790.5/10–1250
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Ward P. Allen, Adviser, United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly 1
Subject: Pacific Pact
| Participants: | Mr. Percy Spender, Minister of External Affairs, Australia |
| Sir Keith Officer, Australian Ambassador to France | |
| Mr. John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State | |
| Ward P. Allen, EUR |
Mr. Hickerson opened the conversation by making clear that while, as the Vandenberg Resolution2 shows, the United States has a general background of sympathetic interest with respect to regional pacts, [Page 150] nevertheless there are a large number of questions in our mind regarding any Pacific Pact relating to the participants, scope of the area, nature of obligations, etc., on which we would appreciate Mr. Spender’s views.
Obligations in Pact: Mr. Spender stated that he envisaged as the “pivotal point” a provision substantially similar to Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty, embodying a definitive and general obligation. He appreciated the scope of the Article as Mr. Hickerson explained it and felt that the same obligation was what was needed. In response to a question as to machinery, Mr. Spender stated that some sort of continuing council would be necessary with some adjunctive military mechanism, but nothing as “elaborate and cumbersome” as the NATO.
Participants: In Mr. Spender’s view, there are three strategic areas of the world (leaving aside Latin America): (1) North Atlantic, (2) Middle East, and (3) the Indian Ocean and Pacific. However, from a realistic point of view the Pact could not embrace the entire third area. He had recently made a public statement suggesting a Pact which would include the Commonwealth countries in the area (Pakistan, India, Burma, Ceylon) but this was purely “for political reasons.” He stated that he was aware that India would not join. He referred to Nehru’s expressed antipathy for such a Pact at the Colombo Conference and stated his conviction that if we waited for India “it is clear there won’t be any Pact.”
Therefore, within practical realistic limits, Mr. Spender believes the parties should be Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, United States, United Kingdom and Canada, if she is willing—those states capable of undertaking military commitments in the area. Indonesia should be asked but would probably follow India’s line and refuse. It is “important but not necessary” to have Asiatic non-white states as members “but the creation of the Pact should not be conditioned upon this.” The question of China’s participation is premature and cannot be answered now. He would be opposed to the participation of the Nationalist government “even assuming they have any probable remaining length of life” but felt that if the Peiping Government is generally recognized, it could be invited to adhere. Japan must be a party at some future time; it is obviously premature now. To exclude them would appear to make the Pact a “bloc anti”, i.e., a bloc directed against some specific country. France and the Netherlands should not participate; their pacific interests are such that it would introduce the whole explosive colonial aspect. Thus the Indochina States could not be members because they could not be brought in except through France.
Thailand would not be a member at least initially. It is a power [Page 151] vacuum, difficult to fill now except by economic means. Later, perhaps after the vacuum is filled they might become members.
There would be no great practical value in including Chile and other Latin American Pacific States, although there would be no objection if it were politically advisable and, from the point of view of the concept as a “Pacific Pact”, the more the better. Mr. Hickerson raised the question as to whether without a non-white country there would be real danger of any Pact being regarded as a white Asian alliance, attendant undesirable implications and repercussions. Messrs. Spender and Officer replied that in their view we tend to emphasize such political aspects. “We cannot hold the Asians without strength which they respect”. It can be sold to them on the theory that it would help prevent war and keep it from Asia. Mr. Hickerson also pointed out that with such a membership, as proposed, the Pact could hardly be effective to protect the mainland, to which Mr. Spender responded that it would probably be difficult defend in any case.
Operative Area: Mr. Allen indicated that the Rio3 and NA treaties become operative in the event of an attack on certain countries within the region although they are not parties and wondered whether Mr. Spender had in mind embracing the same concept. Mr. Spender responded that the strategic area extended through Indonesia, Malaya, Thailand and Indonesia and that at or within those boundaries it might be provided that an attack would be considered an attack on the parties, but would not obligate them to the specific assistance of the non-party initially attacked. He added, however, that this would have to be further considered.
Need For Pact: In response to our doubts as to need, Mr. Spender stated that of course no Pacific war could be fought without Australia (and in this connection deplored United States Navy’s thinking in World War II that Australia could be written off) and that the Pact would serve a real strategic purpose.
He pointed out it would also help Australia discharge its world responsibilities. He recalled that in World War II Australia had sent several divisions to the Middle East and with Japan’s attack, “got caught with its pants down” and would have been lost but for the United States. He referred to the rising feeling in the Labor Party against overseas service and said that although if war came Australia would send its troops where needed, it would be much easier if they had the assurance of a Pact.
In response to questions, Mr. Spender stated that he personally realized that there was no danger of Australia being attacked and no [Page 152] probability that they would ever be attacked without simultaneous attack on the United States. But in his view “that is not the point”. It is public opinion and the necessity of assurance of some assistance. He added that if there is no danger, then the United States commitment under the Pact would be less than that of Australia.
Messrs. Spender and Officer made two additional points regarding public opinion: (1) the Australians, with their affection for the United States, do not understand why, when they are prepared to stand with us if we are attacked, they get no response. It is a feeling that “friends don’t get the same consideration as weak sisters” and that the Australians “are not getting a fair go”. Every time we extend the NAT, as to Greece and Turkey, we strengthen that feeling. (2) Present United States ideas for a “soft” peace with Japan would be very difficult to sell without the counter balance of a pact.
Mr. Hickerson observed that in short the Australian Government’s main concern is public opinion rather than any invocation of a Pact in the immediate future. Mr. Spender agreed with the qualification that of course a Pact would have preventive value and would improve general stability. He did not feel that other means, such as intensified diplomatic consultation to let Australia’s voice be heard would serve the same purpose. (He referred to his defense against criticism for Australia’s exclusion from Korean planning.) However, he did agree that some bilateral agreement would help.
Mr. Hickerson concluded on the note that we see their problems and are sympathetic but there are still major difficulties involved and we do not, at the moment, know the answers.
- Mr. Allen was Special Assistant on United Nations Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs.↩
- For the text of the Vandenberg Resolution and other documentation on the origins of the North Atlantic Treaty, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. iii, pp. 135 ff.↩
- For documentation on the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, concluded at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, Rio de Janeiro, August 15–September 2, 1947, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. viii, pp. 1 ff.↩