795.00/8–2150
The Secretary of Defense (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
My Dear Mr. Secretary: I have Mr. Webb’s letter of August 16 on the bombing of Najin. The bombing of Najin was directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in accordance with their military responsibilities for the conduct of war operations. Najin is one of a number of highly important military targets in North Korea, all of which must be rendered incapable, as far as our forces are able, of providing logistic support to North Korean forces, if the success of our Korean operations is not to be seriously jeopardized. Your earlier objection to the attack which had already been made upon Najin was discussed with the President and the attack met with his approval.
Najin, being seventeen miles south of the North Korean frontier, is, of course, well clear of that frontier and its bombing is, accordingly, within the terms of the Presidential directive mentioned by you with respect to keeping bombing operations north of the 38th parallel “well clear” of the frontier. Also, the bombing of Najin is definitely within the terms of that same directive which authorized the extension of air operations “into Northern Korea against air bases, depots, tank farms, troop columns and other such purely military targets, if and when, in your judgment, this becomes essential for the performance of your missions ….. or to avoid unnecessary casualties to our forces.” In connection with the foregoing, I must make plain, further, that the “well clear” restriction is, in my opinion, intended only to guard against the possibility of frontier violation and not to provide for political determination as to which military objectives within the area of North Korea may or may not be bombed.
The primary target at Najin is a petroleum storage plant. This petroleum storage plant is obviously a military asset to the operations [Page 614] of North Korean forces and, therefore, important to our own forces as a military target which must, in the interests of successful conduct of our own operations, be attacked until destroyed.
I cannot agree with the implication that the opinions of columnists, to the effect that our actual Najin objectives are the reduction of Soviet strategic capabilities or their submarine capabilities in the area, can properly be regarded as factual. Further, I cannot agree that the possibility of Soviet conclusion that our purpose is to reduce their strategic capabilities should logically have special weight in the matter. Otherwise, it would follow that our entire Korean campaign is, or may be, so regarded by the Soviets, thus placing in question practically all military features of our Korean operations.
While I share your concern as to the over-all implications of possible eventual Korean developments and, in fact, as to the entire international situation, I am convinced that there must be no weakening exception to our military effort within Korean territory if we are to permit responsible military authorities to perform their required missions and if we are to avoid unnecessary casualties to our own forces, particularly in the light of the precarious situation now existing in Korea.
I firmly believe in the importance of political considerations in politico-military decisions. However, I also believe that the conduct of military operations, once we are committed to such operations, are not subject to question in detail as long as they are conducted within the terms of the over-all decision and as long as our military commanders are held responsible for their successful conclusion.
In short, once war operations are undertaken, it seems to me that they must be conducted to win. To any extent that external appearances are permitted to conflict with or hamper military judgment in actual combat decision, the effectiveness of our forces will be jeopardized and the question of responsibility may well be raised.
I repeat that we interpret the spirit of the expression “well clear” to be that our planes must not violate Soviet or Manchurian frontiers. We are carefully complying with this spirit not only in our planning, but also in our instructions to General MacArthur.1
Sincerely yours,
- According to a memorandum dated August 28 by the Director of the Executive Secretariat (McWilliams), Under Secretary Webb suggested to Mr. Acheson that no action be taken in regard to this letter, since no good would be served by continuing the correspondence. Mr. Acheson’s staff as a whole felt that the letter showed a lack of understanding of the important issues involved and a lack of willingness to integrate military and political policies. It was agreed that the Department of State should take no action which could be interpreted as interference in the conduct of military operations. (795.00/8–2850)↩