Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII

795.00/12–850

United States Delegation Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee

Washington, December 8, 1950, 11:15 a.m. to 1:20 p.m.

[Extracts]
top secret
US Min–6

Cabinet Room, The White House

Friday, December 8, 1950

11:15 am–1:20 pm

Participants

United States	United Kingdom
The President	Prime Minister Attlee
The Vice President	Sir Oliver Franks
Secretary of State Acheson	Field Marshal Sir William Slim
Secretary of the Treasury Snyder	Sir Roger Makins
Attorney General McGrath	Lord Tedder
Postmaster General Donaldson	Sir Leslie Rowan2
Secretary of Interior Chapman	Sir Edwin Plowden
Secretary of Commerce Sawyer	Mr. Robert Scott
Under Sec. of Defense Lovett	Mr. John Barnes
Under Sec. of Agriculture McCormick	Mr. Denis Rickett
General Omar Bradley
Mr. W. Averell Harriman
Mr. W. Stuart Symington
Mr. William Foster
Ambassador at Large Philip Jessup
Amb.-Designate Walter S. Gifford
Asst. Sec. of State Thorp
Asst. Sec. of State Perkins
Asst. Sec. of State Rusk
Asst. Sec. of Commerce Blaisdell
Mr. Ralph Trigg1
Mr. George Elsey
Mr. Steven Early

The President opened the meeting by saying to the Prime Minister that General Collins, Chief of Staff of the Army, had just returned from a trip to Japan and Korea. They had begun these discussions with a briefing on the military situation by General Bradley and if the Prime Minister thought it would be useful he would ask General Collins to give a briefing on the situation as it stands now.

General Collins said that he had just returned from the four or five-day trip in which he had first gone to Tokyo where he had talked to General MacArthur.³ He then flew to Seoul where he talked to General Walker and went on up to the western front, which at that time was somewhat south of the river. He talked to the Commanders in the field. He then flew to the Hungnam area to see the operations of the Tenth Corps and talk to General Almond. He said that as the result of his conversations, he felt that General Walker’s Command, if not pinned down to any particular directive requiring him to hold the Seoul area or any other particular spot, could gradually withdraw in an organized way to the Pusan area. Pusan was an excellent port where we already had large supplies. The two-track railroad to Pusan was in excellent condition. The Eighth Army was not in danger. They were falling back now to a position north of Seoul. The ROK units were in contact only with small North Korean elements. He felt confident about the general position of the Eighth Army. He spoke of the shift in the position of United States, United Kingdom and Turkish elements in the general redeployment of the forces. He said that the United Kingdom forces had not been badly hurt. The Turks had given a very good account of themselves and had been rather badly hurt in the action. Our Second Division had suffered rather severe losses and had lost a good deal of equipment. The Second Division and the Turks were now being refitted north of Seoul.

Turning to the eastern front, he said that the Seventh Division, which had been up on the Yalu, was now all back in the Hamhung bridgehead area, except for two battalions which were with the Marines south of the reservoir. He had flown out to the area where the Marines were fighting and at first they had had good weather and had been able to see the operation but a snow storm had then begun and they were only able to see part of it. He explained that the Marines had not yet started down the precipitous slope which leads from the plateau area on which they were to the valley below. Forces had been despatched northward from the bridgehead to make a junction with the Marines. In his opinion if we had any kind of a decent break in regard to the weather which would permit the operation of our air force they had a good chance of getting back. The Chinese were making a very strong effort to bar their progress but we should be able to get out if air cover can be supplied. He pointed out also that our artillery was now within range of the area involved to support the evacuation. The column had its tanks with them and the operation was being well handled. He said that General Almond feels he can hold the bridgehead, including the airfield and the two cities of Hamhung and Hungnam for a considerable time with air cover and could evacuate the forces without serious loss. If Russian air came in in strength, this would pose a more serious problem. General MacArthur’s plans, pending any political decision requiring a modification, were to withdraw the Tenth Corps to the Pusan area perhaps dropping small units at Pohang which would then move inland. From a military point of view, he said that all considered, it was far sounder to go to Pusan than to try to go across to form a junction with the Eighth Army. He felt, and the Commanders in the field agreed, that we could hold a position somewhere south of Seoul. He did not think that we could hold the Seoul area itself but perhaps could fall back to a position behind the Han River or hold on the Naktong River front. In summary, from a military point of view he could say that our troops were not in a critical condition today. The position of the Marines, however, was serious. He thought, however, that the Tenth Corps could be concentrated in the Hamhung area and could be withdrawn. He thought further that a junction could be made with the Eighth Army and that they could hold the Pusan bridgehead indefinitely.

