795.00/9–450: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

secret

159. For background purposes only, I have had increasing difficulty in dissuading President Rhee from making harmful public statements and actions; following are two illustrations:

a. On August 6, I outlined to President and later to war cabinet American proposal to include 100 Korean recruits directly into each American military unit. President said war cabinet were enthusiastic that Koreans were to be intermingled with Americans. Recruiting for Korean forces at rate of 1,000 a day was continued and additional accelerated recruitment for Americans was highly satisfactory to UN Commander Korea both as regards numbers and quality.

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In Pusan the military and Youth Corps later resorted to impressment. Strong inducement tactics were probably used elsewhere. Without consulting cabinet, President issued order stopping all conscription. This delayed recruitment. I called on President and pointed out that I also was against forceful impressment but could not understand why Youth Corps, particularly its Youth Guard component and Student Defense League, were not tapped to furnish the requirements of Korean Army and UN forces. These two organizations appeared to be using their “goon” squads to impress other youth and were not furnishing any their own members. He brushed the query aside with “You do not understand the Youth Corps”. I countered that the Youth Corps, especially the Youth Guard which had received six weeks’ intensive military training last summer, and members of the Student Defense League should be called forward, inasmuch as everyone said that they were burning with patriotic fervor and only needed arms to defend the country. That President Rhee has not changed his mind in keeping Youth Corps as sort of “citizens’ army” was reflected in his statement implementing conscription law that members Youth Guard Corps and Student Defense League are to register but are not to be drafted.

b. For about a month now President has been champing to issue statement “condemning negotiations behind his back”. About two weeks ago President drafted message to the 53 nations supporting Korean case which he proposed issuing simultaneously to press, to effect that Korea would recognize no settlement in negotiations of which he had not participated, that Korean forces would not stop at 38th parallel, etc. Noble cautioned against such action. Some days later his new director of OPI called and showed me text similar original message. His FonMin called with another message to India that its position was hurting Korea. I cautioned in strongest terms possible any message, particularly messages as drafted, which publicly questioned motives of President Truman and other leaders spearheading fight against aggression as giving aid and comfort to enemy. I suggested that if President insisted on making his position clear, to do so by instructing his ambassador in Washington to do this informally with authorities there. FonMin accepted suggestion. Several days later director of OPI issued greatly watered down statement to non-Korean correspondents, text of which is being cabled separately.1

Sent Department 159, repeated information CINCFE for General MacArthur only.

Muccio
  1. Not printed.