Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

611.95/5–250

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Under Secretary of State (Webb)

confidential

[Washington,] May 2, 1950.

Statements by Senator Connally¹ Regarding U.S. Policy in Korea

There is attached an excerpt, consisting of two questions and answers on the subject of Korea, from Senator Connally’s interview on “World Policy and Bipartisanship” which has appeared in the May 5, 1950 issue of U.S. News and World Report.

It is recommended that you take advantage of your weekly meeting with Senator Connally to express to him the Department’s concern over the possible effects of his remarks on this subject, particularly on the Government and the people of Korea.² Specifically, the Department’s concern arises out of the following considerations:

(1) Senator Connally’s reply to the first of the two quoted questions betrays an attitude of defeatism which the Department does not share and which it has consistently endeavored to counteract. The Department’s position with respect to the suggestion that we “abandon” south Korea is apparent from the following excerpt from the Secretary’s statement of March 7, 1950 before the Foreign Relations Committee,³ delivered in the presence of Senator Connally:

“There is one further and fundamental question which must be considered: That is the probability of ultimate success of the effort of the Korean Republic to survive. In recent debates a number of members of the Congress have indicated their feeling that the possibility of failure makes them doubt the wisdom of the United States giving a helping hand in this effort. It is my belief that American policy should be based on determination to succeed rather than on fear of the possibility of failure. Despite the problems with which the Republic of Korea is beset both internally and externally, and despite its necessarily limited experience in self-government and paucity of technical and administrative know-how, conditions of stability and public order have continued to improve and the threat of Communist overthrow appears at least temporarily to have been contained.

“There is good reason to hope from progress made thus far that with our assistance, the Republic of Korea can survive and thrive. This cannot, of course, be guaranteed. However, it continues to be true that without our assistance there can be no such hope.”

(2) Senator Connally’s reply to the second of the two questions raises an issue with respect to which the Korean Government is particularly sensitive—i.e. the apparent exclusion of Korea from the American defense line in the Far East. Following the Secretary’s reference in his Press Club speech to the Japan-Ryukyus-Philippines “defensive perimeter”, the Department was subjected to a barrage of representations from the Korean Government and its representatives designed to elicit from the U.S. a commitment to extend its defense line in the Far East to include South Korea. Inasmuch as this Government is not in a position to provide the Korean Government with such a commitment, any public reference to the Japan-Ryukyus-Philippine line can serve only to undermine the confidence of the Korean Government and people, and consequently their will to resist the ever-present threat of Communist aggression.

For Senator Connally’s information, it is being proposed to the Secretary that he reply along the following lines if questioned by the press concerning the views expressed by the Senator with respect to Korea:

“I have had many discussions about Korea with Senator Connally and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, of which he is chairman, and with the House Foreign Affairs Committee. I am confident that there exists between us no difference of opinion or intention.

“The United States is deeply interested in the survival of the Republic of Korea as an independent nation. In order to assist Korea in achieving this goal the United States is providing political support, directly and through the United Nations, as well as economic and military assistance.

“I believe it is perfectly evident from what Senator Connally said that he does not mean that the United States does not consider it a matter of grave importance to the United States that Korea, and, in fact, other Asiatic countries, should remain independent and free from Communist domination. This has been fully recognized by the Congress in appropriations for military assistance and in other ways.”⁴

[Annex]

Excerpt From: “U.S. News & World Report” May 5, 1950

Article: World Policy and Bipartisanship: An Interview With Senator Tom Connally

Q—Do you think the suggestion that We abandon south Korea is going to be seriously considered?

A—I am afraid it is going to be seriously considered because I’m afraid it’s going to happen, whether we want it to or not. I’m for Korea. We’re trying to help her—we’re appropriating money now to help her. But South Korea is cut right across by this line—north of it are the Communists, with access to the mainland—and Russia is over there on the mainland. So that whenever she takes a notion she can just overrun Korea just like she probably will overrun Formosa when she gets ready to do it. I hope not, of course.

Q—But isn’t Korea an essential part of the defense strategy?

A—No. Of course, any position like that is of some strategic importance. But I don’t think it is very greatly important. It has been testified before us that Japan, Okinawa and the Philippines make the chain of defense which is absolutely necessary. And, of course, any additional territory along in that area would be that much more, but it’s not absolutely essential.

1. Senator Tom Connally was Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
2. A memorandum by Under Secretary Webb, dated May 10, stated that at his meeting with Senator Connally on that date the subject of the Senator’s remarks on Korea was not mentioned (795.00/5–1050).
3. Text in Department of State Bulletin, March 20, 1950, p. 454.
4. See footnote 1 to telegram 640, May 5, from Seoul, p. 67.