IO Files
Minutes of the Twelfth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly
[Here follows a list of persons present (48).]
1. Composition of Korean Commission (US/A/C.1/1989)1
The Secretary considered that there were three main choices with respect to the membership of the Special Korean Commission provided for in the British resolution.
1. The Department had recommended that neither the United States, the United Kingdom or the USSR should be on the commission. The British agreed with this view. He saw one great difficulty, however, in that such a commission might not be very vigorous and American leadership would be helpful.
[Page 840]2. The second alternative was to include the United States, but not the Soviet Union. While this would be highly desirable, if it could be done, it did raise certain difficulties in that it might result in loss of support for the resolution from states such as India.
3. The third alternative was to include the three Great Powers, although this would be almost certain to result in complete frustration of our own efforts, since a commission with Soviet representatives had never worked satisfactorily. There would inevitably be long speeches on the subject of American aggression and imperialism and the commission would never make any progress.
As the Secretary saw it, those were the choices open to the United States. After thinking it over and deciding that each of the three alternatives had disadvantages, his personal choice was to include neither the Soviets nor the United States. In his view, it would be almost impossible to explain including the Soviets to American public opinion, since it seemed inconsistent to fight a war and then to put the enemy on the peace commission. If we were not represented, he foresaw American criticism, but he thought the public would generally understand why we had not insisted on membership.
Ambassador Austin was moved by the Secretary’s judgment. His own first thought had been that our stake in Korea was so great that we had to be on the commission. However, he had suggested to others that it was important to consult widely on this problem and consequently believed there was still time to canvass opinion with respect to the composition of the commission. Tentatively he favored the Secretary’s viewpoint.
Mrs. Roosevelt believed it utterly impossible to include both the Soviets and ourselves on the commission. She thought the recommended slate of small states was the best which could be done, considered from the standpoint of trying to preserve the United Nations. At the same time, she thought there were a tremendous number of people who would feel that, because so many of our boys had been killed in Korea, if we did not achieve a democratic Korea it would be because we had shirked our duty and refused membership on the commission. For this reason, our position would be hard to get across. Possibly we could argue that this type of commission was the best way to achieve a democratic Korea. Nevertheless, she was nervous about the public reaction.
Senator Sparkman felt very much as Mrs. Roosevelt did. However, he would personally prefer to see a strong commission without the United States and the Soviet Union. If such a commission could do the job, that was the best alternative. However, if we did decide to eliminate ourselves from membership, he believed we should concentrate every effort on getting a strong commission that could and would do the necessary job in Korea.
[Page 841]From the Congressional standpoint, Senator Lodge had no doubt that the best arrangement would be the inclusion of the United States and the exclusion of the Soviet Union. Referring to the unhappy memories left by UNRRA, he considered that a number of Congressmen would go along with our policy more readily if the United States were included. He agreed with Mrs. Roosevelt that it would be difficult to explain our not being on to the American public. The situation might be helped, he believed, if a well-known American, who had the confidence of the Congress, could be included in the top staff of the commission. He still thought that it would be best to have the United States represented directly, both from the standpoint of Congress and the efficiency of the commission. From the overall political viewpoint, however, he saw the Secretary’s argument for a commission of small states.
The Secretary thought this was correct. He went on to say that in any case the economic side of the Korean operation would be separately organized, probably under American direction. Senator Lodge thought it would be desirable to have an American in this post so that he could go before the Congress to explain the Korean program. If that could be accomplished without including the United States on the commission, he believed that we would successfully break the back of the public reaction to our exclusion.
The Secretary emphasized the fact that there would be operating in Korea the United Nations Commander, an American; a director of reconstruction; and the proposed commission, whose chief job would be to bring about the political unification of Korea. He observed that some [difficulty?] might be anticipated as the result of the Republic of Korea’s insistence that it was sovereign in the area. He forecast that the Republic would announce that its authority covered North Korea.
Mr. Dulles asked whether the commission would have any authority over military operations. Responding in the negative, Mr. Bancroft indicated that the most important people in Korea would continue to be the Unified Command and the Economic Director. Mr. Dulles was uncertain whether the commission would interpret its authority in such a way that the military and economic officers were the more important. He noted that the resolution appeared to give the commission rather broad authority. He hoped that the debate and legislative history of the Korean resolution would clarify the authority of the commission. The Secretary recalled that General MacArthur would continue in command and did not foresee that he would have any difficulty in dealing with the commission. Mr. Dulles thought, nevertheless, that some friction might develop. Mr. Allison pointed out that the theory of the resolution was that the commission should not really begin to operate or have any authority to intervene until the military operations in Korea were concluded.
[Page 842]Mr. Cohen felt on balance that the recommendation of the Department was the best of the alternatives, though he agreed, like the others, that it had some drawbacks. He foresaw a real problem with respect to the authority of the Commission over the Military Command. The greatest difficulty would not be as regards authority over the military command in cases where it could be shown that action was taken under the Security Council resolutions, but in cases where question arose as to the authority of the military, where the advice of the Commission would become important. If the military were simply keeping order, he doubted whether the Commission would be in a position to interfere. The more difficult problem was that of coordination; there he saw room for some friction. He agreed that it would be desirable to get an American to head up the economic operation.
