357.AD/5–550
The Chargé in Korea (Drumright) to the Secretary of State
No. 474
Ref: Embtel 628 May 5, 1950.1
Subject: UNCOK Request to UN SYG Lie To Use Good Offices
The Embassy has received further information on the request of UNCOK to UN Secretary General Trygve Lie to take up certain questions in Moscow,2 and transmits it for the Department’s information.
The more detailed account of the circumstances surrounding the decision to send that letter and a copy of the letter itself (which is enclosed) were supplied to an Embassy officer by a person who did so on condition that the supplier’s name would not be made known in any report made by the Embassy. Assurances were given that the informant’s anonymity would be protected.
The idea of a request to UN Secretary General Trygve Lie to take rip the question of UNCOK contact with North Korean leaders during his visit to Moscow originated with the Principal Secretary, Mr. Bertil Renborg, who easily persuaded the Indian Delegate, Dr. Anup Singh, to assume sponsorship, according to this informant, who is believed to be most reliable.
According to the informant, about April 24, the Indian Alternate Delegate, Mr. Kondapi (Dr. Singh, Indian Delegate still being hospitalized) raised this subject in an unofficial meeting of the Commission in the chairman’s office. It was immediately apparent that Mr. Renborg was the author, however, since Mr. Kondapi showed only a superficial knowledge of the subject, whereas Mr. Renborg did most of the talking, and Mr. Renborg urged that the Commission ask Mr. Lie to utilize Mr. Zinchenko, Assistant Secretary General, to exercise good offices for UNCOK. In the following conversation it was obvious, according to the informant’s statement, that the members of the Commission, including Mr. Kondapi, were scarcely acquainted with Mr. Zinchenko’s name let alone his record and character, but Mr. Renborg described him as a man of outstanding character and ability, a man of the future, Mr. Renborg’s personal acquaintance, and a person with whom Mr. Renborg maintained a mutual regard.
At this first discussion, in which it was urged that UNCOK should not lose so excellent an opportunity to try to make contact with Pyongyang [Page 69] in the carrying out of their responsibilities, Mr. Jamieson, Australia, is reported to have made no comment. This is said to be Mr. Jamieson’s custom when a new subject is raised on which he is without instructions, and on which he wishes to come to a decision in private or to ask his Government’s instructions.
Mr. Henri Brionval, France, is said to have raised several questions: (1) How did the Commission know as a fact that Mr. Lie was going to Moscow? (2) Was Mr. Lie going with the support of other leading member states of the UN, or was he acting on his own and contrary to the interests or wishes of member Governments? (3) Was Mr. Zinchenko a proper person for the Commission to use for the suggested purposes?
Dr. Liu, China, is said to have supported Mr. Brionval’s questions. Nothing was decided at this time. It is understood that Mr. Brionval informed his Government and asked instructions, following this informal meeting and again following a subsequent one, but received no reply. It is said that Mr. Brionval, who was personally doubtful of the wisdom of this action, considered silence on the part of his Government as indicating lack of objection.
A day or two later the subject was again raised in an informal meeting in the chairman’s office. On this occasion Mr. Kondapi presented the draft of a letter to Mr. Lie. The informant was of the opinion that this draft had been prepared originally by Mr. Renborg, although it was possible that Dr. Singh and Mr. Kondapi had made some small changes. Unfortunately, the Embassy has been unable to secure a copy of this original draft.
Mr. Brionval and Dr. Liu are said to have raised questions similar to those of the previous informal meeting, and Mr. Jamieson to have expressed a cautious interest, without making any commitment. Mr. Renborg and Mr. Kondapi continued strongly to urge the proposed action. The group decided, by common consent, following the urgings of Mr. Renborg and Mr. Kondapi, to consider the question, and Mr. Kondapi’s draft, at a formal meeting of the Commission.
The account which follows of the two formal meetings of the Commission is taken largely from the summary records of UNCOK for April 27 and April 28, 1950, with the addition of some descriptive information added by the informant, who states that the summary records never clearly show the force or detail of Mr. Renborg’s interventions, since these records are prepared by Mr. Renborg’s subordinates and then edited by him personally before being approved.
