Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

330/6–2950: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Gaffery) to the Secretary of State

confidential
priority

Cairo, June 29, 1950—2 p. m.
[Received June 29—3:15 p. m.]

699. I believe following factors in addition to the well-known Palestine difficulties are in part responsible for Egyptian hesitation to go along on Korean resolution:

1. Feeling that US is always asking for Egyptian support in UN but never prepared to give quid pro quo on questions which Egypt finds important (e.g. failure to approve transfer 160,000 rounds ammunition).

2. Lack of advance preparation with Egypt on resolution (Embtel 690, June 28¹).

3. Desire to study situation closely and avoid any action which might even indirectly give British lever to postpone negotiations re evacuation because of international emergency.

4. Hesitation to take positive pro-western stand because a danger of involvement in world conflict, (b) possible criticism from other Arab states that Egypt condoning western imperialism (Malik’s statement reported Deptel 549, June 28 regarding refusal to “knuckle under US domination” has at least vestiges of truth), (c) feeling that Egypt has something to gain by maintaining bargaining position between, east and west.

Caffery

1. Not printed.