I attach hereto a memorandum in which I have put down a few thoughts with
reference to developing military strength in Japan. You may want to
consider this from the policy standpoint and with a view to relevant
action.
I have asked Mr. Allison to consult with Mr. Hamilton as to existing
FEC decisions with a view to seeing
whether there are any possibilities of developing some military strength
consistently therewith.1
[Attachment]
From the standpoint of general war and who wins it, Germany and Japan
are of prime importance. If the Soviet Union could augment its
present strength by adding the manpower and industrial resources of
these two areas, it would have reason to feel that it could sustain
a long war and have a good chance of winning it.
It is prudent to assume that there will be increasing Soviet effort
to get these two assets. Indeed, the Korean attack may be the
beginning of such an effort as regards Japan.
I have not been following closely the German situation. As regards
Japan, far distant from us and close to the Soviet Union, the United
States would assume an almost impossible burden in attempting its
defense without any help from the Japanese themselves.
National rearmament by the Japanese government at this time would
encounter serious and understandable objections on the, part of
former victims of Japanese aggression and, indeed, from the Japanese
themselves. A solution might be found in a combination of (1)
recreating a strong federal police force and coastal patrol, and (2)
recruiting Japanese individually as part of an international
force.
- (1)
- Today, in Japan, there is a numerically substantial police
force (approximately 200,000 after the newly authorized 75,000
increase),2 but it is
decentralized to an extreme degree and is not armed (other than
pistols) or trained so that in an emergency it could be quickly
converted into an armed unit usable for defense against attack.
There are only a few unarmed boats for coastal patrol. The
transformation of the police into a para-military force and the
aiming of the Coast Guard vessels is at present impossible due
to standing F.E.C. policy decisions. If these were ended by
treaty or otherwise, there could be developed a police force
with the potentiality mentioned above as well as a small torpedo
boat navy for coast guard and antismuggling purposes
[Page 1248]
which would also be
effective to oppose a landing operation. I understand NA is discussing with the Department
of the Army methods of strengthening the police within the
framework of existing FEC
policies.
- (2)
- The present possibility of action in the Security Council
without Soviet veto may make it possible to establish
contingents under Article 43 which could presumably include
individual Japanese (even though Japan is not a member of the
U.N.) and make these recruits subject to the direction of a
command chosen by the Security Council rather than subject to
political direction from the Japanese government.
If action were taken along these lines, it presumably should be done
quietly and gradually, as any publicly-announced intention to rearm
Japan might precipitate Soviet action of a preventive character. At
best there would be some risk of this, but subject to further study
it would seem that this risk was less than the risk of perpetuating
an indefensible position as regards this area which is one of those
which may constitute the decisive balance of strength between the
communist world and the free world.
