S/AE Files
Memorandum for the Record by the Ambassador at Large
(Jessup)
top secret
[Washington,] December 7, 1950.
Excerpt From Meeting Between the President and Prime
Minister in the Cabinet Room of the White House, Thursday, December
7, 1950
(This information not incorporated in official account of
meetings.)
The President said he had just talked with the Prime Minister and that they
had discussed the atomic bomb and its use. The President reminded Mr. Attlee
that the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States had always
been partners in this matter and that he would not consider the use of the
bomb without consulting with the United Kingdom. The Prime Minister asked
whether this agreement should be put in writing, and the President replied
no that it would not be in writing, that if a man’s word wasn’t any good it
wasn’t made any better by writing it down. The Prime Minister expressed his
thanks.
This is single copy to be retained by Mr. Battle in the Secretary’s
office.1
[Annex]
Memorandum for the Record, by Mr. R. Gordon Arneson, Special Assistant to
the Secretary of State
2
top secret
[Washington,] January 16, 1953.
Subject: Truman–Attlee Conversations of December 1950:
Use of Atomic Weapons
- 1.
- The position which Secretary Acheson discussed with the President,
in anticipation of the British raising the question of the use of
atomic weapons, is attached at Tab A.3
- 2.
- In the course of the Fifth Meeting of the Truman–Attlee
conversations in the Cabinet Room of the White House, Thursday,
December 7, 1950, the President spoke to the subject along the lines
reflected in Tab B.4
- 3.
- As the Sixth Meeting began on December 8, 1950,5 Secretary Acheson called for Mr. Arneson
to join him at the White House to advise him as to what should be
said in the Joint Communiqué concerning atomic weapons.
- 4.
- Shortly after 12 o’clock noon the President withdrew briefly from
the meeting and went to his office to discuss with Secretary
Acheson, Secretary Lovett, Secretary Snyder, Mr. Harriman, and Mr.
Arneson the language to be incorporated in the Joint Communiqué.
During the discussion, Secretary Lovett recalled that the Quebec
Agreement6 had
provided that the United States had to obtain United Kingdom consent
before using the atomic weapon. Members of the Joint Congressional
Committee on Atomic Energy, particularly Senator Vandenberg and
Senator Hickenlooper, had been very disturbed at this provision and
had urged most strongly that steps be taken to abrogate it.
Negotiations were undertaken at the end of 19477 (Mr.
Lovett was then Under Secretary of State) to supplant the Quebec
Agreement with other arrangements. A salient objective of these
negotiations was to terminate the provision concerning United
Kingdom consent. The resultant Modus Vivendi
of January 7, 1948,8 provided, among other things, that the commitment
concerning use of atomic weapons was to have no further force or
effect. As the discussion proceeded, Mr. Arneson drafted the
language which was subsequently incorporated in the final Joint
Communiqué of December 8, 1950. The President approved the suggested
language and asked Secretary Acheson to secure British acceptance
thereof.
- 5.
- Secretary Acheson discussed the matter with Sir Oliver Franks and,
with British concurrence, these two sentences were inserted as the
penultimate paragraph of the Communiqué. (Tab C).9 The United States Minutes of the
Sixth Meeting state:
“The President then said there were a couple more sentences
on which he and the Prime Minister had agreed and which were
to be included in the communiqué. He then read the sentences
dealing with the atomic bomb as they appear in the final
communiqué. The President said we should find the proper
place to insert them.”
- 6.
- In the course of subsequent comparison of minutes of the meetings,
Mr. Wayne Jackson learned that the British Minutes of the Fifth
Meeting included a passage along the lines of the first statement
which
[Page 1464]
the President made
on the subject. (Tab A).10 The point was made at that time that this
statement should be deleted since the President had corrected it and
his correction constituted a change in the record of the conference
itself. It was pointed out that the United States position on this
matter was as reflected in the text of the Joint Communiqué. (For
Ambassador Jessup’s note on this point, see Tab D.)11
- 7.
- In subsequent conversations with Mr. F. W. Marten of the British
Embassy, Mr. Arneson had occasion to make the same point, namely
that the official United States position as agreed by the President
and as accepted by Prime Minister Attlee, was set forth in the
penultimate paragraph of the Joint Communiqué—no more and no
less.
[Subannex]
Position Paper Prepared for the Truman–Attlee
Talks
Use of Atomic Bomb
present position
The President has made clear (a) that by law only
he can authorize its use, and (b) that he has not
authorized its use.
The sensational action by the press in dealing with the questions and
answers at the President’s press conference12 has given the impression that the President
is actively considering use of the bomb in China.
british position
That the bomb should not be used without consultation—and probably
without agreement—with them and perhaps others. Probably, also, they are
strongly opposed to its use in China.
[Page 1465]
other factors
These are known to the President.
recommendations for attlee discussions
- (a)
- That no commitment be made restricting the
action of the U.S.
- (b)
- That our desire not to use the bomb be
stressed.
- (c)
- That our realization of the dire consequences for all of its use
be stressed and our great sense of responsibility. We are, indeed,
trustees for the future of the world in this respect.
- (d)
- That our desire and expectation to move in step with the British
be stressed. (Their role in this matter requires this.)
- (e)
- That, if necessary after the preliminary discussions, further
consideration of our position be undertaken.
