795.00/7–1550
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)
Subject: United States Objectives in Korea with Particular Reference to Problem of 38th Parallel
Considerable thought is being given in the Policy Planning Staff and probably elsewhere in the Department to the desirability of issuing a public statement on our objectives in Korea which would make clear that we do not intend to allow our own troops or Republic of Korea troops to proceed beyond the 38th parallel. I have noted Mr. Feis’s memorandum of July 141 urging that this government “positively and publicly disassociate itself” from President Rhee’s statement that action of the North Koreans had obliterated the 38th parallel. I have also been asked to comment upon S/P document dated July 5,2 recommending that General MacArthur announce that he will order forces under his command not to conduct “close pursuit” should North Korean forces offer to withdraw and that he should further undertake to prevent his troops and those of the Republic of Korea “crossing into North Korean territory in force”. The reason given for these suggestions is, in the case of Mr. Feis, that the attitude of our Allies will be adversely affected and Chinese Communist and Russian governments will be encouraged to put their own troops into the fight in Korea if we don’t disavow President Rhee,3 while in the latter case it is stated such action will “aid in blocking Soviet charges of United States aggression in Korea …”.
I wish to express my most emphatic disagreement not only with the above suggestions themselves but with the reasoning back of them. In my opinion any such action as that recommended by Mr. Feis or in the S/P document in question will go far toward making impossible a successful carrying out of the terms of the June 27 Resolution of the Security Council which stated in conclusion:
“Recommends that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.” (Underlining added)
[Page 394]Obviously in determining what our course in Korea should be we must take into consideration the effect of bur action both among the members of the United Nations now associated with us and also among the Korean people themselves. Any action taken in Korea with a view to keeping our UN Allies on our side will be of no avail unless it also keeps the Korean people on our side.
If any one thing seems certain as a result of our experience in Korea over the past five years it is that a perpetuation of the division of that country at the 38th parallel will make it impossible “to restore international peace and security in the area.”
From the beginning the 38th parallel was meant to be a temporary line delineating areas in which to take the surrender of the Japanese. That it has become a permanent division of the country into two states has not been the fault of either the people of South Korea or of the United States. It is solely due to the intransigent attitude of the USSR and its lackeys in North Korea. This has been recognized by an overwhelming majority of the United Nations. It is North Korea and the Soviet Union that have restricted the movements of the UN Commission in Korea—not the South Koreans or the United States. Any solution of the problem which ignores the past and in effect says “If you stop fighting and withdraw to your original positions all will be forgiven and we will start over again attempting to reach a solution” disregards realities and would be a compromise with justice which would, and in my opinion rightly, cause the people of South Korea, to lose all confidence and faith in the moral position of the United States.
Conversations among officers in NA and representatives of Embassies of our United Nations allies, has, in the majority of cases, indicated a definite agreement that it would be utterly unrealistic to expect to return to the status quo ante bellum. It is believed that a positive program of persuasion conducted through the diplomatic channel, Voice of America and USIS would obviate most of whatever opposition there may be to taking advantage of this opportunity to carry out the pledges of Cairo and bring about a truly independent, unified Korea.
A determination that the aggressors should not go unpunished and vigorous, courageous United States leadership to that end should have a salutary effect upon other areas of tension in the world. Notice would be served on the aggressor elsewhere, who is the same as the covert aggressor in Korea, that he cannot embark upon acts of aggression with the assurance that he takes only a limited risk—that, of being driven back only to the line from which the attack commenced.
At the very least we should destroy the North Korean Army, through force if necessary, or by disarmament under UN auspices as [Page 395] a result of an offer of peace. We should then insist upon the full implementation in North Korea of the procedures laid down by the General Assembly resolutions of November 14, 1947 and December 12, 1948, including the holding of elections under the observation of the UN Commission on Korea. In view of our desire to bring about permanent peace and order in the area and a removal of psychological as well as geographic barriers between North and South Korea, it is believed it might be desirable to be generous in such matters as reparations, war crimes and related problems.
I do not advocate a public statement at this juncture of our intentions with regard to Korea but I most strongly urge that no statement be made which in any way commits this government not to proceed beyond the 38th parallel or implies that we will agree to any settlement which merely restores the status quo ante bellum.
I also strongly recommend that an early determination be made of just what our policy toward a Korea settlement should be, at least in broad outlines. One of the reasons for the difficulties we now face in Korea is that we failed to realize that political forces would be more compelling than military and hence did not insist upon our military establishment being prepared to implement the political decision we made when the test came. I hope we will realize that political necessity will compel us to act in such a way as to bring about a real restoration “of international peace and security” in Korea, and that we will be adequately prepared. The risks are admittedly great—the risks in accepting a partial solution or in compromise are, in my opinion, infinitely greater.