Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795.00/9–750

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

[Extracts]

top secret

[Washington,] September 7, 1950.

NSC Meeting¹

1. Action at the NSC on the Korean paper.² The paper has been approved, subject to the senior staff members from State and Defense getting together, principally on Paragraphs 15 and 17.

General Bradley’s comments seemed to be that the paper contemplated a stabilization at the 38th Parallel, whereas, if General MacArthur could destroy the North Korean forces, then President Rhee might proclaim an election and police the whole country north of the 38th Parallel with Korean forces. He had not had time to study the paper closely but felt that it would preclude this.

I said that it had no such effect, and that Paragraph 15 should be rewritten to make it clear that if there was to be an actual invasion north of the 38th Parallel with fighting forces—American, etc.,—that decision had to be made in Washington.³

I also explained the trouble with Paragraph 17.⁴ The President, Secretary Johnson and General Bradley agreed and thought there would be no problem about the paper. I am attaching General Bradley’s memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, copy of which he gave me.⁵

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4. After the meeting General Bradley and Secretary Johnson raised with the President another bombing of Rashin. They said that one-quarter of the oil supplies of North Korea were at this point, and Secretary Johnson thought that it was the point through which most of the tanks came.

They wanted to bomb the installations and marshalling yards. They said they would do this, if the President approved, in daylight so as to be certain of not violating the border.

The President asked my opinion.

I said that I was not so much worried about violating the border as I was about bombing so close to the Soviet border and in so sensitive a spot; that it might provoke attack on the bombing expedition or Soviet reaction in the direction of occupying some or all of North Korea. If these eventualities occurred, or either of them, we would lose far more than we would gain by knocking out the gasoline.

I also spoke about the danger of another action on our part in a sensitive area so soon after the episode of the plane.

General Bradley asked whether some postponement of the operation would be useful.

The President expressed considerable worry about the matter and asked the JCS to review the situation, asked me to review it, and asked that Defense and State get together and discuss the matter before laying it before him.

I would like Mr. Matthews to take charge of this and have a word with me at the 9:30 meeting tomorrow.

1. The 67th meeting of the National Security Council was held on September 7.
2. Reference is to NSC 81, September 1, p. 685.

3. Under cover of a memorandum dated September 7, not printed, to Mr. Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State Rusk forwarded the following proposed revisions in Paragraph 15 of NSC 81:

   “1. Paragraph 15, 2nd sentence.

   Delete the first four words, and substitute the phrase indicated:

   It would be expected that the UN Commander would be authorized to conduct …

   2. Paragraph 15, bottom of page 6.

   Insert the following additional sentence after the 2nd sentence of paragraph 15, bottom of page 6:

   Since such operations would involve a risk of major war with the Soviet Union and would directly involve the interests of other friendly governments, the UN Commander, should prior to putting any such plan into execution, obtain the approval of the President in order that he may give consideration at the time to time various elements involved.” (NSC Files)

4. The following revisions were proposed for Paragraph 17:

   “3. Paragraph 17, 3rd sentence.

   Delete the introductory word “However”. Begin the sentence with “If”.

   4. Paragraph 17, last sentence at bottom of page 7.

   Delete this sentence and substitute the indicated sentence.

   It is assumed that Soviet occupation down to the 38th parallel would be accompanied by the withdrawal of North Korean forces behind the 38th parallel. Otherwise new decisions would have to be made as to the nature of U.N. military operations in the area.” ( Ibid. )

5. Infra.