Senator Lodge asked whether it was true that the Commission would be carrying out some rehabilitation. The Secretary referred to the terms of the resolution and noted that the Economic and Social Council would be responsible for general planning in this area. The Commission might give some political guidance to this work. Senator Lodge observed that the Congressional reaction would partly depend upon whether the Commission would be empowered to spend money or not. Mr. Cohen noted that from the viewpoint of good administration, we would want to keep the commission free from the detail necessarily involved in the economic operation. Senator Lodge asked how the reconstruction plans would be developed. Mr. Cohen assumed we would try to get our ideas accepted in the Economic and Social Council. The Secretary thought we would wish to have a single person to administer the relief operation.
Senator Cooper thought it would not be acceptable to anyone to include the Soviets on the new Korean Commission. He favored the alternative supported by the Secretary, and believed that the fact that General MacArthur would continue to head up the military opperation and that an American would probably be selected to direct the rehabilitation program would outweigh other considerations. The Commission would have to consult both, and in that way, the United States would undoubtedly be able to exercise great influence. He accordingly did not fear not having the United States represented on the Commission. Also, he wondered whether this position might not obviate our difficulties with the Republic of Korea. He thought it would be desirable to have Canada on the Commission; its membership would be helpful in creating confidence in this country in the Commission. Senator Lodge believed it would be unfortunate if after the magnificent effort in Korea, anyone could ever say that the affair had fizzled because we setup a commission which was not sufficient for the task before it. He hoped this was an imaginary rather than a real danger.
[Page 843]Senator Sparkman considered there was still another viewpoint to be taken into consideration. The American people were pretty well sold oil the idea that Korea was a United Nations affair; that had been difficult at first, but now the idea that the United Nations was handling Korea had been accepted. We should be careful not to give the impression that the United Nations belonged to the United States. He rather believed that the establishment of the Commission, without the United States or Russia, as suggested, with the assurance that people were included who will lend vigor to it, would be the better part of wisdom in carrying on the idea of the United Nations rather than the United States acting in Korea. Senator Lodge agreed if we could get representatives with vigor.
Ambassador Gross saw the primary advantage of our not being on the Commission in the fact that, at least superficially, we would not be blamed for everything which happened. Nevertheless, he leaned toward putting the United States on the Commission or at least making itself available for service on the Commission at the will of our colleagues. We should be ready for service if wanted, but suggested the matter should be left in the hands of our colleagues. He was troubled by the fact that when India, in the Security Council, proposed a commission of non-permanent members, it had been done on the theory that small states were neutral and thus synonymous with disinterested parties. When a commission of this sort was established, it meant that almost no member had any interest in the subject as a matter of national policy so success would depend on the individuals which actually served on the Commission. He concluded from this that the major powers—particularly the United States—could not escape their responsibilities. If the Commission fell apart because of lack of interest from the small states represented on it, we would get the blame, since the world would realize that we had been the determining element in this situation.
The Secretary said that he had not supposed we would refuse to serve if there were a general demand for us, and the Russians were not included. Senator Sparkman agreed absolutely with Ambassador Gross. The Secretary stated that what he had in mind was that there was no chance of our membership without the Soviets. The moment our inclusion was suggested the Soviets would insist upon being put on; there would be a great sense of fright and there would result the compromise of including both. He referred to Ambassador Gross’ remarks about the Indians, and said he had understood the Indians were being very cagey about their interest. Mr. Bancroft indicated that India would not wish to be included if the United States were represented.
Ambassador Gross did not trust that judgment on India. The Indians were playing the situation both ways. India wanted to be on the [Page 844] Commission and to serve as its chairman. However, he agreed it was difficult to know just what the Indians really wanted. He did not think we should permit the Indian position to deter us from being on the Commission. He thought we should simply let our general willingness to serve, if wanted, be known. The Secretary observed that the resolution’s sponsors did not want the United States on the Commission.
Mrs. Sampson2 was concerned about the possible reaction of the American people. She said that she would like to see an attempt made to have the United States represented; she thought the majority of the United Nations members would like to see us on the Commission and that we belonged there.
With all due respect to the various views expressed, Mr. Ross considered that it was wishful thinking to try to set up a neutral commission, full of vigor, since all our experience with commissions—particularly when the United States was not a member—despite promises made of good personnel, showed that they simply did not work out that way. He believed that so-called neutral commissions were weak and generally lacked good members. If there were a general desire for the United States to be included on the Commission, in his opinion that definitely entailed the risk of Soviet membership. In this connection, he recalled that the Soviets had proposed a commission composed of states bordering on Korea. Other members might well regard that position as a reasonable one and wish to give the Soviets a seat—there would be a good deal of sympathy for that position. Senator Lodge thought this showed disregard for the Russians’ role as war criminals. Mr. Ross said he was certain that if the United States wished to be on the Commission it would increase the desire of some members to include the Soviets. He recommended as the course we should follow the adoption of a neutral slate as an indication of the slate we would be prepared to accept, but at the same time we would make clear that if there were a strong desire for us to serve, we would accept, but would be opposed to the inclusion of the Soviets.
