Lot 54D444
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles)1
Subject: Japanese Peace Treaty
| Present: | Prime Minister Menzies2 |
| Ambassador Makin3 | |
| Secretary Acheson | |
| Mr. Harriman4 | |
| Mr. Jessup | |
| Mr. Dulles |
Mr. Menzies said that he favored proceeding promptly with a Japanese Peace Treaty and he felt that it should be a generous and not a punitive treaty. He referred to the fact that after the last war we had adopted half-way measures as regards Germany, being neither punitive nor liberal, and that, in his opinion, largely explained the rise of Hitlerism. He felt it important to avoid repeating that mistake this time as regards Japan and Germany.
[Page 1262]He did not believe that the treaty should impose economic or military restrictions upon the Japanese except possibly restricting their right to build a navy with offensive capabilities.
Secretary Acheson said he was glad to hear this expression of the Prime Minister’s views as that coincided very largely with those of the United States and we are now giving active consideration to the policy of proceeding with the kind of a peace treaty that the Prime Minister had outlined. Secretary Acheson said he doubted the efficacy of even naval restrictions as in practice it became extremely difficult to enforce them.
Mr. Dulles expressed the hope that the Prime Minister would return via Japan and acquaint himself personally with the situation there.5 He said that the Australian Ambassador, Colonel Hodgson, had indicated opposition to a peace treaty at this time, being apparently the only one of the allied diplomatic corps at Tokyo to feel that way. The Prime Minister indicated that Colonel Hodgson’s views would not carry great weight with his government.
- The conversation took place at a dinner at the Australian Embassy on July 28.↩
- Robert Gordon Menzies was in the United States on an official visit from July 27 to August 7, 1950. For other documentation, see pp. 189 ff.↩
- Norman O. Makin, of Australia.↩
- Ambassador Averell Harriman was Special Assistant to the President.↩
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In telegram 399 from Tokyo, August 15, Mr. Sebald reported on his conversation held there the preceding day with the Prime Minister. He stated in part:
“Regarding Japanese peace treaty, Menzies definitely convinced treaty should be negotiated without further delay, not only because Japan in present anomalous position unable contribute its share toward stability and peace in Asia, but because of long-range necessity making Japan firm ally of West. Quoting Chamberlain as saying in 1936 that Britain’s greatest mistake was abrogation of Anglo-Japanese alliance, Menzies felt best hold we could have over Japan would be firm partnership with Japan, designed to stabilize situation in Northeast Asia. He of course, fully aware of difficulties to be faced in Australia in “selling” this concept to people, but plans immediately after arrival Australia call together every important newspaper publisher and editor for off-the-record briefing session and plea for assistance in swinging public opinion around to realities of Japanese situation, with special emphasis upon necessity denying Japan and its industrial complex to Soviets. While expressing alarm over potentialities of Sovietized Japan as aggressive force, especially as revived naval power, he felt Communist SEA would pose no immediate threat to Australia for reason that those countries lack naval and air power. He concluded that Japan must at all costs be brought firmly into Western camp and that urgent problem today is definitive action regarding Japan.” (694.001/8–1550)
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