Subject: Voorhees’ Suggested Approach to Japanese Treaty
Problem
Yesterday, March 23, Under Secretary of the Army Voorhees called on the
Secretary at his own request. At the meeting, which was attended by the
Secretary, Ambassador Jessup and Messrs. Rusk, Butterworth and Howard,
Mr. Voorhees outlined the approach to the Japanese treaty problem
contained in a memorandum from him to the Secretary.
The Secretary replied that we had already considered a proposal of this
nature and that the Secretary’s preliminary reaction was that the
arguments advanced for the proposal on legal grounds unduly stressed the
extent to which such grounds, as contrasted with the political and power
relationships between the USSR and the United States, would motivate the
Soviet Union in its actions. Mr. Voorhees replied that he had discussed
his proposal at length with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he thought that
they would be willing to go along with such a proposal, but he felt
certain that the concern of the Joint Chiefs with respect to these legal
grounds could not be changed. The Secretary indicated that he would
nevertheless wish to discuss the matter with the Joint Chiefs.
Mr. Voorhees left with the Secretary a copy of his memorandum together
with four tabs consisting of memoranda prepared by Messrs. Dorr and
Murchison.2 Copies
of these memoranda are attached as indicated above.
[Attachment]
Memorandum for the Secretary of State
Subject: A suggested approach to the Japanese Treaty
problem
Last December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated their conclusion that
a treaty with Japan is premature. This reaffirmed their opinion of
June 1949 and was in accord with the existing NSC policy approved in May 1949.
[Page 1151]
At my request, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during their trip to Japan
in January,3 reconsidered this subject after having a full personal
presentation to them of General MacArthur’s views. On their return
they again reaffirmed their previous position.
The basic reasoning underlying this position is, I believe, that an
unarmed Japan would have no security without the presence of U.S.
forces; that the surrender terms require that the occupation forces
of the Allies withdraw at the end of the occupation; that to avert
the necessity of withdrawal of U.S. troops, the proposed making of a
bilateral agreement between Japan and the U.S. for bases might well
be a breach of the surrender terms that occupation forces should
withdraw when the occupation is over; further, that Russia has a
right to have occupation troops in Japan but has not exercised it
because of unwillingness to place her forces under an American
Commander, as she is required to do while the “regime of control”
continues; that if Japan should succeed in terminating the “regime
of control” by a treaty to which Russia is not a party, this would
leave Russia with a right to send in occupation troops free of any
American Command, even without restoration of hostilities; that this
would give the U.S. troops remaining in bases in Japan the
unattractive options of resisting such landing by force or of
attacking Russian troops which had landed, or of sharing the islands
with Russian troops, or of withdrawing and turning Japan over to the
Russians; further, that Russia would have an alternative right to
consider the state of hostilities restored because of Japan’s breach
of her surrender agreement (to place her Government and her Emperor
under the Supreme Commander) and by harassing tactics against
shipping or otherwise make the maintenance of the economy of Japan
impossible.
On the other hand, public discussion over the past six months has
made a treaty an issue of great importance in Japan. High hopes have
been raised, the complete disappointment of which might well
prejudice the present favorable orientation of Japan toward the U.S.
General MacArthur believes that the focal point of interest for
Japan is to obtain by treaty a termination of the state of war,
which will give her the right to conduct her international affairs,
and to this end to have diplomatic and consular agents and trade
representatives in other nations. He states that the Japanese are
now in very large part running their domestic affairs and that the
Occupation’s economic controls are now being progressively reduced
to the minimum necessary to assure effective utilization of U.S.
economic aid.
The salient fact is that the word “treaty” itself has become an issue
of importance in maintaining Japan’s favorable present
orientation.
[Page 1152]
The problem is therefore a serious one, not only for the State
Department, but for the Occupation and for the Department of the
Army with its occupational responsibility.