[Here follows discussion of the questions of raw materials and United States–United Kingdom liaison, scheduled for publication in volume III.]

The President said it then appeared that this part of the work had been a very successful conference for both of us.

Secretary Acheson raised the question of the final communiqué and suggested to the President that the group was too large to draft it.

The President said clearly that the whole group could not engage in drafting. He told the Prime Minister that he would name the Secretary of State and any one that he wished to work on the matter, if that was agreeable to the Prime Minister. It was not possible to work out a draft in the entire meeting.

The Prime Minister agreed and said that he would designate Sir Roger Makins to assist with the drafting on their side. He then referred to a paper which he had handed to the President yesterday on the question of perfecting the liaison between the United Kingdom and the United States (Annex B).⁴ He wondered whether the President had had a chance to look at it. He had not proposed any formal arrangement but merely some informal steps.

The President said that he thought the general idea was a good one but he had had no chance to talk about it with General Marshall yet but that he would do so.

The Prime Minister asked Sir Roger Makins if he could report on the present state of the communiqué.

Sir Roger Makins said that a text was nearly ready to look at and that he thought they had no particular points to raise at the moment.

Secretary Acheson suggested that the drafting group could look at the issues involved and bring back to the President and the Prime Minister any points requiring their decision.

The President said the drafting group could get to work at once and then submit the results to the Prime Minister and to him. If the Prime Minister had not yet met the Vice President and the members of the Cabinet who were present this interval would give an opportunity to talk with them about various matters.

The Vice President said that he had had the pleasure of meeting the Prime Minister some time ago and that he had spoken to him this morning and was glad to say that he found him even younger and more handsome than he had been five years ago.

In response to a question from the President, Secretary Acheson said he would designate Assistant Secretary Perkins to take charge of the work on our side.

The President asked the Prime Minister whether there was anything else he wished to bring up at the moment.

The Prime Minister replied he thought things were pretty well covered.

Sir Oliver Franks said that all of the things they had wanted to bring up had already been covered and he thought in a very satisfactory way. They had nothing new to bring up at the last moment.

The President said that he had nothing new in mind but that he did not want to cut off the discussion if the Prime Minister had wanted to raise anything else. The talks had been very satisfactory from his point of view.

The Prime Minister said that he felt the same way.

The President said we now know where each other stands and commented that the military report which they had had from General Collins gave a more satisfactory presentation than they had had before.

The Prime Minister agreed.

The President said that it was hard in such a military situation for those of us who are sitting at desks to know just what the situation is in the field. He recalled how in various military situations there is a tendency first to have one’s feelings very high up and then very low down. He did not think that we were going to be kicked out of Korea.

The Prime Minister said that we must take a stand and see what happens. No rapid judgment should be made in a fluid situation.

General Bradley remarked that on the basis of the present situation we were at least not forced to negotiate under pressure.

The President and The Prime Minister agreed.

The Vice President inquired whether the line that General Collins had referred to could be held by the forces already in Korea or whether we would have to send more.

General Bradley said that we could hold it with the present force supplemented by the normal flow of replacements.

The President said that was very encouraging. The situation was not as gloomy as it had appeared on the day when the discussions had started. It was very satisfactory to hear from a man who had just been on the spot.

The Prime Minister said that this was very good indeed.

There then ensued general conversation around the table in the course of which the President asked the Prime Minister to excuse him for a few minutes and withdrew from the room.

The President returned to the room at 12:35 and at 12:50 the drafting group returned with its text and the conference resumed.

The President said that if it was agreeable to the Prime Minister he would ask someone to read the communiqué all the way through after which we could discuss the different points.

Secretary Acheson suggested that Mr. Perkins, who had been in charge of the drafting, should read it.

Mr. Perkins read the communiqué.⁵

Secretary Acheson interposed at one point to ask the President whether he could raise a question then or whether the President wished the reading of the communiqué to continue and then to raise the questions.

The President said he would prefer to come back later to specific points.

The President then said there were a couple more sentences on which he and the Prime Minister had agreed and which were to be included in the communiqué. He then read the sentences dealing with the atomic bomb as they appear in the final communiqué. The President said we should find the proper place to insert them.

The President then asked Secretary Acheson if he wanted to bring up the point he had raised on the part dealing with the question of seating the Chinese Communists and Formosa.

