Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795B.551/8–1450: Telegram

The Department of State to the British Embassy

top secret

London, August 14, 1950—3 p. m.
[Received August 14—3:52 p. m.]

910. ReDeptel 787 August 11.

1. Talked with Attlee and Bevin again regarding expediting the embarkation of troops for Korea or moving troops from Hong Kong or Malaya or some other spot such as the Middle East immediately and making substitution of troops from the UK for those sent at once to Korea.

2. As to movement of troops from Malaya to Korea, both Attlee and Bevin made the argument that not only would they run the risk of being seriously repulsed in Malaya, but also, which they considered to be of great importance, the withdrawal of British troops from the battle in Malaya would have very adverse effect upon the battle in Siam and might even mean the loss of that part of Asia.

3. As to Hong Kong, they said the troops for Hong Kong were inadequate to meet the situation that might develop.

4. They realize of course the importance of refuting the Soviet propaganda aimed at concealing the fact that the Korean affair is a United Nations engagement and making it an exclusively US venture, but they would review the matter and would do everything they could to expedite the movement of troops to Korea and would let me know.¹

Douglas

1. On August 21, the U.K. Government informed the U.N. Secretary-General that an infantry force would be dispatched immediately from Hong Kong to Korea (U.N. document S/1702). Subsequently, Ambassador Douglas reported to the Department of State in telegram 1119, August 22, that the British were speeding up the movement of ground forces from the United Kingdom to Korea and that the target date for sailing had been advanced from November 1 to October 1 (795B.551/8–2250).