795.00/10–450
Memorandum of Conversations, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)
Subject: Korean Operations
| Participants: | Sir Oliver Franks—British Ambassador |
| Lord Arthur W. Tedder—British Embassy | |
| Dean Rusk—Assistant Secretary of State |
Sir Oliver Franks called me at the office last night and asked if I could drop out to see him and Lord Tedder. He preferred not to come to the Department at that unusual hour in order not to arouse speculation if the press happened to get hold of it.
When I arrived at the Embassy, the British Ambassador, Lord Tedder and Mr. Graves were going over some telegrams from London. Their immediate concern was to provide the answers to some questions which London had raised on a most urgent basis about the operations in Korea. The Ambassador pointed out that he did not wish to raise any questions of policy nor to indicate that any difference of opinion existed, but merely wished to know how to reply to the specific questions on which London wished answers. He had no indication of what London might think about the matters involved.
[Page 860]The first question was whether South Korean forces are in fact north of the 38th parallel and whether they went north of the parallel in pursuance to a directive from the Unified Command. I replied that our information is that South Korean forces are in fact north of the 38th parallel along the east coast, that this advance had not penetrated initially as far as the first press reports had indicated, but that I did not know how rapidly they were moving and could not say exactly where they are.1 I stated further that I did not have precise information as to whether these forces crossed the parallel in pursuance to a specific directive from the Unified Command but that I supposed they were operating under general pursuit directives from the Unified Command.
The second question was whether any United Nations forces other than South Koreans were north of the 38th parallel. I replied that our present information is that no United Nations ground forces other than South Koreans are beyond the 38th parallel, that considerable resistance has been encountered by American forces between Seoul and the parallel, but that air and naval operations north of the 38th parallel were continuing and that raiding and demolition parties might of course be going ashore at any time as they had been throughout the operations.2
The third question was whether it is the United States view that operations by General MacArthur north of the 38th parallel are covered by the Security Council Resolution of June 27. I stated that we considered military operations by General MacArthur north of the 38th parallel to be covered by the June 27 Resolution, that there is a hostile army in the field which is still shooting at United Nations forces, that this army continues to operate throughout South Korea wherever it can do so, that it has refused to disgorge its American prisoners of war, and that it shows every indication of continuing the fight. In this circumstance we consider it militarily necessary for General MacArthur to continue the fight in whatever way seems appropriate to him and the 38th parallel would not itself impose a barrier, I stated, however, that we did not consider the June 27 Resolution in itself to represent a broad political-military objective looking toward the occupation of all of Korea for the purpose of bringing about a particular political result. This, we thought, would follow [Page 861] from further United Nations action of the sort now being considered by Committee 1.
The final question was whether General MacArthur had received instructions to go north of the 38th parallel and the nature of these instructions. The telegram from the Foreign Office stated that Gascoigne (UK) in Tokyo3 had been informed by General MacArthur that he was under strict instructions not to operate north of the 38th parallel without a specific directive from the President. Sir Oliver then said he thought that I ought to know that he knew about certain plans which were in existence for execution within a “finite time”, and that he was not clear how Gascoigne’s report and this information fitted together. He outlined the content of such plans sufficiently to make it evident that he had received excellent information, although he did not disclose the source or the channel. I told him that General MacArthur had received an operational policy directive which permitted operations north of the 38th parallel, that he had been asked to refer his plans for such operations back to Washington for approval in order that Washington could take a good look at the situation in the United Nations and the Russian and Chinese aspects before the plans were executed. I told him that General MacArthur had submitted such plans and that he had been given general approval although I could not tell him whether it would be necessary for General MacArthur to get a final word from Washington before carrying out his plans. I told him this was a matter of ignorance on my part since the matter had been handled on a very high level while I was in New York, but I reminded him that the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercised continuing responsibility and supervision for the source [course] of operations in Korea.
Sir Oliver stated that he thought the information I had provided would be helpful to London and would give them something to “chew” on pending the arrival of Mr. Bevin and Mr. Dening on Wednesday. I told Sir Oliver I felt that Mr. Dening had very considerable background on these matters which I had given him in New York and which would be most useful to the Foreign Office upon Mr. Dening’s arrival.
Sir Oliver then asked me whether I could give him any further information on Wednesday morning4 on the particular point as to whether General MacArthur requires any further check with Washington before carrying out his plans. I told him that I would let him hear from me on Wednesday morning.
[Page 862]After talking the above over with Mr. Matthews, I called the British Ambassador on the morning of October 5 [4?] and told him—
- (1)
- We do not know whether the South Koreans moved north of the 38th Parallel on specific order of the Unified Command but presumed the South Koreans had a general pursuit directive and that the Unified Command was responsible for their operations whether a specific directive was issued or not.
- (2)
- We do not know whether General MacArthur would be required to make a last minute check with Washington before moving north of the 38th Parallel with United Nations forces, but that Washington was following the situation on a day-to-day basis; in any event, it might be useful for Lord Tedder to have a talk with General Bradley, to which the Ambassador agreed.
- ROK patrols crossed the 38th parallel on September 30, and the ROK army advanced past the frontier in strength during the next two days. On October 3, General MacArthur made the first public official announcement of the crossing of the parallel. (Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 615)↩
- U.S. forces crossed into North Korea on October 7 and commenced fighting northward above the 38th parallel on October 9. (Ibid., p. 623)↩
- Alvary Gascoigne, U.K. Political Representative in Japan.↩
- October 4.↩