The Commission met on Apil 27, at 10:30 a. m. In addition to Mr. Jamieson, Australia, Mr. Liu and Mr. Ssutu, China, Mr. Brionval, France, and Mr. Kondapi, India (Alternate), Mr. Renborg and Mr. [Page 70] Gaillard, Principal Secretary and Deputy Principal Secretary, plus the usual staff, were present.
Mr. Kondapi presented his draft of a letter from UNCOK to UN SYG Lie, asking the Secretary General of the United Nations, if he visited Moscow as the press reported he intended to do, to discuss with the Soviet authorities the difficulties experienced by UNCOK in making contact with the North. Since the Secretary General would have matters of greater importance than the Korean question to discuss in Moscow, Mr. Kondapi proposed that the services of Assistant Secretary General Zinchenko should be made use of, referring to Paragraph 1 (c) of the General Assembly Resolution on Korea of October 21, 1949,3 as authority for this.
Dr. Liu, China, while approving in principle, said he thought Mr. Lie would be more successful if he were asked to approach the USSR solely in regard to the question of the withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces from Korea. Dr. Liu also thought it preferable not to mention Mr. Zinchenko, but to leave to the discretion of Mr. Lie the decision as to whom to use to achieve the objective.
Mr. Jamieson also supported the proposal in principle. He thought Mr. Lie might well be asked to take up matters under paragraph 1(b) as weir as on troop withdrawal (paragraph 1(e)). Dr. Liu said his proposal regarding troop withdrawal was intended to make it impossible for the Soviet Government to evade the issue, since this question certainly concerned the USSR, whereas the Soviet Government might claim the matter of unification should be taken up directly with Pyongyang.
Dr. Liu also suggested that the Commission should remember the well-known attitude of the Government of the Republic of Korea which was opposed to making contact with the Northern officials. By limiting the approach to Moscow to the question of troop withdrawal, controversy with the Korean Government would be avoided.
Mr. Kondapi, Indian Alternate, thought stressing the subject of troop withdrawal would unnecessarily irritate the USSR and so cause failure in the primary purpose of making contact with the North.
Mr. Renborg, Principal Secretary, agreed with Mr. Kondapi. He suggested that since subsequent to U.S. troop withdrawal the U.S. had entered into the KMAG Agreement with the Korean Government, the USSR might be asked whether a similar agreement had been entered into between the USSR and the Northern regime. The larger issue of making contact with the North might be raised subsequently to the raising of this question. Mr. Jamieson considered Mr. Renborg’s proposal an unnecessary round about means for accomplishment of the intended purpose.
[Page 71]Dr. Liu didn’t think the Commission need worry about irritating the USSR since by its very existence UNCOK was a continuing source of irritation to the USSR. Since the USSR had claimed to have withdrawn its forces from Korea, an approach along the line he had suggested would be a challenge to the Soviet Government to provide proof of the claim.
Mr. Kondapi considered the question of Soviet troop withdrawal unrealistic, since Russian troops in any case were just across a frontier, while the bulk of U.S. troops were thousands of miles away. Confining the approach in Moscow to troop withdrawal questions might only intensify the Soviets’ negative attitude.
Mr. Brionval agreed the opportunity presented by Mr. Lie’s reported visit to Moscow should not be missed as a means to contact the North. He suggested, however, that the question of how best to approach Moscow might be resolved by an unofficial suggestion to the Secretary General to take up the Korean problem, leaving to him to use his own judgment as to whether conditions were favorable for So doing. Mr. Jamieson, however, objected, believing that only an official approach to Moscow could have any effect.
Dr. Liu raised the point that this action might be open to an interpretation that UNCOK “recognized” the Northern regime. Both the Principal Secretary and Mr. Jamieson asserted the proposed action could not be so construed. Mr. Jamieson cited the recent case of ECA officials who were released after direct contact had been established by U.S. officials with North Korean officials, although there was no question of U.S. recognition of the Northern regime.4
Mr. Jamieson summed up to the effect that all were agreed on the desirability of making every effort to contact the North, but that nothing should be done which implied recognition of the Northern regime. He did not believe, however, that the Indian proposal entailed any such risk.
Mr. Renborg then proposed an ad hoc committee to revise the draft letter in the light of this discussion, and such a committee was appointed consisting of Mr. Jamieson and Mr. Kondapi.