Accordingly, since the Joint Chiefs’ latest reaffirmation of their
position, we have made intensive studies of this subject. In these
Mr. G. H. Dorr, Mr. David C. Murchison (until recently associated
with Mr. Dorr’s law office) and I have all participated. These
studies led us to the conclusion that a treaty
dealing with the subjects which are most essential to the U.S.
and Japan is not necessarily inconsistent with the retention of
the “regime of control”; that such a treaty might,
therefore, be negotiated between Japan and the U.S. and any other
nations which might care to join, without violation of Russia’s
rights. We feel that this approach may reconcile in large degree the
dilemma created by the need for a treaty and the Joint Chiefs’
requirement of a continuing secure position for U.S. troops in
Japan.
This approach might be utilized in more than one way. One could be to
call a peace conference inviting all the nations including Russia
and China. (Present difficulties relating to recognition of China
are of course recognized.) Such a call could state that Japan had
done all in her power to carry out the surrender terms, entitling
her to a treaty if obtainable, but also pointing out that one basic
occupation objective, that of establishment of peace and security,
has not yet been fully accomplished if the terms of the surrender
requiring that Japan be unarmed and that occupation troops withdraw
be adhered to; that this is due to no fault of Japan but to the
disturbed conditions in nearby areas, which are such that Japan
would be left without security. Some such reservation appears
necessary to avoid an admission that there is no right or necessity
to continue the occupation after Russia and China refuse to modify
the surrender terms and to join in a treaty recognizing Japan’s
right to agree to U.S. bases.
A simpler, more direct approach might be for the U.S. merely to
announce that Japan had done everything in her power to entitle
herself to a treaty, but that, without some modification of the
surrender terms, this could not be achieved in a way to provide for
her security, due to troubled conditions on the nearby mainland; and
further stating that positions already taken by Russia had made it
clear that no treaty which would realistically provide for
establishment of peace and security could apparently be negotiated
at the present time with Russia; that accordingly the U.S. proposed
to negotiate with Japan, in company with any other friendly powers
who care to join, a partial treaty covering such subjects as could
be dealt with consistently with the Potsdam and Moscow
agreements.
Under either approach the proposal would also contemplate the
issuance by the President of the United States of an “interim
directive,” under his right to do so granted by the Moscow
Agreement,
[Page 1153]
which would
establish as a matter of policy for the Supreme Commander that,
after the treaty goes into effect, he should endeavor as far as
possible consistent with the objectives of the occupation to seek to
achieve such objectives through the Japanese Government, with a
minimum of intervention in the Government and in a manner which
would be consistent with the purposes of the treaty. This would be
possible because there is no general limiting provision as to any
minimum degree to which, nor as to the manner in which, the Supreme
Commander must exercise his powers.
Under this plan, the “regime of control” would be continued, there
would be a Supreme Commander and none of Russia’s rights under the
various agreements would be violated. Further, there would be a
continued clear legal right for the presence of U.S. occupation
troops, and there would be no increased danger of Russia’s seeking
to send troops because, if sent, they would still as at present have
to be placed under the Supreme Commander, a condition which Russia
has found unacceptable.
Yet, on the other hand, a state of peace would be established between
Japan and the U.S. and any other friendly nations joining in such
treaty; the Japanese Government could have international recognition
and dignity in its relations with the signatory nations, and would
possess a very large measure of sovereignty in both domestic and
international affairs. It could in fact have a greater degree of
sovereignty than the German Government possesses under the present
occupation statute. Yet the U.S. would have the residual power
residing in the inherent authority of the Supreme Commander ready to
be exercised in an emergency due to war, attempted Communist coup or
otherwise.
Under such a plan, the limitations on the complete sovereignty of
Japan could also be clearly shown to be due to the unwillingness of
Russia to participate in the negotiations for a more complete
treaty.
While there would be subjects which such a partial treaty could not
cover, such as reparations rights—unless the U.S. or other nations
should choose to end their reparations claims as part of the
treaty—and disposition of areas outside the four main islands, these
omissions would not appear to interfere with achievement of the main
objectives of a treaty as a solution of the present dilemma.
The above approach was submitted to Secretary Johnson on February
27th and he directed that I take this up in his behalf with the
Secretary of State in a purely exploratory way, with of course no
commitment being made on any one’s part.
Should the present suggestion prove to have value, the credit for it
would be due in very large part to Mr. Dorr’s and Mr. Murchison’s
contribution.
