Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795.00/8–1250

Draft Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison)

top secret

[Washington,] August 12, 1950.¹

U.S. Courses of Action in Korea

the problem

1. To determine what measures would be necessary and/or desirable in order to contribute to the restoration of international peace and security in the Korean area, either by defeat of the Korean Communists or as the result of a Soviet suggestion for an early voluntary withdrawal of the aggressor forces back to the 38th parallel.

analysis

Military Factors

2. The present military objective of the U.N. Command is to “repel the armed attack” of the Korean Communists and restore international peace and security in the area. The Security Council Resolutions in pursuance of which action is being taken call for the withdrawal of the aggressor forces beyond the 38th parallel but do not specifically limit military ground operations of the U.N. Command to the area south of the 38th parallel.

3. The strategic importance of Korea to the Soviet Union is of such a high degree that it is unlikely that it would permit the establishment of a regime in North Korea which it could not dominate or control.

4. Hence, the Soviet Union will probably take whatever action it deems necessary to prevent such a consummation of the present Korean hostilities. Such action might take the form of committing Soviet or Chinese Communist troops to action in Korea or at least occupying Korea north of the 38th parallel by such troops.

5. However, it is believed that when the tide of battle begins to turn, the Soviet Union will not wait for U.N. forces to reach the 38th parallel before taking action. When U.N. forces begin to have military successes then will be the time to look for new Soviet action—entry of Soviet forces, entry of Chinese Communist forces, a new effort at U.N. settlement, or all these together.

6. From a strategic point of view the Korean peninsula is not of such importance to the U.S. that it would be desirable to have large U.S. forces committed there. In fact in case of a global conflict, it would be a serious disadvantage to have U.S. forces so committed.

Political Factors

7. After 45 years of either colonialism or division, the people of Korea have an irrepressible urge for the unification of their country and its recognition as an equal and respected member of the family of nations.

8. The division of Korea at the 38th parallel is an entirely artificial barrier violating the natural integrity of the nation. This division was never meant to be permanent and for five years the U.S. has endeavored to eliminate it by all possible peaceful measures, first through bilateral negotiation with the Soviets and later through initiating action through the United Nations machinery.

9. Since November 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations has passed, by Overwhelming majorities, three Resolutions looking toward achieving the objective of a free, independent and unified Korea. A U.N. Commission on Korea was established and has been and still is charged with seeking Korea’s unification by pacific settlement. In its Resolution of October 21, 1949, the General Assembly reaffirmed its aims in Korea and called upon all member states “to refrain from any acts derogatory to the purposes of the present resolution.” While the General Assembly for three years has sought to unify Korea by peaceful means, it has never formally considered nor explicitly approved the unification of Korea through military means.

10. The Government of the Republic of Korea has been established in accordance with the Resolutions of the General Assembly, has been declared by the U.N. to be the only lawful government in Korea and has been recognized by 32 nations.

11. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities the Government of the Republic of Korea demonstrated, despite many weaknesses, a growing capacity to govern. In its report of June 26, 1950, UNCOK pointed out that “there have been distinct signs of improvement in recent months in both economic and political stability of the country.” Recent elections for the National Assembly gave significant gains to moderate and non-Government elements, thus confusing those critics who had raised the cry of “police state.”

12. The leaders of the Republic of Korea have stressed that the aggression from the North provides the opportunity to abolish the 38th parallel and unify all of Korea under United Nations auspices. President Rhee has insisted on the special position of his government and has formally notified the President of the U.S. that the Republic of Korea will not recognize the validity of any decision reached about the future of Korea in the making of which the Republic of Korea has not participated.

13. There is a growing sentiment in the United States favoring a “final” settlement of the Korean problem and disapproving of any settlement which smacks of compromise or a “deal”.

14. On the other hand there are significant groups who believe further efforts should be made to find a peaceful solution. Should a peace offer be made or the aggressor retire or be forced back to the 38th parallel there would doubtless be strong efforts made by large sections of the public and the Congress to stop the fighting and return to a peace basis.

