795.00/6–3050
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Frederick E. Nolting, Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)
Subject: Korea
| Participants: | Mr. Matthews | Mr. Achilles |
| Dr. Jessup | Mr. Armstrong | |
| Mr. Bohlen | Mr. Merchant | |
| Mr. Hare2 | Mr. Bonbright | |
| Mr. Hickerson | Mr. Nolting |
Mr. Matthews opened the discussion by saying that the Secretary thought that we were perhaps giving too much attention to Korea, and not enough attention to the effects of the Korean war in other parts of the world. He also stated that the President had authorized General MacArthur to use the U.S. 24th Division stationed in Japan in the Korean operation and to authorize our Air Force to attack military targets north of the 38th parallel.
Dr. Jessup said that as of now there seems to be no evidence of Soviet intentions directly to intervene in the Korean conflict; that the main danger of intervention comes from the Chinese Communists. He suggested that we make a check-list of those matters which we should decide in common with the Defense Department, instancing the reply to Chiang regarding defense of the Channel Islands.3 Dr. Jessup undertook to get up such a check-list.
Mr. Bohlen gave in summary form his views on probable Russian action in the Korean situation, stating that Mr. Kennan was of similar opinion. He said that he saw no evidence that the Russians had changed their traditional tactic of probing for soft spots; that now they had found a hard spot they would probably not directly intervene; they would do their utmost to get the United States involved with Asiatic Communist troops, particularly Chinese. Mr. Bohlen stressed, however, that if we or any of our allies indicate an intention to strike Soviet territory in the neighborhood of Vladivostok or elsewhere the Soviets could be expected to react in a more primitive manner. Mr. Bohlen expressed the view that it would be dangerous for us to become committed more deeply in Korea without replacing military units which were called up from other areas. In order to make the necessary replacement he felt that the President would probably have to order partial mobilization. He said that the places we should watch are: China (any [Page 259] movement of armies there), Indo-China and Hong Kong. He said he thought it possible that the Soviets might reimpose a blockade of Berlin and wondered whether in view of our commitments in the Far East the Air Lift would be feasible as a counter-measure there.
As an indication of Soviet intentions, Mr. Merchant mentioned the fact that key Soviet personnel had recently been withdrawn from Japan and Thailand to Moscow. Mr. Hare said that this had also been the case in Iran. A round-up was taken of the number of withdrawals of key Soviet personnel and it was agreed that a telegram querying all of our missions on this subject should be dispatched immediately.4 (Mr. Armstrong’s action.)
Dr. Jessup suggested that an announcement should be made at the UNSC of offers to help in the fulfillment of the SC resolution. He suggested that those countries willing to send forces should themselves be invited to state their intentions to do so, whether or not they were members of the SC. This general idea was approved.
It was also agreed, upon Mr. Hickerson’s suggestion, that Senator Austin should announce before the SC this Government’s new decisions (ground forces and removal of limitations on air operations), emphasizing that these actions were being taken in pursuance of the SC resolution. It was suggested that Senator Austin use a paragraph of the Secretary’s speech of June 295 to emphasize the point that we were acting on behalf of the Security Council and in conformity with its decision.
It seemed to be the consensus of the meeting that our European allies and our friends in the Orient would not be deterred, through fear of a more general war, from supporting those measures necessary to accomplish the objective in Korea.