795.00/7–750
Memorandum by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen 1 to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)
Subject: Indications of Soviet willingness to seek settlement of Korean fighting.
The handling of the indication of a Soviet desire to find some manner of terminating the hostilities in Korea, whether through the intermediary of the British or possibly directly with the Soviet Government, must be done with the greatest possible care. While subsequent evidence, i.e. Soviet press handling of this matter, continues to confirm our original impression that the Soviets are serious in this matter and wish to find some means of terminating a situation which obviously has taken a turn unanticipated by them, we must however remember that there is no reason to believe that this Soviet desire is unlimited. It looks to me as if Stalin, looking into the future, had foreseen a situation which would present him alternative choices, neither of which he would by preference like to make. It is doubtful if he believes that despite temporary reverses the U.S. will not in a comparatively short time bring sufficient power to bear on the North Koreans as to bring about victory on the spot. Then, as U.S. forces approach the 38th Parallel, he would be confronted with the following choices:
- (1)
- To do nothing and permit American power to come up to the Soviet frontier right next door to Vladivostok and within easy bombing distance of their chief military headquarters in the Far East Khabarovsk, a situation which he might well find intolerable; or
- (2)
- Prior to our reaching the 38th Parallel, to re-occupy Northern Korea with Soviet forces.
This he would undoubtedly prefer not to do since it would immeasurably increase the risk of an open conflict between U.S. and Soviet [Page 326] forces and from the political point of view would be most undesirable for its psychological effect throughout Asia. He therefore, probably in anticipation of the development outlined above, is casting around for some means to prevent its occurrence.
This does not, however, mean that we could expect a complete Soviet surrender, i.e. withdrawal of North Korean forces and accepting the continued presence of important U.S. forces in South Korea. It is more likely that he is willing to accept a backdown but only a partial one and that the Soviet proposition might well be the restoration of the status quo ante in Korea in accordance with the terms of the June 25 resolution of the Security Council. This would mean the withdrawal of North Korean forces behind the 38th Parallel and the end of the fighting in Korea but on that basis would also involve the withdrawal of U.S. forces. This would clearly be unacceptable to us and I believe to the other members of the U.N. But we should not forget it is a position which might have important propaganda value to the Soviet Union. Considerable point could be made of the thesis that the Russians had offered to bring about the end of the fighting in Korea but that the U.S. had insisted on keeping its troops in that country and hence the peace effort had failed. We must therefore be very prudent in any discussions directly or indirectly with the Soviet Union to avoid (a) being caught in a position which might imply a willingness on our part to withdraw the troops, or (b) on the other hand getting caught in an awkward propaganda position, which the Soviets could exploit to advantage before world opinion, in rightly refusing to accept any such proposal.
We must, therefore, give a great deal of attention to this point and establish immediately the justification for our insistence on leaving U.N. forces in Southern Korea which will both be a position in any negotiations and will stand up in public.
There is another and perhaps even more important element which could bring about a change in the Soviet attitude at the present time. That is the development of the military situation in South Korea. I am quite certain that Stalin cannot conceive that the U.S. will for any appreciable time continue to suffer reverses in the field and he is therefore ignoring the initial difficulties we are encountering in the expectation that massive American forces will soon be brought to bear on the spot. Should it most unfortunately become apparent that the U.S. will not be able to bring this force to bear for a considerable period of time and that we have a steady series of reverses extending for several weeks, we should logically anticipate a considerable hardening of the Soviet attitude. Not, I should add, in the direction of Soviet involvement but in a much tougher line completely excluding any willingness on their part to contemplate terminating the hostilities in South Korea. It would seem, therefore, of vital importance to charting our political [Page 327] course that we should obtain from the Defense Establishment the most realistic possible estimate of the probable course of military developments. It is not necessary to emphasize what the consequences might be, not only in Korea but in other parts of the world, of a sudden Soviet realization that the U.S. is not militarily in a position to win a relatively quick victory in Southern Korea, if this should prove to be the case. Therefore if our best military estimate is that we are in for a considerable period of military reverses there is only one way, quite apart from the obvious necessity of broadening our military base, of preventing the Russians from attempting to exploit dangerously such reverses. It would be to have the U.S. Government adopt some measure which would indicate a mobilization of our power to correct this situation. I honestly believe that in that case the reverses on the spot would be offset by the evidence of a seriously aroused America.
- Mr. Bohlen, Minister at the American Embassy in Paris, was at this time in Washington for consultations.↩