wish to maintain maximum maneuverability for attainment of an appropriate solution.
Of course, if Bevin’s proposal is made and rejected by Commies, such rejection would have obvious advantage of further demonstrating (to those who for one reason or another have misgivings re righteousness of UN cause) the basic Commie objectives and degree of Commie determination to continue operations in Korea.
Obviously if Bevin’s proposal is to be voiced, the manner of its handling is of utmost importance. In this connection, my British colleague informs me that he was instructed two days ago to see Gromyko and, in emphasizing British adherence to UN objectives in Korea and [Page 1192] British conviction that those objectives do not contemplate violation of Manchurian frontier, to take occasion, if such were offered, to explore Soviet attitude toward demilitarized zone. Kelly added that British Chargé in Peking has similarly been instructed to see Chou En-lai. On grounds that Gromyko would have taken his usual position of inquiring what specifically the British had to propose, Kelly was disinclined to make the suggested approach and was in the process of so informing the Foreign Office when he received a second instruction to delay his representations pending the results of Hutchinson’s démarche in Peking.
We are apprehensive at this proposed British initiative which seems to us to play into Soviet hands in the same fashion as British talks on this subject last July. The Soviets inevitably welcome any unilateral action which could be interpreted as diminishing US–UK solidarity in that it implies divergence of views between our two governments, and British initiative in this instance can only tend to facilitate Soviet confusion of the issues. We are also unhappy for similar reasons that proposal is to be made by British at Peking, although perhaps some consolation may be had in the fact that representations there might tend to strike responsive chord among Chinese who may not be wholeheartedly in favor of course Chinese Government is now taking, presumably at Moscow instigation. In this connection, while Embassy notes statement Burmese Ambassador (and has been informed similar views are held by Pannikar and Dutch in Peking) that Chinese Government really apprehensive that US intends invade Manchuria, it seems possible to us that there may be some validity in the theory that Chinese authorities are, on the contrary, convinced we do not intend invade and would take increasing comfort in the possibility of their continuing to act with impunity if our intention to held that frontier inviolate should be over-emphasized.
We concur with Department that consideration of Bevin’s proposal should not result in postponement or interfere with action on present six-power resolution.
(Unless above information re British instructions to British Ambassador Moscow has also been received through other channels, Department, London and Paris are requested not to reveal his having discussed these matters with me.)
Repeated info priority London 198; priority Paris 210.