756D.00/8–2650: Telegram
The Ambassador in Indonesia (Cochran) to the Secretary of State
284. Visited President Sukarno forenoon 26th his request. He sought information and advice on China. Said when Nehru was here,1 latter said Kuomintang finished in China, Mao Tze-tung in control and no use expecting anything except full relations with Communist Government, admission to UN, etc. Sukarno asked why US had diplomatic relations with Communist Russia but not with Communist China. I recalled we had refrained from establishing diplomatic relations with Communist regime at Moscow for several years and that our actual relations were perhaps better in that period of absence of diplomats than since.
As for China, I said we had aided Chiang Kai-shek importantly over several years and had been disappointed his government had not followed up its success in liberalizing China by a program of improvement welfare Chinese people under truly democratic and benevolent regime. At same time we felt Communization of China came as directly from Moscow as if tremendous army of Muscovites had marched into China to install their institutions at point of sword. We aware that Communist control widespread in China, but do not know how much may be superficial acceptance and how deep may be hatred and potential resistance against Communism by truly patriotic Chinese, guerrillas, etc. We did not feel Communism had been voluntarily adopted by the country and we doubted China would become irretrievably Communist. We did not risk believing, however, that Communism as it now exists in China is different from Communism as found in Moscow. Our view to date had been that present Peking regime has not conducted itself as government of sovereign state duly cognizant of rights of other sovereign states and following accepted methods and standards in international intercourse. I cited indignities inflicted upon our Foreign Service officers and American businessmen, and also mentioned difficulties British are experiencing, even after being ready to exchange diplomats.
I summarized President Truman’s statement of June 27 on both Korea and Formosa.2 I said US upholding its pledge to UN and would continue to fight in behalf UN created state suffering from [Page 1055] aggression at hands of Communist North Korea with latter benefiting from last word in Russian equipment and training in addition to compaign of fraud and, lies perpetrated by Malik3 in manner insulting decent members of UN and countries they represent. I said I was happy to see Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and Philippines helping, as well as British and French sparing aid from their Far Eastern outposts. I said frankly many friends of Indonesia would have been delighted if this new state, owing its birth so importantly to UN, and now awaiting for admission to UN, had come out publicly in support of UN cause and had made some official contribution thereto, I said I had not approached his government toward that end, desiring meticulously to respect its sovereignty and freedom of action. I had not failed, however, constantly to remind him and his associates in government of danger which they are risking from Communism and of urgency of their taking every measure and precaution to get their own internal problems solved soonest while being vigilant to keep out and down Communist elements trying to penetrate or raise their heads from within.
I said we did not know whether Communist China would dare attack Formosa in view of position we have taken, and risk full war with US as result. I said if this happened Sukarno surely ought to realize more fully than ever that there is a concerted move on part of Communists stemming from Moscow to take over all of Asia including islands to the south. I pointed out how vulnerable Philippines and Indonesia would be if Chinese with Moscow support took Formosa, moved en masse over Indochina and Thailand and then threatened the two island republics, still weak from their birth struggles and from Communist internal machinations. I said Sukarno should realize it is US force alone that can save Indonesia from Communism and that he should keep that in mind in his international relations.
I told Sukarno that Melby mission4 would be here shortly and would question me searchingly re use to which Indonesians will put military equipment being provided. I recalled to President he had told me morning after outbreak of Communist uprising in Republic in September 1948 that he had chosen his side in third world war. I told him I had not reminded him of this lately but I was still convinced of his real sentiments and those of Hatta, Sultan of Jogja and his other close collaborators or I would not have carried on as calmly as I have, recommending military equipment, continuing economic aid, etc. I said my visitors would have to be convinced also, however, that arms that we spare to Indonesia, at a time when we are carrying burden of UN fighting against what may eventually be Communist world, will be utilized in our common cause.
[Page 1056]I told Sukarno he and his people were inclined to become too self-satisfied and complacent over their newly-acquired sovereignty. I reminded him of years he and his colleagues had fought and had passed in jail or in exile in endeavor to achieve sovereignty for their people. I said they might lose everything in brief period unless they were keenly alive to dangers of Communist infiltration in their schools, labor organizations, army, etc. I told him to be sure not to underrate recently arrived Chinese Communist Ambassador who now has large staff already here. Sukarno admitted it was largely because of recent visit from that Ambassador and prospect of a follow-up call in next few days that he had asked me to come in for a talk.