[Page 72]There appears to have been no active decision to adopt the proposal. Dr. Liu and Mr. Brionval simply ceased to interpose objections. Mr. Renborg proposed a committee to revise the letter, and in effect a decision was thereupon made to communicate with Mr. Lie along the lines originally suggested by Mr. Renborg to Mr. Kondapi and by the latter to the Commission, without further discussion.
Dr. Liu had presented the strongest arguments against the Indian proposal, and Mr. Brionval also had raised serious questions as to its wisdom. According to his subsequent account to an Embassy officer, Mr. Jamieson thought the proposal harmless, one which would be rejected by the Soviet Government and yet which would clearly establish the intent and effort of UNCOK to work towards unification. Mr. Jamieson says that after reflection he decided the proposed action fell-within his general instructions and therefore he did not ask Canberra for specific instructions.
Dr. Liu’s ultimate silent acquiescence in a proposal which he considered unwise is in line with his general conduct in the Commission and is supposed to be related to the difficult position of the Government which he represents. He is said to follow the practice of presenting his views, but of never following through in attempts to get them adopted by the Commission if some other Delegate has strong contrary feelings.
Mr. Brionval likewise is said to have had serious misgivings as to the wisdom of the proposal, but having twice informed his Government by telegraph of what was proposed and having received no reply he is said to have concluded that his Government did not object and so he acquiesced despite his own misgivings.
The Commission met for the second formal meeting on this subject at 10:30 a. m., April 28, and was in session fifty minutes, almost all of which were devoted to consideration of the letter as redrafted by the ad hoc committee. It was read paragraph by paragraph, a few minor changes being suggested and made. The draft communication was then approved as amended, by general consent without a vote. (It is rare that the Commission makes decisions by formal vote.) It was agreed that the letter, signed by the Acting Chairman, Mr. Jamieson, should be transmitted by cable and by pouch to Lake Success, to be forwarded to Mr. Lie.
It will be noted that Dr. Liu’s suggestions regarding verification of troop withdrawal, combined with Mr. Renborg’s suggestion of tieing the KMAG Agreement to the question of an analogous Soviet-North Korean agreement was added to the original draft, but not as matters of primary emphasis.
The essential element of the letter, as in the original draft, was a request that the Secretary General, while he was in Moscow, either [Page 73] personally or through Assistant Secretary General Zinchenko, should use his good offices (in accordance with UNGA Resolution on Korea, October 21, 1949, Paragraph 1(c)) with the Soviet authorities to discover ways and means by which the Commission would be able to enter into discussions with the North, either through a visit to the North or through a meeting in a neutral place outside Korea. The Commission further suggested the possibility of Mr. Zinchenko continuing his journey to North Korea to pursue this question there.
In the Embassy’s opinion, the transmittal of this letter in the form adopted has explosive possibilities should knowledge of its contents become known in South Korea. Mr. Brionval’s proposal of an informal request to the Secretary General to take up this question in Moscow, and the suggestions by both Mr. Brionval, France, and Dr. Liu, China, that it was unwise to name Mr. Zinchenko, seem to have shown greater awareness of the dangers involved in the form the letter took than was shown by other members of the Commission, and by Mr. Renborg.
The Embassy recognizes that the Commission was entirely within its prerogatives in taking this action and in attempting to carry out its terms of reference in the manner chosen. But such is the emotional antagonism of the Korean Government to the Communist regime in the North and to Communists, including Russians, in general, the Embassy believes the Commission would have shown more practical wisdom in not specifying by name a Soviet citizen as the one to extend good offices, but to have left this decision to the discretion of the Secretary General after he had reached Moscow. Although the proposal itself is a simple one which would not cause controversy in normal times, these not being normal times, as evidenced by the presence of the Commission in Korea and its continued inability to make any contact with the North, considerable controversy may be expected if knowledge of the contents of this letter becomes general at an early date. In the emotional reaction immediately following knowledge of this letter, it is considered even possible that the Korean Government might withdraw or restrict its invitation to UNCOK to observe elections. If the Government did not go so far, at least it would be likely to enter into public controversy with the Commission to the mutual harm of the Government and the Commission.
It is the earnest hope of the Embassy that knowledge of the contents of this letter and its despatch shall remain secret, and that the Russians will not make propaganda capital of it, until well after the elections and until it has become clear that the USSR will not accept Mr. Lie’s, or Mr. Zinchenko’s, good offices.