Secretary Acheson said there were two questions regarding the language which he would like to raise. In the present text, the explanation of the reasons for the United States not wishing to seat the Chinese Communist representatives in the United Nations was put in terms of our recognition of the Nationalist Government. He proposed the following substitute language: “The United Kingdom has recognized the Central People’s Government and considers that its representatives should occupy China’s seat in the United Nations. The United States has opposed and continued to oppose the seating of the Chinese Communist representatives in the United Nations.”

The Prime Minister said that this alternate language was satisfactory.

Secretary Acheson also called attention to the sentence which said that the decision on Chinese representation was, of course, a matter for the United Nations. He said this was obviously true but the question arose why it was inserted. It must have some significance. Some people might interpret it as meaning we don’t like this situation but it is a fact. It was either a statement of a platitude or it had some special significance which was not apparent and he thought it was better to leave it out.

Mr. Harriman said that this was especially true since the thought was already expressed in the first sentence.

The Prime Minister agreed that the first sentence did carry the same idea, and it was agreed to delete the sentence in question.

Field Marshal Slim wished to raise a question regarding the sentence about the appointment of the Supreme Commander. He hoped this could be modified to read: “It is intended that this appointment will be made soon.” People in Europe are waiting for a definite decision on this point.

Secretary Acheson said that he had no objection to the thought which the Field Marshal had advanced, but his language would sound as if the President and the Prime Minister were announcing the intention of all of the NATO countries.

The President remarked that he was very anxious to appoint the Supreme Commander.

Secretary Acheson suggested it might be possible to say: “It is our joint desire that this shall be made soon.”

The Prime Minister, Field Marshal Slim and Sir Roger Makins all expressed approval, and The President agreed.

The Prime Minister said that in the next to the last line in the sixth paragraph he would like to take out the word “world” before “peace.” As the sentence now reads, it sounds as if we were anticipating the outbreak of world war.

The President agreed.

Secretary Acheson said to the President that it was recommended that the statement on the atomic bomb be inserted in the middle of page 7. In this context it would avoid having the statement refer to any particular part of the world whether Europe or the Far East. It comes in a section dealing with general military capabilities.

The Vice President asked that the statement on the atomic bomb be read again, and The President read it.⁶ The Vice President wondered whether the statement meant that only the Prime Minister would be informed and no one else.

The President pointed out that the Prime Minister represented the country which was especially helping us with raw materials and the general defense effort. He understood that the insertion was satisfactory.

The Attorney General pointed out that on page 3 the language did not correctly state the purpose of the mission of our troops in Korea. They had been sent there not to unify Korea but to resist the aggression. The language in the communiqué did not sound as if this were true.

Mr. Harriman said he thought this was a very important point.

The Prime Minister and The President agreed.

Secretary Acheson suggested substituting the words “to end the aggression” but thought that the drafting group could fix it up. (There followed an exchange of suggestions in which Mr. Harriman, the Prime Minister and others participated ending in an agreement on the text.) The Secretary said that Mr. Early had pointed out a possible misunderstanding beginning at the bottom of page 6 where the text said that the President and the Prime Minister had “reached the following decisions.” Actually, this referred to only two conclusions and not to the balance of the paper. The two conclusions might be numbered.

The President and The Prime Minister agreed.

Mr. Harriman said the Attorney General suggested in the fourth line from the end on page 3 that the word “joint” be inserted so that the phrase would read “For our joint part we are ready. …”

The President said that he and the Secretary of State did not think that the insertion of this word added anything.

Secretary Snyder agreed and The Attorney General said he would not press his point.

The President said that the word had better be left out and The Prime Minister said it was not necessary to put it in. The President said it would therefore not be inserted.

The Prime Minister then returned to the question of the place in which the statement on the atomic bomb would be inserted. He wondered if it would not be better to insert it between the ultimate and penultimate paragraphs.

Sir Oliver Franks added that if this were agreeable to the President they would be happy to have it in that place.

The President agreed and said the insert should be put in the place indicated by the Prime Minister.

The President then asked whether there were any other suggestions. If the communiqué was now satisfactory, it could be agreed upon.

Mr. Harriman said he thought there might be some concern in this country about the statement on page 9 which merely said: “We are fully conscious of the increasing necessity of preventing materials” reaching our adversaries. There was some feeling that this statement might create a good deal of discussion in the United States because of the strong feeling that we ought to do something about this problem.

The President thought that the language was all right as it was. He said that actually we are doing something about it.

As the meeting closed, The Prime Minister thanked the President for his kind hospitality and for the way in which the President and his colleagues had received the Prime Minister and his associates.

