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Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)
I telephoned General Burns at 10:30 this morning and referred to my conversation with Mr. Young on Saturday.1 I said I was calling to emphasize the very grave danger which the State Department felt [Page 574] was involved in the bombing of Rashin and our belief that such bombing is contrary to the directive to stay “well clear” of the Manchurian and Soviet frontiers.2 I called his attention to the article by Talbert in this morning’s Herald Tribune indicating that the real purpose of the mission was to hinder possible Soviet submarine operations out of the ice-free port of Rashin. I said that in view of what must be presumed to be the present state of mind of the Soviet authorities and their extreme sensitivity to any operations in that area, the State Department felt strongly that any repetition of the bombing of Rashin might entail the gravest consequences. I said that I understood that both the Defense Establishment and the State Department feel very strongly that we do not want active Soviet participation in the Korean war or the commencement of worldwide hostilities this year. We believed that if the Soviet authorities are undecided or are hesitating as to whether to move on a wider basis now the bombing of Rashin or similar moves might well prove an important deciding factor. I asked General Burns to convey this view immediately to the appropriate Defense authorities. He promised to do so and made no comment other than to say that he thought in view of the present Air Force precision there probably was no likelihood that the B–29s had flown over Soviet or Manchurian territory.
- August 12; see memorandum by Deputy Under Secretary of State Matthews, p. 566.↩
- In a memorandum of conversation, not printed, Ambassador Jessup recorded his discussion of this same subject on the morning of August 14 with Secretary of the Air Force Finletter. Mr. Jessup registered the State Department’s grave concern with the bombing and reported that Mr. Finletter urged that the State Department communicate formally with the Defense Department on the matter. Mr. Finletter also said that he would look into the question personally. (795.00/8–1450)↩