Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

357.AA/10–550: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in India ¹

secret

Washington, October 5, 1950—8 p. m.

512. Neth Amb² called on Asst Secy FE³ evening Oct 4 to ask, on his Govt’s instruction, that US Govt make urgent effort thru its Rep on UNCI to cause that body intervene immed to “stop hostilities between Indo Rep and South Moluccan Rep.” Amb said RI mil now landing Ambon in force approx nine thousand; that Ambon troops number about two thousand; that in his view Ambon wld fight to the finish; that fighting wld continue for sometime and wld be characterized by great brutality. Neth Amb said he believed Indo Rep civil authorities wld welcome strong action UNCI as he thought such action wld strengthen them vis-à-vis Indo mil who Amb believed were architects present operation. Amb emphasized great sympathy for Ambon in Holland, and pointed out that during course Hague negots Neth had believed that federal system in Indo wld provide local autonomy for Ambon and that in some part this belief contributed to Neth acceptance of HRTC.

In response to questions Neth Amb said his Govt believed UNCI shld ask for cease fire which he believed wld be accepted by both Indo Rep and Ambon: that in their present predicament Ambon wld probably settle for less than complete autonomous status but desired “considerable, degree local autonomy.”

Asst Secy FE told Neth Amb Dept had asked US Rep UNCI to intervene effectively as he cld immed upon receipt original request by Neth Emb Sept 30 but that efforts “US Rep so far unavailing”; that Dept fully realized serious character Ambon development.

On Sept 30, Dept instructed Doolittle, US Rep UNCI as follows:

“Code Room pls insert here full text of Deptel 342, Sept 30 to Djakarta, Control No. 9500.”⁴

Doolittle’s reply of Oct 3 stated that Comm agreed such request wld do no good at present.⁵ Amb Cochran advised as fols:

“Code Room pls insert here full text of Djakarta’s tel 455, Oct 2, to Dept, Control No. 255.”⁶

In view of oft-rptd expressions regret he not consulted concerning Asian affairs, Dept believes Nehru shld be interested in Ambon developments. If you agree, Dept believes you shld give Nehru background foregoing without revealing Dutch requests to US, emphasizing his great influence on Indo leadership, expressing hope that India, so distinguished for its humanitarian concerns, shares US desire that this violent episode be brought to speedy and peaceful conclusion. You shld point out that protracted violence on Ambon may have serious effects on Indo stability and will give at least color to claims of enemies of Indo and other new Asian states that they cannot run their own affairs. Dept does not believe you shld ask Nehru to take any particular course in the circumstances; rather that you shld express hope that he can exert his influence in any way he thinks desirable.⁷

AmEmbassy, London shld give FonOff background on Ambon developments and ask FonOff if it believes it can bring influence to bear on this situation.⁸

AmEmbassy, Karachi authorized, in its discretion, to make approach to FonOff along lines of above instruction to New Delhi.

AmEmbassy, Djakarta, in its discretion, shld make such reps as it believes wld be useful, emphasizing, if it is deemed desirable, humanitarian aspects of situation developing in Ambon as well as obligations Indo has assumed under UN Charter.

Webb

1. Repeated to Brussels as 449, Canberra as 82, Djakarta as 364, Karachi as 183, London as 1789, and The Hague as 399.
2. J. Herman van Royen had become Netherlands Ambassador to the United States on September 19.
3. Dean Rusk.
4. Not printed; it reported the request of the Netherlands Embassy on September 30 and asked Doolittle to “immed recommend cease fire” if the reports of an attack on Ambon, were true. Ambassador Cochran was instructed to back up the UNCI efforts “by strong representation … to Indo Govt.” (357.AA/9–3050)
5. Telegram 457 (Gocus 903), October 3, from Djakarta, not printed (357.AA/10–350).
6. Not printed; it reported, inter alia, that Roem had told Cochran that Leimena’s second peace mission to Ambon had been repulsed and that he had cabled the Indonesian Government on October 2 “recommending military action against Ambon.” Cochran had reiterated his offer to help in any possible way, but Roem said he did not see anything that the Ambassador could do. (357.AA/10–250)
7. In telegram 864, October 9, from New Delhi, not printed, Ambassador Henderson reported that he had discussed the Ambon situation with the Indian Foreign Office which indicated that there was nothing it could do although regretting the Indonesian resort to force. (357.AA/10–950)
8. In telegram 2078, October 9, from London, not printed, Ambassador Douglas indicated that he had discussed Ambon with Foreign Office officials who felt Bevin would hesitate to approach Nehru. The main basis for his hesitation “was feeling UK had already used up all its store of good-will with Nehru in attempting influence him with respect to Korea and any further requests for his good offices would serve only to irritate him.…” (756D.00/10–950)