795.00/6–2950: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
priority
[Received June 29—7:02 p. m.]
1768. Repeated information priority Delhi 29, priority USUN 47. Indian Counselor Kapur urgently asked Embassy officer call his home during office hours today and opened conversation by throwing down on table top secret “Radhakrishnan for Nehru” cable dated June 28 in which Indian Ambassador, while agreeing that linking of Korean question with Formosa “unfortunate”, goes on to make strong case for forthright support by India of present UN action against North Korean aggression.
Saying that he was taking up matter on his own responsibility and that his Ambassador was unaware his initiative, Kapur said that Indian Embassy here has been making vigorous stand for clear [Page 242] cut action by GOI on Korean issue (Embtel 1743, June 27) and that US declaration June 27 re Formosa has been block to Rau’s voting for SC resolution that date without further instructions. Indian Ambassador Pannikar’s cable blasts from Peking, “conceived in narrow terms GOI–Communist China relations”, were adding to Nehru’s indecisiveness and Soviet UN representative Malik was attempting to put pressure on GOI by telling Rau that UN action along lines June 27 SC resolution would mean “general conflagration”. According to Kapur “next two or three days will tell story re India’s orientation” and while “realizing risk of responsibility he is taking” he wanted to make specific suggestions which would put India on right road.
Kapur then proposed that US Ambassador India discuss Korean issue with Nehru and Bajpai (or if both not available together, then with one of them since discussion on lower level would not have desired effect), that Secretary take similar action with Ambassador Pandit in Washington (“imperious, vain woman who feels that as sister GOI Prime Minister she has been ignored”) and that possibly Senator Austin also see Rau, all approaches to be along following lines:
- 1.
- Objective, factual review of history of Korean problem up to time North Korean attack, pointing out inter alia role played by India in UN history Korean question (e.g., US–India resolution in 1947 UNGA).1
- 2.
- Keep issues of Formosa and Korea separate, giving GOI representatives to understand that supporting UN action re Korea does not in any way tie their hands on Formosa and that they are free to say or do as they like on latter question. Better not to dilate on US reasons for Formosa step but rather to emphasize clearcut aspects UK aggression Korea and let GOI do its own worrying about Formosa.
- 3.
- Appeal to Nehru and other Indians on two grounds: (a) Asian aspects of Korean issue; and (b) UN aspect. Emphasize dire consequences for India’s position of leadership in Asia should it acquiesce in trampling down of free Asian nation such as ROK. Furthermore as leading Asian nation and member SC, India has special responsibility for supporting UN and UN ideals. Asia is important to UN and UN to Asia. If Asian countries do not support “Asian issue” in UN, this means “tripartite disruption” of UN. Whatever action taken by India repercussions will have far reaching effects especially in SEA.
- 4.
- Avoid context of “cold war” as much as possible but speak in general terms of “rule of law” as against “rule of force”, that is, contrast difference between violence and use of arms on one side and [Page 243] “political action” on other. In re SC proceedings and Soviet claims re number of vote, etc., emphasize that problem is not technical one but of “threshing it out around conference table in democratic way”.
- 5.
- Keep in mind as background that Nehru sensitive to “European interference in Asian matters” and that “white race attitude toward colored races” very much in his consciousness. Avoid “tendency to give advice in imperious manner” or “any suggestion of pressure on Nehru”. “Talk straight but not condescendingly; don’t lecture.”
- 6.
- “Keep British out of picture, for they are indelibly associated with pressure.”
- 7.
- Message from President to Nehru, even if couched in friendliest terms, also would have appearance pressure; far better are suggested, intimate, high level talks.
Kapur then added as keystone his edifice proposal that Trygve Lie (not US Government) cable Nehru to effect, “Here is critical Asian issue on which I would like your mediatory assistance”, making it clear that mediation cannot of course take place until after withdrawal North Korean troops from ROK; US representatives might wish discuss such course of action with Lie beforehand.
Though as is evident from foregoing Kapur is not seasoned or discreet diplomatic representative Embassy does have good reason believe that he is sincerely (and emotionally) concerned over failure his government adopt firm stand which he thinks it should take against international Communism if it is to survive. What he has done in effect is to furnish a revealing brief on how we should approach his government leaders and particularly Nehru and his sister if we wish get full GOI support on UN and US action re Korea (brief may be useful on other issues too). Embassy assumes US representatives are now in touch with appropriate GOI representatives in Washington, New York and Delhi on Far Eastern situation. While not wishing from this distance and with events moving so swiftly to make specific recommendations as to course we should follow vis-á-vis Indian implications for our position in SOA and Soviet, Communist prospects should GOI take neutral position on present UN action Korea are sufficiently grave to warrant careful consideration by Department of approach suggested by Kapur.
Please protect source.
Department pass Delhi, USUN.2
- See Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. vi, pp. 853–859.↩
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The Department’s reply to this telegram is contained in telegram 7, July 3, 7 p. m., to Moscow, p. 294.
Concerning the Indian Government’s acceptance of the June 27 Security Council resolution, see footnote 4 to telegram 973, June 29, from New Delhi, received at 3:54 p. m., p. 237.
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