330/8–1650: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received August 16—7:17 p. m.]
293. After dinner last night at his apartment, Rau (India) told USUN officer he hoped both US and USSR could find it possible to say very little about his proposal for a committee, and perhaps to [Page 591] abstain on the vote setting it up. He realized, he said, that if either the US or the USSR supported the proposal vigorously the other would be forced to vote against it. He did not ask what US reaction to committee was.
Queried on wire service story from Lake Success to effect that committee would not insist on fulfillment of 25 and 27 June resolution as prerequisite of settlement, Rau said story was incorrect. He said the fulfillment of those resolutions was obvious prerequisite to peaceful settlement, adding that five members of proposed committee had already voted in favor of resolution[s] and would therefore of course insist on their fulfillment. This may have been intended as indirect means of telling us not to be worried if reference to earlier resolution was not included in committee resolution; Rau implied that leaving out specific reference to earlier resolutions might make it possible for Soviet Union to abstain on committee resolution instead of vetoing it.
Queried on statement that committee might hear representatives of other governments, Rau said North Koreans would have to be heard at some time but that he had deliberately inserted phrase in his speech “at an appropriate time” so as to make sure that NK’s would not be heard until they had complied with earlier resolution. He suggested possibility that withdrawal to 38th parallel, if agreed to by committee as prerequisite and also agreed to by NK’s, might be carried out in stages. Queried on whether Chinese Communists might be heard by committee he said he was anxious to avoid details at this stage keeping resolution as general as possible so as to increase chances of its being accepted.
He asked what State Department views were on peace aims. Told that Department was giving matter careful consideration, he commented that he thought it essential to formulate the general terms of peace plan soon, indicating why UN is fighting in Korea. Malik’s propaganda speeches, he said, were doubtless doing great damage in Asia, where even knowledge of fact that NK’s committed aggression tends to be obscured by fact that Americans are fighting Koreans, and where determination to resist aggression also tends to be overlayed by emotional reaction against bombing of civilians and industry. He thought even presence of Turkish and Thailand troops would do little to offset Asian reaction against “colonial forces” fighting in Korea since Turkey was far away and Thailand was regarded in Asia as artificial creation designed as buffer between French and British territories, and therefore as untypical Asian state. Only way to meet Malik’s propaganda, he thought, aside from reiteration of facts, was formulation of peace plan even if drawn in very general terms in order to avoid binding commitment or possible prejudice to future military operations.
[Page 592]The basis of a peace plan, he said, must be unification of Korea and establishment of free independent government through UN supervised election in entire country. Asked whether he thought UN troops should unify country by force if necessary, he replied that NK’s were likely to agree to some such proposal when they saw they could not win war. On this point, he thought it important to make peace early and if possible before fighting our way back to north, both in order to localize fighting and to prevent further destruction which would increase number of Communist votes.
He said Malik had not liked the plan when he broached it to him over the weekend, but added “if you can show me the advantages, I may change my mind”. Rau said he told Malik committee would of course base any proposal on NK’s withdrawing. He said Malik replied quickly, “Would the foreign troops also withdraw”. Rau said he was unable to reply to this. Malik said he would consult his government.
Rau said he had not been sure on Monday1 that he would make his proposal until he was shown advance text of Chauvel (France) speech in which proposal was welcomed, at which point Rau decided he would speak. He said his only prior consultations with other delegates had been in secret meeting last week when he suggested plan. Since making speech he had received favorable personal reactions from Egypt, Ecuador, Yugoslavia and Norway, all of whom had told him they would consult their governments. He guessed chief reason for French enthusiasm was French concern about US troops being tied down in Asia when they might soon be needed on French border.
Rau advanced suggestion that ROK representative in council should write letter to SYG stating he would not sit so long as President was clearly opposed to it. We replied that a gentleman might leave the company where one member did not wish his presence, but that a government representative could hardly do so. Rau said this government representative would undoubtedly do so if the US Government suggested it to him. We replied we could not conceive that the US Government would entertain such a thought. Rau returned to point indirectly several times stating that council delegates were perhaps too much impressed by proper procedure and observance of correct forms, whereas people outside were not impressed, did not understand importance of procedure, and wished council to make progress somehow toward settlement in Korea.
- August 14.↩