Executive Secretariat Files: NSC 80

Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)

top secret
NSC 80

Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on Peace Offensive Concerning Korea

On the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and with the concurrence of the President, the enclosed memorandum by the Joint [Page 684] Secretaries on the subject is circulated herewith for the information of the National Security Council and the Secretary of the Treasury and referred to the NSC Staff for use in the preparation of a report for Council consideration.

James S. Lay, Jr.
[Enclosure]

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense

Subject: Peace Offensives Concerning Korea

Statement

1. The past few weeks have produced the outline of the pressures for compromises in Korea. The Soviets have plunged into an avalanche of words on peace, U.S. aggression, and civil war. India, and other UN members, are seeking ways to end hostilities as soon as possible. Unless skillfully managed, these and other efforts plus growing casualty lists may build up into an uncontrollable demand for a settlement that would nullify the heroic resistance of American and South Korean troops and injure U.S. interests.

2. In a few weeks, barring large-scale entry of Chinese Communist or Soviet forces into Korea, a military stalemate may develop. This stalemate possibly could last several months. It is a bleak prospect for our troops, the American people, and the UN cause. In anticipation of this possibility, vigorous action on the psychological and diplomatic front, based on well-considered policy directives, should be undertaken by the United States almost immediately.

Recommendation

We strongly urge that you request the National Security Council staff to prepare a report on the courses of action to be taken to offset the psychological and diplomatic effects of a stalemate in Korea. Such actions would be taken, on the President’s approval, with a view to bridging the gap until sufficient military force is available to launch a successful offensive in Korea.1

Frank Pace, Jr.

Secretary of the Army
Dan A. Kimball

Acting Secretary of the Navy
Thomas K. Finletter

Secretary of the Air Force
  1. At its 69th meeting on October 12, 1950, the National Security Council, on the recommendation of the NSC Senior Staff, agreed to cancel this project (NSC Action No. 369c).