795.00/11–1550
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald)1
Subject: General MacArthur’s Concept of the Korean Campaign.
| Participants: | General MacArthur |
| Ambassador Sebald |
In response to my question regarding his concept of the Korean operation, General MacArthur said that his immediate objective is to destroy the bridges across the Yalu River in order to isolate the area between the present line of the UN Forces and the border. He said that he had given orders to his forces, and particularly to the Air Forces, that the border must be scrupulously observed, an order which is the object of considerable resentment on the part of many Air Force officers who complain that Communist planes use Manchuria as a sanctuary from which they operate and to which they retreat when convenient. Furthermore, the Manchurian side of the border contains many anti-aircraft batteries which are employed against UN aircraft. As part of the air campaign, the General said that orders have been given to destroy as much as possible of the built-up areas between the present UN front lines and the Yalu River, thus obviating any possibility of the Communist Forces living off the country.
With regard to Communist China, General MacArthur said that he was glad to learn of the proposed resolution calling upon Communist China to withdraw its forces from North Korea. He said that beyond this it would appear that little can be done by the UN under present circumstances, and that it looks as though the UN has now reached an impasse in so far as Communist China is concerned. He hoped that in view of Communist China’s refusal to attend the discussions in the UN (“a slap at Soviet Russia by the Chinese”), the UN would refuse to receive Communist Chinese representatives to discuss Formosa. General MacArthur said that it would be a mistake, in his opinion, to allow the Chinese Communists to dictate as to what they would or would not discuss in the United Nations.
Concomitant with the destruction of the bridges, as previously mentioned, General MacArthur said that every effort is now being made to build up the supplies for the UN Forces preparatory to an all-out offensive designed to drive the Communist Forces across the Yalu [Page 1149] River.2 The UN Forces would, of course, stop at the boundary. If this can be accomplished during the next several weeks and before the river freezes, General MacArthur feels that the Korean campaign would be at an end. Should the planned operation fail and the Communist Forces continue to stream into North Korea from Manchuria, however, he saw no alternative, from a military point of view, to bombing key points in Manchuria. He said that if this should become necessary “the fat would be in the fire”, because such operations would, in his opinion, bring about a counter-move by Soviet Russia. Such counter-move, he felt, could only lead to a spreading of the war and he therefore hoped that it would not be necessary to resort to such drastic action.
General MacArthur expressed the opinion that the entry of Communist China into the Korean war was largely motivated by the Chinese themselves, and that such entry is merely one more manifestation of what he termed “Chinese imperialistic aspirations”. He said that he is convinced that Communist China undertook the North Korean operation, the Tibetan invasion, and assistance to Ho Chi Minh on its own responsibility, and that Soviet Russia, despite its satisfaction derived from action parallel to its own objectives, has remained in the background. General MacArthur said that there is no evidence available that Soviet Russia is taking a direct part in the Korean war. While, admittedly, the materiel being used by the North Koreans and Chinese Communists is of Soviet origin, the General believed that the North Koreans and Chinese Communists have paid for such material either in cash or in kind.
General MacArthur felt that if his military operations, as envisaged above, are successful, the Korean campaign will be at an end. He expressed the opinion that the Chinese Communists would then feel that they had demonstrated their desire to be of assistance to the North Koreans, and had also proven to the world their ability to engage in a first-class war. He explained the late date of the Chinese assistance by saying that the Chinese Communists had not thought it necessary previously to enter into the war, as they had believed that the North Koreans would drive the UN Forces into the sea. It was only after the Inchon landings that it became apparent that something must be done. In consequence, considerable time was lost in the complete reorientation of the center of gravity of Chinese military force, requiring the shifting of Chinese armies and supplies from Central and South China to the northeast.
- This document was forwarded by Mr. Sebald to Assistant Secretary of State Rusk under cover of a letter dated November 15, not printed, which was received in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs on November 24. A manuscript notation on the source text indicated that the memorandum was seen by Mr. Acheson.↩
- In the daily teletype conference held on the morning of November 14, officials of G-2, Tokyo, stated that the U.N. offensive, originally scheduled to begin on November 15, had been postponed due to logistic difficulties (DA TT–4011).↩