Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

751G.00/10–2350: Telegram

The Minister at Saigon (Heath) to the Secretary of State

secret

Saigon, October 23, 1950—10 p. m.

635. Reference Deptel 384, October 18. Presented credentials Sunday morning¹ at Dalat. In afternoon saw Bao Dai alone, delivering substance of message contained reftel. I had French translation of message with me to which I referred occasionally during conversation to mark that this was communication made under instructions my government.

I delivered message without essential change up through the 5th paragraph of reftel. I necessarily used different approach for the 6th and 7th paragraphs since Bao Dai, in replying my remarks accompanying presentation credentials had stated “he had personally assigned himself the mission of taking into his hands the formation of Vietnamese National Army” and at the beginning of private conversation had informed me that he intended to proceed immediately Tonkin via Hue and would also make public appearance Saigon. He further stated he intended to personally take over reigns of government “with his coir laborators” and expressed full understanding of necessity of greatest government activity during this grave menace confronting his country. Accordingly, I paraphrased 6th paragraph but saying that news of Bao Dai’s intentions as above stated would be very reassuring to my government which considered such activity on part of himself and his government urgently necessary.

As regards paragraph 7, I inquired whether he intended to take up his residence in Saigon stating I had heard from Pignon the High Commissioner’s Palace had been offered him. Bao Dai, in replying, said that in fact Letourneau and Pignon had called on him last summer but had only “vaguely mentioned” his taking over the Palace. He denied there was firm offer. I said I thought his establishing himself in Saigon would have an excellent effect both within his country and abroad and intimated that he might now take up the matter again with the French. Bao Dai demurred that he should take any initiative. It was up to the French freely to offer him the Palace and the Vietnamese Government would then take upon itself the provision of proper substitute residence for the High Commissioner. In any case, Bao Dai said the effect of such a move now would not be great; it was four years too late. I expressed the opinion it was not too late.

I did not in view of Bao Dai’s assurances as above reported consider advisable to warn him as directed in paragraph 7 of reftel that procrastination in facing realities or prolonged periods of seclusion would raise question of wisdom of continuing support Vietnamese Government which proved itself incapable exercise autonomy acquired. Please instruct whether Department wished me to issue this warning on occasion of next interview.

Bao Dai insisted that he had no feeling against the French and that he saw advantages for Vietnam to remain within the French Union. The French, however, must allow him to form National Army, must give him the means to accomplish this mission and they must make it possible for him to rule. The delay in formation of the National Army was due to French fears that a Vietnamese force would turn against them. If the Vietnamese Army were formed and commanded by himself, Bao Dai, there was no danger for the French. The French have wanted to maintain direct command and put French officers and non-coms in the new Vietnamese battalions. That simply would not work. The French were quite right in entertaining doubts as to the loyalty of such battalions as were now under French command. At the time the Japs struck on March 9, 1945 French commander [commanded] Vietnamese troops had outnumbered the Japanese but certain units refused to obey orders of their French officers to resist the Japanese.² That was understandable. If they had been Bao Dai’s troops and Vietnamese commanded, they would have resisted. French had agreed in the accords of March 8 to form Vietnamese Army but there was always great difference between agreements in principle and their execution due to French distrust and the influence of the old Colonial functionaries. Of course, the French would have to train the new troops and he had selected French officers to command during the period of training but these officers must be responsible directly to him and not to the French High Command. He saw the status of Vietnamese Army under his command as somewhat similar to that of American forces in World War I which had their own commanders but were under the High Command of Marshal Foch. I inquired when he would have definite plan for formation of the National Army, he replied it would be ready within a month. I replied I hoped the main lines of Vietnamese Army project would be ready before that date since time was of the essence in this grave situation in which our aid had been solicited. He replied that the army plan must be solid and realistic one that would stand up. In addition there were many local complications such he intimated as the presence of the armed religious groups, Catholic, Cao Daists, Hoa Haos, etc. (In the morning he said that during his trip to Rome he had told the Pope that Vietnamese Catholics were indulging too much in politics instead of confining themselves to religious activities. The Pope showed great understanding of threat to Vietnam and had explained that he planned to give Vatican recognition to Vietnam but by “étapes”. Bao Dai did not elaborate on the “étapes”.) Bao Dai said he had no illusions that modern complete Vietnamese Army could be set up within six months or year. Returning to the question of the failure of French to implement their agreements, he cited the case of the officers school in Dalat. The French had not furnished the requisite equipment and had delayed furnishing the proper instructors. Terminated this chapter of his remarks by approving the recent interview given by Huu to the journal De L’Extreme Orient (Legtel 592, October 18).³

He then qualified his undertaking to visit the North and make public appearances by saying that he would have to hear what Letourneau and General Juin⁴ had decided before going to Hanoi. He assumed, however, they would call on him but he had, as yet, no request for an audience. He said that Letourneau and Juin must not make unilateral decision to abandon any part of the country. The Vietnamese Government [would?] never abandon Tonkin and it would find forces to protect it against Ho Chi Minh. I remarked that I understood it was not question of abandoning Tonkin but merely certain frontier posts which because of their isolation, the lack of communications and sufficient troops to support them represented danger to French-Vietnamese military operations in the North. Bao Dai said he could understand that but his point was that no decision of this kind should be made without consulting him.

Our talk was most friendly one and Bao Dai expressed himself with every appearance of sincerity of his appreciation of American help and intentions. In view of his declaration of intention to take over the government and make public appearance in the country, I was extremely careful and tactful in referring to the bad impression his prolonged absence abroad created. He was, however, quite aware of the implied criticism and at the end of the interview said that, while he could understand his action was not understood abroad, the reasons for his actions were perfectly understood and approved of by Vietnamese people. I saw nothing to be gained on this occasion arguing this statement. Very probably his advisors have given him that idea and he believes it because he wants to believe it. I personally think his prolonged absence was not understood by the Vietnamese people and that it has done harm to his prestige. Bao Dai expressed the desire to have fairly frequent, private talks with me in the future.

Sent Department 635, repeated info Paris 306.

Heath

1. October 22.
2. On March 9, 1945, Japanese occupation forces disarmed French troops in Indochina and evicted the French administration. For documentation on this event, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. vi, pp. 298 ff.
3. Not printed.
4. In telegram 429 from Saigon, October 12, Heath reported receiving confirmation from High Commissioner Pignon that Minister of Associated States Letourneau would arrive for a 10-day inspection tour on October 16. He would be accompanied by Gen. Alphonse Juin, Resident General in French Morocco and former Chief of the French General Staff. (751G.00/10–1250)