330/8–750: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received August 7—10:09 p. m.]
227. Jebb (UK) convened meeting with Sunde (Norway), Ordonneau (France) and Gross to consider procedural tactics for Tuesday’s1 SC meeting.
[Page 538]At beginning of meeting Gross outlined the procedural situation at end of Friday’s meeting2 with Chinese point of order that SC had decided on June 25 to seat representative of ROK as the previous question. He therefore suggested that on Tuesday first business is this point of order which should be put to a vote immediately under rule 30. Therefore, Tsiang (China) or someone else should insist on Tuesday that President rule on point of order that President is bound by SC decision of June 25 to invite representative of ROK to the table. Under rule 30 he would request immediate ruling on this point.
It was suggested that other members of SC would thereupon remain silent until the President rules. If he refused to rule on the pending point of order we would suspend or adjourn to a day certain to consult on the ground that serious constitutional crisis created and SC cannot continue so long as President refuses to act. Gross then outlined other alternatives that might occur:
- 1.
- The President might rule that the Council made no decision on this question on June 25. In that event his ruling would be challenged and overruled.
- 2.
- He might rule that the Soviet proposal be put to the vote first. Here again his ruling would be challenged and overruled.
- 3.
- He might attempt adjournment for lack of speakers. Objection would be made on the ground Council should not adjourn without hearing President’s ruling as rule 30 provides. If he adjourned the meeting in spite of objection and left the chamber other members of Council would remain.
- 4.
- Gross pointed out that in a variety of circumstances the President might claim that on a ruling after he has ruled as President and it is challenged, his vote as USSR representative in sustaining the ruling, and opposing a challenge constitutes a veto. That would raise the question of overruling the decision that a negative vote of a permanent member on a challenge constitutes a veto. Gross observed that this tactic is more a successive veto operation than the usual double veto problem.
The meeting indicated a general reluctance to be firm on the issue of seating the ROK representative if this involves anything resembling a double veto fight and the necessity for overriding a purported Soviet veto. Ordonneau, who will be sitting on Tuesday since Chauvel and Lacoste remain away, indicated that he would not be allowed to challenge a Soviet veto and added that even as to decisions stated to be procedural in GA resolution or part I of San Francisco statement, he would still feel bound by part II of San Francisco statement. The UK and Norwegians reflected to a lesser degree the same view. Jebb stated that although his FonOff did not like the idea he had suggested going ahead without ROK representative at the table to avoid this [Page 539] entire subject. Gross pointed out that this would be a serious propaganda victory for USSR and appeasement to them on an important charter principle. If we avoided the issue this time we would undoubtedly have to face it later. Stabell (Norway) suggested that rather than be involved in a double veto fight we should point out that the decision of Malik is illegal, not a binding precedent and go on the ground that nothing could be done.
Gross pointed out that if we adjourn should the President refuse to rule, it would be possible to save the principle and consider a number of remedies, such as the amendment of the rules of the SC or a special session of the GA.
Jebb suggested that we might not insist on applying the rules of procedure but simply have a general debate on the subject of Korea in general without regard for the rules. Gross again stressed that this was giving in to dictatorial and illegal acts by the President and would lead to inch by inch capitulation. The major objection pressed by the UK and Norwegians was that Malik will refuse to rule on whether the ROK representative is entitled to sit and will simply say that he will put that question to the Council as previous Presidents have put question of substance or procedure to the Council. That would lead directly into the feared double veto fight.
Jebb suggested that it might be simpler for Malik to rule as requested that ROK should be seated if first we voted on paragraph a of Soviet proposal which provides that representatives of Korean people and Chinese Communists be seated. This would be defeated for lack of seven votes and then we would go ahead and insist on a ruling on the pending point of order. Gross pointed out that the major objection to this is that we would then have gone far toward abandoning our strong position that the Council has already decided on seating ROK representative and that force of that decision would have been put in doubt.
At the end of the meeting Ordonneau and Jebb came back to the point that it was unlikely Malik would insist on a veto but would take his medicine as he has on previous August votes. It was therefore agreed that subject to instructions and reflection the same group will meet Tuesday before SC meeting and that (1) Tsiang should raise a new point of order stating that the previous question is that the President is bound by the SC decision of June 25 to invite representative of ROK to table; (2) other SC members will not speak on this issue; (3) reasonable efforts will be made to get Malik to rule and his insistence that his resolution or some other motion be considered will be treated as a ruling against Tsiang’s point; (4) if Malik as USSR representative casting a negative vote takes the position this [Page 540] is a veto, SC will adjourn; (5) if he attempts adjournment without consent for lack of speakers and leaves the chamber, Council will continue in session without him; (6) it was agreed that we would at least consider the suggestion that in the light of rule 39 upon the adoption of the agenda Chang of Korea by agreement of all except the USSR privately reached should sit at the table so that the burden of removing him will be up to Malik; (7) it was agreed that we would oppose the seating of the North Korean representative. Ordonneau stated he would oppose it “for the moment”. Jebb pointed out that there may be a movement by India to set down certain conditions precedent on which the NK representatives would be invited. This would include return of NK forces to 38th parallel. He added that Pearson of Canada had been thinking along this line and that Jebb’s FonOff feels that the time will come when SC should hear North Koreans. Gross warned of the danger of weakening now about what might be done in the future and questioned whether the SC is the right body in the foreseeable future for hearing NK representatives in light of UNCOK and GA consideration of this case.