15. There is evidence that the UNCOK which is operating in the field will make recommendations of a far reaching character designed to bring about the unification of Korea under U.N. auspices. (See USUN’s 266, Aug. 11. Copy attached.²) The U.S. will have to take a stand on these recommendations.

Politico-Military Considerations

16. By a quick and crushing victory of the North Korean military forces in South Korea, the USSR would have gained its long-standing goal of the complete absorption of Korea into its orbit. Furthermore, the building of a “cordon sovietaire” from the Soviet borders of Sinkiang to the southern shores of Korea would have neared completion, Only Japan and the Philippines at the edge of the orbit, and Southeast Asia to the South, would have still remained outside. Yet, the aggression in South Korea may result in the opposite effect—the failure to complete the cordon.

17. In this light, the situation in Korea now provides the United States and the free world with the first opportunity to regain territory from the Soviet bloc. Since a basic policy of the United States is to check and reduce the preponderant power of the USSR in Asia and elsewhere, then UN operations in Korea can set the stage for the non-communist penetration into an area under Soviet control.

18. Penetration of the Soviet orbit, short of all-out war, would disturb the political, economic and military structure which the USSR is organizing between its own Far Eastern territories and the contiguous areas. The bonds of Manchuria, the pivot of this complex outside the USSR, would be weakened, for a free and strong Korea could provide an outlet for Manchuria’s resources and could also provide non-communist contact with the people there and in North China.

19. The significance in Asia of the unification of Korea under UN auspices would be incalculable. The Japanese would see demonstrated a check on Soviet expansion. Elements in the Chinese Communist regime, and particularly important segments of the Chinese population, might be inclined to question their exclusive dependence on the Kremlin. Skillful manipulation might drive a wedge between the Chinese Communists and the Kremlin. Throughout Asia, those who foresee only inevitable Soviet conquest would take hope.

20. The above reasons, in addition to the strategic factor mentioned in paragraph [3], make it even more probable that the Soviet Union will not be willing to see settlement resulting in a Korean Government which it cannot control. However, it is possible that, notwithstanding its considerable military strength located in the Far East, the Soviet Union is not yet ready to risk a general war to prevent a determined and rapid effort by the U.N. to create a unified Korea. This possibility might be increased if the U.N. should adopt by a large majority a program recommended by UNCOK and if some means can be devised of assuring the Soviet Union that a U.N. settlement would not be only a U.S. settlement and that it would not be directed against legitimate Soviet interests.

U.S. Interests and Obligations

21. In subscribing to the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, the U.S. pledged its support to Korean independence. Our intentions have been measured in our diplomatic support, military aid, and economic assistance. Our obligation to the United Nations to block a breach of the peace, is fixed.

22. The broad objectives of the United States were stated in NSC 8/2.³ approved by the President on 23 March 1949, as follows:

• “a. To establish a united, self-governing, and sovereign Korea as soon as possible, independent of foreign control and eligible for membership in the UN.
• “b. To ensure that the government so established shall be fully representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people.
• “c. To assist the Korean people in establishing a sound economy and educational system as essential basis of an independent and democratic state. A more immediate objective is the withdrawal of remaining U.S. occupation forces from Korea as early as practicable consistent with the foregoing objectives.”

23. The political value to the United States of showing to the world that it is determined that aggression shall be repelled, and that the expressed will of the United Nations shall be respected, justifies our current military effort in Korea.

Conclusions

24. The following principles form the basis for consideration of U.S. actions:

a. The unification of Korea conforms with Korean aspirations, U.S. policies, and the expressed objectives of the United Nations.

b. The permanent unification of Korea can only be fairly and correctly resolved with the participation of representatives of the Korean people chosen as the result of free elections on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot held under the authority and observation of the U.N.

c. The Government of the Republic of Korea should continue to be recognized as the only lawful government in Korea and should be consulted with respect to any long-term solution of the Korean problem.

d. The problem of Korea is manifestly a United Nations problem and the final solution of that problem must be one which is consistent with the principles of the U.N. Charter.

e. The tremendous problem of an economic, social and political nature attendant upon the establishment of a unified Korea are of such a magnitude as to require the assistance of the United Nations. Korea is an Asiatic state and it is therefore appropriate that the Asiatic members of the United Nations should have a major voice and should play a prominent role in the assistance that the United Nations can give.

f. The establishment of a free and united Korea and the elimination of the North Korean Communist regime, following unprovoked military aggression, would be a step in reversing the dangerous strategic trend in the Far East of the past twelve months.

g. The 38th parallel, in and of itself, has no military significance other than such an artificial barrier as would limit if not prevent a military victory.