Mr. Sandifer observed that there was a calculated risk in not having the United States represented. The Department thinking was that we had taken a large part in the conduct of hostilities, and that subsequent action in Korea should be shared by other members. The Department was also interested in obtaining as much leadership in Korea as possible from the Asian members, particularly India, possibly as its chairman. Mr. Sandifer noted that there might be a question with respect to India in view of the present Indian attitude, but it still seemed to him, if it was possible to work it out, that it was desirable [Page 845] to have India, and that it would be the logical chairman. He observed that there was always a difficulty in getting states to appoint capable people to United Nations bodies. This had been especially true of the Korean Commission. India had not had an effective member, and neither had Turkey or the Philippines. The Department had thought it important to have a responsible state from Latin America; El Salvador had not delivered on the old Commission. When everything was balanced, he sympathized with Mr. Ross and Ambassador Gross, but felt almost bound to take the risk of not having the United States included, and to rely on our influence through the Unified Command and the Economic Director. He indicated that the Department’s tentative thinking on the latter problem was in the terms suggested by the Secretary of a single United Nations administrator for the economic side of the operation. This could solve a very considerable part of the problem. The success of the Korean operation required responsible participation by other members, particularly by the neighbors of Korea.
The Secretary suggested that the matter be left in such a way as to make clear our determination to have a vigorous commission. The United States would be willing and glad to serve on such a commission if that was the desire of the members, but we were not seeking membership. We were absolutely opposed to any Russian or satellite being represented, and if any member felt considering membership for the United States required Russian inclusion, we would make it clear that we did not desire membership under that condition. We should do it in that way so as not to appear coy.
Senator Lodge observed that a rough test for the success of the Commission would be whether we could get a unified Korea. In the event we did not obtain a vigorous commission and it looked as if we were not getting anywhere, he wondered whether we had enough influence through General MacArthur and the “almighty dollar” to take care of the situation. The Secretary did not believe we could guarantee anything. The Commission would not provide the whole answer to the Korean problem. A good commission could do a lot to help, and a poor one could do some harm. An intermediate one would not do much either way.
Mr. Dulles thought that one of the practical problems would involve the relations between the Commission and General MacArthur. He foresaw the possibility of a frightful row between the two, if India, for example, was on the Commission, insisting upon policies which disagreed with what General MacArthur considered to be sound. The same situation might arise with the Philippines; in this connection Mr. Dulles recalled his attempt to get General MacArthur to permit Romulo to come either to Tokyo or Korea, which the General vehemently [Page 846] resisted because of the Baguio Conference and other matters. There had also been difficulties with Australia in the past; the Secretary commented that in that case it had been the individual involved. Mr. Dulles hoped the change in the Australian Government might improve that situation, though this had not yet been sufficiently tested to be sure what would happen. He thought that it would be unfortunate to have any clash between the new Commission and the Unified Command. He hoped everything would be done to make sure that there was a chance for their working together in harmony.
Mr. Cohen thought that if we could arrange to substitute Canada for one of the other states on the Commission and, by talking to Mr. Pearson, make clear that we were depending upon Canada to send their ablest man as representative, some of our difficulties could be met. Mr. Dulles suggested a Canadian chairman would be helpful, and Mr. Cohen concurred.
Senator Lodge did not want to hear the criticism that America had won the war but once again lost the peace. If we considered the choice of this Commission in the abstract, we might get into trouble. He believed it should be hand-picked so that we would know what we were getting. In his view this matter was as important in its way as the June 25 resolution had been with respect to the military aspect of the matter. Senator Cooper asked whether we might not insist on countries appointing able, well-known individuals; this would provide some insurance against the Commission’s failure.
The Secretary asked when this matter would come to the vote. Mr. Bancroft replied this afternoon. He observed that Canada did not wish to serve on the Commission. Mr. Raynor suggested that we might talk to Mr. Pearson; he noted that Canada wished to see the Commission weighted with Asian states. Mr. Popper pointed out the difficulty of including both Australia and Canada. The Secretary said that he would speak to Mr. Pearson this morning to ascertain the Canadian reaction. Mr. Bancroft noted that it would be important also to determine the sentiment toward United States membership; if that was unanimously opposed by the sponsors of the resolution, there was nothing we could do.
Mr. Lubin said that, as regards the rehabilitation administrator, it had been tentatively thought that if we did not get a qualified American, we should look for a Canadian. He suggested this factor should be borne in mind in connection with consideration of Canada for membership on the Commission. Ambassador Gross thought someone on the Delegation should speak to the Secretary General about the necessity for including top-flight personnel on the staff of the Commission.
[Page 847]The Secretary said that it seemed to him that there was in the Delegation some strong feeling that the United States should be included on the Commission but at the same time there was an equally strong feeling that this should not be at the price of the inclusion of the Soviets or a satellite. Mr. Dulles agreed to this latter point, subject to the qualification that a strong commission could be established without the United States.