Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

611.56D/7–2750

Policy Statement on Indonesia. Prepared in the Department of State¹

[Extract]

secret

Washington, July 27, 1950.

[Here follow sections A–C—the objectives of United States policy toward Indonesia, the policies followed from 1945 to 1950, and Indonesia’s relations with other states.]

d. policy evaluation

The transfer of sovereignty to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, and the establishment of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, represent a notable success for American diplomacy as well as for the United Nations. Through the Round Table Agreements reached at The Hague, Indonesian national aspirations have in large part been satisfied while the Netherlands has been placed in a position to preserve friendly relations with her former dependency. Both countries have the opportunity through the Netherlands-Indonesian Union to secure mutually beneficial cooperation in economic, military, cultural, and international affairs. The United States has retained the respect of both parties and won the confidence of Indonesia’s foremost nationalist leaders who now head the new Government. As the result of support given to Indonesian nationalism, particularly through the efforts of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia, American prestige was enhanced among Asian nations friendly to Indonesia.

The success of United States policies in Indonesia in the short period following the transfer of sovereignty cannot as yet be evaluated. Thus far, however, none of the basic United States policy objectives has been voided or seriously threatened by events in Indonesia. The Government is non-Communist and its leaders have in the past demontrated their willingness to suppress forcibly any Communist attempt to seize power. Close relations are maintained with the United States and American economic and technical aid is actively sought.

Factors Relevant to Possible Future Policy Problems. Future United States efforts to help Indonesia achieve and maintain political stability and economic viability must take cognizance of factors which, operating singly or in combination, may limit or negate the effectiveness of United States policies.

1. A hypersensitivity to any move that might be termed foreign intervention and a suspicion of the motives of western powers are characteristic of Indonesian political groups. This hypersensitivity is the result of strong nationalist feelings, Indonesia’s recent colonial status, and the tensions of the “cold war.” Indonesia, like India, wants to maintain a neutral position between the United States and the Soviet Union.

2. In the Indonesian view, inconsistencies exist in United States policy toward the conflict between nationalism and colonialism in the Far East. United States recognition of Bao Dai in Indochina is equated with United States support of the French against Vietnamese nationalists.

3. While the Indonesian Government enjoys wide popular support at the present time, there are indications that the achievement of independence has resulted in the appearance of divisive influences previously suppressed by the unifying force of the struggle for independence. It is likely that opposition parties will continue to grow in strength. However, among the masses there is an inclination to follow individual leaders rather than a party program.

4. Indonesian political methods are unlikely to conform to American concepts of democracy. Similarly, public management is unlikely to meet American standards of efficiency and honesty.

5. Many Indonesian leaders do not consider that Indonesia has gained complete independence. These leaders may be expected to make a concerted political drive to annex Netherlands New Guinea, to dissolve all Federalist states formed by the Dutch, and to remove many Dutch advisors and technicians still in Government service.

6. Dissatisfaction with the very limited Indonesian participation in the management of enterprises and in retail business is likely to arise. Dissatisfaction with the small return earned by Indonesian workers in foreign-owned enterprises is likely to result in a period of labor unrest which may be exploited by Communist propaganda.

In view of these factors, it is possible that American aid may become an internal political issue. Fear of foreign domination or of involvement in the “cold war” may be capitalized on by opposition political groups, at least to the extent that the Government is forced to adopt an ambivalent attitude toward the United States. This might lead to an exploitation of American assistance without concomitant sympathy for American aims. Animosity against the United States is also incited by Colonial Dutch who fear that the spread of American influence in Indonesia will be detrimental to the Dutch position. At its worst, Indonesian resentment might be aroused by Communist propaganda to the point that the enmity felt for the colonial Dutch might be transferred to the United States. This danger should be given consideration in the implementation of any future United States program of Point IV aid, or in offers of military aid. To maximize possibilities for success, it may be advisable to consider whether aid should be given through the United Nations, insofar as possible, rather than directly.

The Indonesian desire to annex Netherlands New Guinea has thus far been channeled into peaceful negotiations with the Dutch. It is doubtful, however, that direct negotiations will succeed, in which case the United Nations Commission for Indonesia will presumably have to intervene.

With a view to strengthening Indonesian confidence in the United States and preventing the development of an ambivalent attitude toward the United States and an increased receptivity to Communist propaganda, additional measures are required, mainly in the psychological sphere.

Indonesian culture places a higher value on spiritual and intellectual matters than on material power, in spite of the tangible demonstrations, in the war and postwar period, of the need for military and economic strength. The policies of the Soviet Union are evident mainly in the sphere of ideology; American policies are apparent in the shape of physical power. Without an at least equally strong reservoir of ideological appeal, the United States cannot hope to secure the sort of sincere friendship of the Indonesians that might be needed in the event of an open conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.

To strengthen confidence in American motivation, greater proof may be needed of our sympathetic understanding of Indonesian problems and aspirations. Reference in public statements and information materials to peculiarly Indonesian problems may usually be connected with reference to conditions in America. Similarly, all efforts to stimulate anti-Communist attitudes may best be geared to Indonesian ideals rather than to our own. To carry out our psychological program in Indonesia effectively, increased attention to the preparation of studies of social conditions and public attitudes is needed.

1. Policy Statements on various countries were prepared periodically within the Department of State and reviewed and updated every 12 to 18 months. This is the first statement on Indonesia.