25. The following limiting factors on action which should be recommended by the United States must be kept in mind:

a. The probability that any attempt either by force or through U.N. action to establish a unified Korea would cause the Soviet Union to commit either its own forces or those of Communist China or both with the consequent danger of global war.

b. The fact that as stated in paragraph 3 of NSC 73/1, “The United States is not now capable of conducting immediately a general military offensive against the USSR because our forces are either not appropriately positioned or are so inadequate as to be incapable of effective action.”

c. Possible reluctance of other members of the United Nations to agree to action necessary to effect the unification of Korea if it appears it would lead to the outbreak of a general conflict with the USSR or the breaking up of the United Nations.

26. In consonance with the above principles and having in mind the above limiting factors, the United States should take the following steps:

a. Continue its efforts in cooperation with the other members of the United Nations to repel the aggressors and restore the integrity of the Republic of Korea, taking such military action north and south of the 38th parallel as is necessary.

b. Take such action through the diplomatic channel as necessary to assure the greatest possible support of United States action by United Nations members.

c. Announce in the United Nations its determination to seek a solution of the Korean problem within the general framework of previous United Nations Resolutions and in a manner consistent with the United Nations Charter.

d. To the above end, recommend or urge others to recommend, the creation of an appropriate United Nations body which would study and make recommendations to the General Assembly on the future of Korea in accordance with principles enumerated above. It might be appropriate for the representative of India to act as chairman of such a body.

e. Recommend to the United Nations that, after the successful repulsion of the aggression in Korea and the unification of the country in accordance with recommendations of the above named United Nations body, Korea be demilitarized, the United Nations body in question to recommend the methods by which this could be done, together with recommendations as to the size and character of internal security forces needed by the Republic of Korea.

f. Announce its belief that for as long as the 38th parallel divides Korea or until a stable unified Korea is established, a United Nations military force should be retained in Korea to prevent renewed aggression or internal strife during the natural period of readjustment, and that such forces should consist primarily of contingents from Asiatic countries. The United States might recommend that such of its forces as are included in the United Nations force be stationed south of the 38th parallel.

g. Recommend that the members of the United Nations, upon the advice of the United Nations body mentioned above, give such political and economic aid to the Korean Government as may be necessary after the conclusion of hostilities.

h. Should the United Nations Commission on Korea make recommendations along the lines indicated in paragraph 15, the United States should strongly support the general character of those recommendations reserving the right to suggest changes in detail as may appear desirable.

i. To the extent feasible take measures to speed up and intensify military and industrial preparations with a view to eliminating as early as possible the factors mentioned in paragraph 25b.

27. Should the USSR make clear that it intended to commit its own troops or those of Communist China into action in Korea with a view to making impossible the action contemplated above, the United States should undertake the action recommended in NSC 76,⁴ at the same time making clear that it did not renounce in any way its ultimate objective of contributing to the creation of a free, independent and unified Korea in accordance with the announced objectives of the United Nations.

1. The date is the drafting date given on the source text. This draft memorandum was forwarded for comment under date of August 14 to Messrs. Butler, Sandifer, Reinhardt, Jessup, and Rusk with an accompanying note from Mr. Allison which read in part as follows:

   “Herewith is a draft NSC paper on the Korean problem. I am afraid you will find that it is not by any means a perfect presentation of the problem but it is the best I have been able to think up over the weekend. Certain of the paragraphs on this paper have been lifted bodily from a paper prepared by the Defense Department on the same problem. These paragraphs are 8, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, part of 23 and paragraph 24(a) (b) (c) (g).…” See the draft memoranda from the Defense Department dated July 31 and August 7, pp. 502 and 528.

2. Ante, p. 564.
3. Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. vii, Part 2, p. 969.
4. See footnote 2, p. 346.