Sukarno said on last call Ambassador had talked of their community of interest, strength of China and wisdom of their working out their problems together. He expects that on his next visit Ambassador will press him to come out openly in favor of admission Communist China to UN. He asked me what he should say. I replied that in first place Indonesia was not a member of UN and its Chief of State had no business telling UN who should be admitted. Furthermore, Indonesia had not declared itself along side UN in Korean matter even though indebted to UN for its freedom and enjoying support from freedom loving and respecting members thereof. I said these friends of Indonesia would certainly be shocked if Indonesia should now take position that could be interpreted as throwing itself in with Communist group in opposition to free nations. He said he would not give desired endorsement to Communist China.
Sukarno asked if I did not realize he had asked Natsir5 to form a government because of strong opposition of Natsir and his Masjumi Party to Communism. I said I hoped that whatever government is formed will for sake of its own country realize Communist danger and take strong measures against movement before it is too late. Incidentally, Sukarno said Natsir visited him last night re difficulty in filling position Minister of Interior. Said too early tell whether Natsir may succeed in forming government. I said I would work loyally with whatever government comes in but naturally would like to see in office old dependables whom I have come to know.
I told Sukarno how much I liked tone of his reply of August 22 to greetings from US Senate on occasion Indonesian independence anniversary. I said I knew how much Sukarno respected American institutions and desired that his country pattern itself after mine. I said I had come to feel rather badly past few weeks since it had begun to appear Indonesians did not desire have world think they were even friends of US. I said I had been obliged to “play down” assistance US giving Indonesia in way of police equipment, economic support and [Page 1057] assignment of medical, agricultural and other technical experts under STEM plan. President assured me that there was no diminution in friendship but he did sympathize with position Hatta and Djuanda had taken especially in these several weeks of political crisis when leftists would use against these and my other moderate friends any possible evidence that US might be endeavoring influence Indonesian policy and draw latter into Korean war.
Sukarno happy to report that he thought Djuanda, Sjaffrudin and Sultan of Jogja, all moderates would be in next Cabinet. Said he hoped US would continue aid his country and work through his associates in government. He did say, however, that such help could be much more effective if extended quietly rather than with much publicity. He said Chinese Ambassador would undoubtedly approach him now seeking permission for Chinese center comparable to USIS and for display Chinese films. Said if we expanded any further it should be done quietly and unobtrusively rather than obviously. He appreciated assistance we have given and are giving in police training, etc.
At this point I again stressed danger to Indonesia of Chinese Embassy and its agents. When Sukarno said chief of Police had learned various security ideas in US I said this had only been a beginning and much more instruction necessary both in US and Indonesia, and then dissemination of information and implementation of methods learned. I said in meantime his government would have to be most vigilant in watching Chinese activities which can be covered up so easily with a colony of two military [million] Chinese in this archipelago.
Sukarno referred once more to Nehru’s visit. I said my country had great respect for him and sympathy with his purpose in striving for peace. I said we were convinced, however, that one could not depend upon Soviet word and that it would be foolhardy to endeavor purchase peace through deal which would give Communist China seat in UN. I said separate questions should be determined on their respective merits and that US had no idea of dropping out present conflict while taking chance on a Soviet promise. I said we had seen too many countries which we had originally helped establish, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, fall prey to Communism to permit us to relax our vigilance now that we have taken up challenge. I said I realized Indonesia leaders had some conceptions of a “third force” comparable to those advanced in India. I thought time would prove, however, that one must take side one feels is right one in such division as that which now faces the world.6
- Ambassador Cochran had reported on Nehru’s visit to Indonesia in telegram 796, June 17, from Djakarta, not printed (756D.00/6–1750).↩
- For the text of President Truman’s statement of June 27, see vol. vii, p. 202.↩
- Yakov A. Malik, Permanent Soviet Representative to the United Nations.↩
- For further documentation on the Melby mission, see pp. 1399 ff.↩
- Mohammad Natsir, Chairman of the Leadership Council of the Masjumi Party.↩
- In telegram 214, August 29, to Djakarta, not printed, Cochran was informed “Dept gratified your representation Sukarno.” (756D.00/8–2650)↩