In the meantime, it is expected that the Commission will make other efforts to contact the North directly, first by another radio [Page 74] address by Dr. Anup Singh, India,5 and second by attempts to transmit a letter possibly addressed to “His Excellency Kim Il Sung, Prime Minister of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea,” instead of to “General Kim Il Sung”, as was done last year.6 The adoption of the new address, with the use of the self-claimed name of the Northern regime, if it occurs, will be on the recommendation of Mr. Renborg, who has been urging it upon the Commission for a considerable period of time. While no doubt the Government of the Republic of Korea would find the use of the proposed address for Kim Il Sung objectionable, it is believed that the Government could be persuaded not to react too strongly. The Korean Government’s attitude on such subjects has changed materially since last year, the change being largely due to the assumption of responsibility by the Commission, and the consequent elimination of the Secretariat from policy dealings with the Government. The Commission has always been more diplomatic and friendly in its conduct than the Secretariat. The result is that questions which might lead to controversy usually are discussed privately in advance of public decision, and in a tactful manner, by the Chairman of UNCOK with the President or the Foreign Minister. Both these gentlemen have a high regard for Mr. Gulek, UNCOK Chairman, who unfortunately has not returned from Turkey,7 and for Mr. Jamieson, the Rapporteur and currently Acting Chairman. Although Mr. Renborg, Principal Secretary, has rendered himself anathema to the Korean Government, and is himself most antagonistic to that Government and to Koreans in general, in accordance with current Commission practices he is not permitted to deal with the Government on any but administrative matters. Consequently, it can be hoped that the Acting Chairman, Mr. Jamieson, or the Chairman, Mr. Gulek, should the latter return to Korea, would take appropriate steps to allay Korean suspicions by advance conversations before the suspicions actually had been aroused.
In the present instance, however, the transmittal of the letter to Mr. Trygve Lie requesting the good offices of Mr. Zinchenko, since no preparation of Korean Government opinion has been undertaken by the UNCOK Chairman through advance and private discussion, it is feared that disclosure of the contents of the letter would result in very unfortunate controversy.
- Not printed; it transmitted to the Department a summarized version of the material contained in this despatch.↩
- Mr. Lie visited the major European capitals including Moscow during a trip (April 22–May 25) in connection with his 20-year program for peace through the United Nations; for related documentation, see vol. ii, pp. 371 ff.↩
- Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. vii, Part 2, p. 1091.↩
- Reference is to the case of Messrs. Alfred T. Meschter and Albert Willis, ECA employees who were aboard the steamship Kimball R. Smith, a U.S. vessel on loan to the South Korean Government, when it defected to North Korea on September 22, 1949. The U.S. Government transmitted two notes to the Soviet Government, on October 1 and 29, 1949, requesting information on the fate of the ship and the Americans. The Soviet Government agreed to inform the North Korean authorities of the U.S. request for information and, on November 15, the North Korean Government broadcast its willingness to turn over the two Americans. On December 11, the two men were handed over to a representative of the American Embassy at the 38th parallel. (See Background Information on Korea. Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs Pursuant to H. Res. 206. House Report No. 2495, 81st Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 69–70.)↩
- Mr. Singh had made a radio broadcast on May 3 and made a second on May 11; Mr. Jamieson made a broadcast on May 1 (see U.N. document A/1350, p. 17).↩
- No letter was transmitted by UNCOK to the North Korean authorities during 1950.↩
- Kamil Gulek was in Korea from January 26 to March 24, 1950; he did not return from Turkey to Korea.↩
- See U.N. document A/936, pp. 7–9.↩
- Following his return from Moscow, Mr. Lie replied to UNCOK in a letter dated June 19 which reached that body on July 5, after the outbreak of hostilities. The Secretary-General said that he had not been able to satisfy UNCOK’s request, since he had concentrated most of his attention on the problem of obtaining continued participation by the U.S.S.R. and the Eastern European countries in the work of the United Nations. He stated that the question of Korea had not come up in his conversations, and he had not felt it appropriate in the context to give undue emphasis to the Korean problem. Mr. Lie’s letter is quoted in part in Leon Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korea: the Politics of Field Operations, 1947–1950 (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), p. 224.↩