795B.5/10–350
The Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Secretary of State
Dear Mr. Secretary: The Department of Defense has considered the memoranda of 16 September 1950 and 22 September 1950 from Deputy Under Secretary of State Matthews to Major General J. H. Burns, dealing with matters relating to the termination of Korean hostilities.
The Department of Defense perceives no objection, from the military point of view, to those matters, in both of the letters, which are primarily within its purview. From the standpoint of execution by the field command, the proposals in these memoranda are entirely feasible and practicable.
With regard to the “Program for the Cessation of Hostilities,” the Department of Defense notes the effort of the Department of State to gain as favorable a reception as possible in the General Assembly for all parts of this program, and is in accord therewith. The Department of Defense would like to offer for your consideration the following suggestions, which are based on study and comment by the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force:
- 1)
- A provision might be included in paragraph A for the reorientation of captured North Korean troops before their return to their homes in North Korea, insofar as this is practicable in view of local conditions. It is important to our long-term objectives, in accordance with paragraph 22 of NSC 81/1,1 to render these troops as politically harmless as possible and to rehabilitate the majority of them for reliable service in the post-hostilities period.
- 2)
- U.S. planning should allow for the possibility that North Korean civil authorities may not be able or willing to maintain law and order north of the 38°, pending the assumption of control by the Government of the Republic of Korea. In case of a complete breakdown of authority in areas north of the 38°, the U.N. forces should be prepared to assume direct responsibility for civil affairs.
- 3)
- In the light of the contingency mentioned in paragraph 2, and the responsibilities that may fall upon the United Nations’ Command, the U.S. Government should seek the immediate creation of adequate U.N. organizations to handle the tremendous problems that will follow hostilities. It would appear that the present U.N. Commission for Korea is neither staffed nor equipped to meet all these problems. Therefore, the U.N. should create either one single combined or three separate agencies to handle the three major problems of relief and reconstruction, political unification, and the immediate and long-range security of Korea.
- 4)
- Paragraph 5B of the Program makes reference, by implication, to the possibility of war criminal trials. It is questionable whether the U.S. should commit itself to trying war criminals without the most careful consideration of the situation since, in any case, the real war criminals will not be reachable by any judicial process.
I wish to state, in conclusion, that the Department of Defense continues to believe that as few U.S. troops as possible should engage in the physical occupation and pacification of areas north of the 38°, once organized military hostilities have ended. It remains important, therefore, to increase the number of other U.N. troops sent to Korea, particularly from countries in Asia.
Faithfully yours,