795B.58/6–2350

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

secret
No. 660

Ref: WARX–81993, April 20, 1950 to Chief, KMAG1

Subject: Transmitting Plan for Reduction of KMAG Personnel

There are enclosed, for the Department’s information and consideration, copies of an exchange of self-explanatory communications between the Chief, KMAG and the Embassy on the subject of the proposed reduction in KMAG personnel. KMAG was instructed, by the Department of Army in radio message WARX–81993, April 20, 1950, a copy of which is presumably available to the Department, to submit such a plan after consultation with the Embassy. Following several discussions with General Roberts and Colonel Wright,2 the reduction outlined in the enclosure to the Chief, KMAG’s letter of June 22, 1950 was found acceptable in so far as it related to Army and police advisory duties. The Embassy’s views regarding Coast Guard and Air Force advisory personnel, apart from those having been transmitted to the Department in various telegrams and despatches, are set forth in the Embassy’s letter of June 23, 1950 to the Chief, KMAG.

Briefly, the proposed plan provides for a reduction in KMAG personnel from a total of 472 to 242 (exclusive of Coast Guard). Officer strength is slated to decline from 181 to 96 and enlisted men from 283 to 139. Despite the severity of this proposed reduction, provision has [Page 122] been made for retention of officers and enlisted men in the field at approximately their present strength. In this way close supervision will continue to be exercised over Korean Army units through the regimental level—an essential desideratum if Korean Army units are to be maintained at an efficient level. Under the reduction plan, the Engineer and Ordnance sections of KMAG will be strengthened in order better to handle the expected flow of MDA supplies and equipment, which should reach a high level in the calendar year 1951. Some reduction is envisaged in officers assigned to the various schools, but it is believed that this can now be done without impairing the efficiency of the schools which are now well established and operating under definite curricula. Most of the contemplated reductions will be found in Headquarters personnel. Various logistic functions, such as the motor pool, are being turned over in their entirety to Joint Administrative Services, with the result that officers and enlisted men in such spaces can be spared.

The Embassy, after careful consideration, is of the view that the reductions proposed can be effected after January 1, 1951 without any appreciable impairment of the ROK Security Forces. The Korean Army, in particular, has made enormous progress during the past year; and the systems and institutions set up through the instrumentality of KMAG are now such that reductions in advisory personnel can well be made.3

For the Ambassador:
Everett F. Drumright

Counselor of Embassy

Enclosure 1

secret

The Chief of the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (Sturies) to the Ambassador in Korea (Muccio)

Sir: In accordance with instructions contained in WARX 81993, dated 20 April 1950, I have the honor to submit herewith for your consideration the detailed plan for the reduction of KMAG.4

[Page 123]

This plan envisions a one-time reduction with an effective date of 1 January 1951. Normal attrition, curtailment of extensions and suspension of requisitions will be utilized to achieve a smooth reduction and obviate the necessity for reporting large numbers of officers and men for reassignment to other commands.

Please note that since our last informal discussion of the problem it has been deemed advisable to increase the strength of both Engineer and Ordnance advisory sections each by two officers. This increase has been motivated by consideration of the problems involved in those two sections in handling MDAP supplies and equipment, and in the progress made by the Engineers in affecting major economies. As approximately seventy five (75) percent of the dollar value of the MDAP program for Korea is in ordnance materiel, it is considered essential that the maximum supervision be exercised over this type of equipment. The addition of two Engineer officers is justified on the grounds that Engineer advisors are currently achieving remarkable results in saving ROK many millions of won by insuring proper utilization of Korean Army engineers in preference to hiring civilian contractors for construction or rehabilitation projects;

It would be appreciated if you would indicate your concurrence at your earliest convenience in order that the proposed Table of Distribution may be submitted to Department of the Army with the least practicable delay.

Carl H. Sturies

Lt. Col., Sig. C

Enclosure 2

secret

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Chief of the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (Sturies)

Sir: I have received your letter of June 22, 1950, with which you submitted a detailed plan, pursuant to instructions contained in WARX 81993, for the reduction of KMAG personnel to take effect from January 1, 1951.

I note that the plan submitted by you corresponds generally with the plan originally agreed upon in consequence of informal discussions with General Roberts and Colonel Wright, except for the changes outlined in the third paragrah of your letter. I fully agree that the Engineer and Ordnance advisory sections should be strengthened in order to handle MDA equipment and supplies to the best effect.

In so far as your plan relates to Army and police advisory duties, it has my full concurrence. I note, however, that the plan includes no provision for Coast Guard advisors who have hitherto been carried as [Page 124] a part of the KMAG complement. I strongly feel, as I am sure you do, that the United States must retain and even strengthen its Coast Guard advisory personnel. I wish, therefore, to go on record as endorsing the written request which went forward from the Chief KMAG to the Department of the Army, under date of April 1, 1950, for the strengthening of the advisory group to the Coast Guard.5 The financing of the Coast Guard advisory group is obviously a matter for determination in Washington.

While, under existing policy, the inclusion of Air Force advisory personnel in the KMAG complement would not be proper, I am hopeful that a top-level decision will be taken in Washington, in accordance with the recommendations set forth in the Embassy’s telegram no. 744, May 23, 1950, to the Department of State, which will permit of the inclusion of Air Force advisory personnel in the KMAG complement.6

Very truly yours,

John J. Muccio
  1. Not printed.
  2. Col. Sterling Wright, who had been Chief of Staff of KMAG, assumed command of the Group pending the arrival of a new Chief following the departure of General Roberts from Korea on June 15. At this time, Colonel Wright was in Japan and Lt. Col. Carl H. Sturies was in temporary command of KMAG. (See Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, p. 119.)
  3. Under cover of despatch no. 661, June 23, from Seoul, not printed, Ambassador Muccio transmitted copies of the semiannual report of KMAG for the period from January 1 to June 15, 1950, the latter date having been advanced 15 days to coincide with the departure of General Roberts from Korea. The concluding portions of despatch no. 661 read as follows:

    “… It is hoped that every effort will be made to expedite the shipment to Korea of items critically needed. It is also hoped that an affirmative decision will be reached regarding the additional fiscal year 1950 MDA program which is now under consideration in Washington.

    “The continued progress made by the Korean Security Forces during the first half of the calendar year is yet another indication of the fine performance of KMAG. General Roberts and his staff have worked exceedingly hard and are entitled to the highest commendation.” (795B.58/6–2350)

  4. Not printed.
  5. Not printed; the substance of the request is given in Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, p. 92.
  6. See footnote 3 to telegram 744, May 23, from Seoul, p. 87.