The President responded by referring to his statement that this had been a very productive and successful conference.

(Final Communiqué attached.)

[Annex]

Communiqué Issued at the Conclusion of the Truman–Attlee Discussions

Since Prime Minister Attlee arrived in Washington on December 4, six meetings between the President and Mr. Attlee have been held. Among those who participated as advisors to the President were the Secretary of State Dean Acheson, the Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snyder, the Secretary of Defense General George C. Marshall, the Secretary of the Interior Oscar L. Chapman, the Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Mr. W. Averell Harriman, the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board W. Stuart Symington, and Ambassador-designate Waiter S. Gifford. Mr. Attlee’s advisors included the British Ambassador, Sir Oliver S. Franks, Field Marshal Sir William Slim, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder, Sir Roger Makins and Mr. R. H. Scott of the Foreign Office and Sir Edwin Plowden, Chief of the Economic Planning Staff.

At the conclusion of their conferences, the President and the Prime Minister issued the following joint statement:

We have reviewed together the outstanding problems facing our two countries in international affairs. The objectives of our two nations in foreign policy are the same: to maintain world peace and respect for the rights and interests of all peoples, to promote strength and confidence among the freedom-loving countries of the world, to eliminate the causes of fear, want and discontent, and to advance the democratic way of life.

We first reviewed the changed aspect of world affairs arising from the massive intervention of Chinese communists in Korea. We have discussed the problems of the Far East and the situation as it now presents itself in Europe. We have surveyed the economic problems and the defense programs of our respective countries, and particularly the existing and threatened shortages of raw materials. We have considered the arrangements for the defense of the Atlantic community, and our future course in the United Nations.

The unity of objectives of our two countries underlay all the discussions. There is no difference between us as to the nature of the threat which our countries face or the basic policies which must be pursued to overcome it. We recognize that many of the problems which we have discussed can only be decided through the procedures of the United Nations or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The peoples of the United States and the United Kingdom will act together with resolution and unity to meet the challenge to peace which recent weeks have made clear to all.

The situation in Korea is one of great gravity and far-reaching consequences. By the end of October, the forces of the United Nations had all but completed the mission set for them by the United Nations “to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.” A free and unified Korea—the objective which the United Nations has long sought—was well on the way to being realized. At that point Chinese communist forces entered Korea in large numbers, and on November 27 launched a large-scale attack on the United Nations troops. The United Nations forces have the advantage of superior air power and naval support, but on the ground they are confronted by a heavy numerical superiority.

The United Nations forces were sent into Korea on the authority and at the recommendation of the United Nations. The United Nations has not changed the mission which it has entrusted to them and the forces of our two countries will continue to discharge their responsibilities.

We were in complete agreement that there can be no thought of appeasement or of rewarding aggression, whether in the Far East or elsewhere. Lasting peace and the future of the United Nations as an instrument for world peace depend upon strong support for resistance against aggression.

For our part we are ready, as we have always been, to seek an end to the hostilities by means of negotiation. The same principles of international conduct should be applied to this situation as are applied, in accordance with our obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, to any threat to world peace. Every effort must be made to achieve the purposes of the United Nations in Korea by peaceful means and to find a solution of the Korean problem on the basis of a free and independent Korea. We are confident that the great majority of the United Nations takes the same view. If the Chinese on their side display any evidence of a similar attitude, we are hopeful that the cause of peace can be upheld. If they do not, then it will be for the peoples of the world, acting through the United Nations, to decide how the principles of the Charter can best be maintained. For our part, we declare in advance our firm resolve to uphold them.

We considered two questions regarding China which are already before the United Nations. On the question of the Chinese seat in the United Nations, the two governments differ. The United Kingdom has recognized the Central People’s Government and considers that its representatives should occupy China’s seat in the United Nations. The United States has opposed and continues to oppose the seating of the Chinese communist representatives in the United Nations. We have discussed our difference of view on this point and are determined to prevent it from interfering with our united effort in support of our common objectives.

On the question of Formosa, we have noted that both Chinese claimants have insisted upon the validity of the Cairo Declaration and have expressed reluctance to have the matter considered by the United Nations. We agreed that the issues should be settled by peaceful means and in such a way as to safeguard the interests of the people of Formosa and the maintenance of peace and security in the Pacific, and that consideration of this question by the United Nations will contribute to these ends.

The free nations of Asia have given strong support to the United Nations and have worked for world peace. Communist aggression in Korea increases the danger to the security and independence of these nations. We reaffirm our intention to continue to help them.

The pressure of communist expansion existed in Europe and elsewhere long before the aggression against Korea, and measures were taken to meet it. The need to strengthen the forces of collective security had already been recognized and action for this purpose is under way. Clearly, decisions regarding the Far East have their repercussions and effects elsewhere. In considering the necessities of the Far Eastern situation, we have kept in mind the urgency of building up the strength of the whole free world. We are in complete agreement on the need for immediate action by all the North Atlantic Treaty countries to intensify their efforts to build up their defenses and to strengthen the Atlantic Community.

We recognize that adequate defense forces are essential if war is to be prevented.

Accordingly, we have reached the following conclusions:

1. The military capabilities of the United States and the United Kingdom should be increased as rapidly as possible.

2. The two countries should expand the production of arms which can be used by the forces of all the free nations that are joined together in common defense. Together with those other nations the United States and the United Kingdom should continue to work out mutual arrangements by which all will contribute appropriately to the common defense.

We agreed that as soon as the plan now nearing completion in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for an effective integrated force for the defense of Europe is approved, a Supreme Commander should be appointed. It is our joint desire that this appointment shall be made soon.

In addition to these decisions on increasing our military strength, we have agreed that the maintenance of healthy civilian economies is of vital importance to the success of our defense efforts. We agreed that, while defense production must be given the highest practicable priority in the case of raw materials whose supply is inadequate, the essential civilian requirements of the free countries must be met so far as practicable. In order to obtain the necessary materials and to devote them as rapidly as possible to these priority purposes, we have agreed to work closely together for the purpose of increasing supplies of raw materials. We have recognized the necessity of international action to assure that basic raw materials are distributed equitably in accordance with defense and essential civilian needs. We discussed certain immediate problems of raw materials shortages and consideration of these specific matters will continue. We are fully conscious of the increasing necessity of preventing materials and items of strategic importance from flowing into the hands of those who might use them against the free world.

In the circumstances which confront us throughout the world our nations have no other choice but to devote themselves with all vigor to the building up of our defense forces. We shall do this purely as a defensive measure. We believe that the communist leaders of the Soviet Union and China could, if they chose, modify their conduct in such a way as to make these defense preparations unnecessary. We shall do everything that we can, through whatever channels are open to us, to impress this view upon them and to seek a peaceful solution of existing issues.

The President stated that it was his hope that world conditions would never call for the use of the atomic bomb. The President told the Prime Minister that it was also his desire to keep the Prime Minister at all times informed of developments which might bring about a change in the situation.

In this critical period, it is a source of satisfaction to us that the views of our governments on basic problems are so similar. We believe that this identity of aims will enable our governments to carry out their determination to work together to strengthen the unity which has already been achieved among the free nations and to defend those values which are of fundamental importance to the people we represent.

2. Economic Minister in the British Embassy in Washington.
1. Administrator of the Production and Marketing Administration, Department of Agriculture.
3. General Collins held his final meeting with General MacArthur in Tokyo on December 7, at which time the latter gave his overall views on the Korea situation, which were then reported to the JCS by General Collins. General MacArthur felt that the full power of the United Nations should be assembled at once to meet the Communist threat in Asia, since it had appeared there. If reinforcements could be sent to Korea in time, the most advantageous maneuver would be a series of fighting withdrawals to Pusan to damage the Chinese armies as much as possible. If reinforcements could not be forwarded, he thought the Command should be evacuated from Korea. In any case, if the Communists continued their all-out drive and his Command continued to operate with the present restrictions, the forces of the United Nations would have to be withdrawn with or without an armistice. These restrictions, as listed by General Collins, were: (1) no U.N. air action against China; (2) no U.N. naval blockade of China; (3) no reinforcement of U.N. forces from Nationalist China; (4) no substantial reinforcement of U.N. forces from the United States. If the restrictions were withdrawn, and if he could secure 50,000–60,000 Chinese Nationalist troops from Formosa, General MacArthur thought he could hold a line across Korea. If, on the other hand, the Chinese Communists could be persuaded not to cross the 38th Parallel, General MacArthur thought that the United Nations should accept an armistice based on the 38th Parallel, because that would be the most advantageous settlement which could be achieved in the circumstances. (Record of the Actions Taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pp. 70–72)
4. The text of this document is scheduled for publication in volume iii.
5. The draft communiqué read by Mr. Perkins is not printed.
6. See Mr. Jessup’s memorandum of December 7 and the annexed memorandum by Mr. Arneson supplementing the Minutes of the 5th Truman–Attlee Meeting of December 7, p. 1462.