611.51G/10–1350: Telegram
The Minister at Saigon (Heath) to the Secretary of State
546. In my view, US should have some voice not only with respect to French “military operations” but with respect political and financial policy which are, of course, inextricably entwined with military considerations.
Secondly, with due regard to local sensibilities and the need for making our participation unobtrusive as well as effective, we must have an advisory if real influence over the military, political and fiscal policies of the three Associate States, in particular over those of the Vietnamese Government. Cambodia and Laos present much smaller problem.
Thirdly, it is not sufficient to have high-level general agreement between the Defense and Foreign Affairs Departments of our two governments. The French should be given to understand at this stage that we expect the Legation to be advised and to some extent advisory on local French planning and operations. Paris sets policy for IC but when put into operation here such policy frequently has quite different aspect than when it left Paris.
I do not propose that we take over managerial responsibilities or a veto role out here, even if we could. The Legation with MAAG does not have the special experience nor ability to fill such a role even if possible or desirable.
On the military side, it would not be desirable or practicable to have US military participation by US officers on the operational staff. [Page 891] I contemplate that the Chief of MAAG, General Brink,1 should act solely in an advisory capacity to French High Command and General Staff in IC and occupy similar capacity in relation to Ministries of National Defense of three Associate States and the commanders of the Associate State’s armed forces. On French side, the French Command would be expected to keep MAAG Chief thoroughly informed of current operations including performance of US equipment and to consult with him during planning phase.
Obviously General Brink could not fulfill this function, purely advisory and consultative as it would be, without some increase in MAAG. His curbstone estimate is that he would require 15 officers. These would keep in touch at top-level with both the French and Associate States’ military staffs attached to the three Ministries of National Defense, the heads of French Army, Navy and Air Forces top field GHQ for North Vietnam, Vietnamese Army headquarters and training centers and heads of Associate States’ Armies. It would probably not be necessary to increase MAAG by this number since some of the officers already assigned could be utilized.
It would seem unnecessary in preliminary talks with French in Washington to discuss the small augmentation in MAAG which General Brink would require to fulfill his advisory functions. It would suffice to say that General Brink and MAAG should have continuing access to and general consultation with levels indicated above.
It is to be expected that Paris probably and the local High French Command would register objections to even advisory participation in military decisions and policy, particularly in view of absence, to date of any staff talks and arrangements, with the French and of a unified strategic concept. However, French complacency has been rudely shaken by the Caobang affair; and in Washington they are requesting further aid about equal in amount to their military expenditures in IC.
I believe the close and continuing practical advice is immediately needed here in IC and unless systematized arrangements for it are made at once, success of our entire program will be jeopardized. Lack of joint or unified strategic concept for this area should not be overriding impediment for advisory participation we are recommending in this localized theatre.
Although our personal relations with General Carpentier, French Commander in Chief, are good, he is very sensitive to any slight hint of American intervention in his command. For example, Legation has rarely been told by his staff of completed operations such as Caobang until well after press has been informed. We have learned and reported developments only by our own devices. And there are the factors of vestigial colonial mentality and French fears that American [Page 892] participation would be a derogation from French prestige in eyes of Associate States. Our advisory participation should be subtle and unadvertised. It should not be such as to undermine the French nor should it give grounds to Vietnamese for the belief we are irrevocably committed to support French aims and policy. I am confident General Brink would carry out activities outlined above with great tact and discretion. He is an old friend of General Alessandri for whom he has high professional respect. The proper degree of US participation here can best be arranged between Washington and Paris with Paris issuing appropriate instructions to HICOM and General Carpentier. Both would be inclined to yield readily enough to direct orders from Paris.
We, of course, could not ask or expect to obtain any definite engagement from the Chiefs of the IC states or the heads of their government to consult with us or accept our advice. No such arrangements or engagements would in fact be necessary. If our military and economic aid is administered on a specific project or short-term basis and its continuance or expansion subject to previous project performance, we should have all the influence and leverage required.
As to US grant of funds directly to states, Legation believes this legal under accords. (President Huu has expressed this view to me.) We believe French would, reluctantly, accept it. They would point out, what is perfectly true, that native states presently incompetent to present proper estimates, budgets or justifications and that French help would be required all along line. If such grants are feasible under US laws and procedure, and if lack of local funds is limiting factor on useful increase of native forces, idea should be seriously entertained. We fully aware difficulties of undertaking, in view loose procedures and undependability local authorities. We should have to consult with French, and we should require from all authorities a much more exact accounting of receipts and expenditures than any so far available in order to be sure that our aid would be a net contribution and not merely substituted for normal expenditures of local governments.
If substantial direct dollar assistance is given toward support national armies, Legation urges that one condition which should be insisted upon by US is that French Government through their foreign exchange authorities in Paris and Saigon or as otherwise appropriate should formally undertake to ensure that foreign exchange additional to IC’s current requirements will be made available finance necessary imports in an amount equivalent to piastre value dollar aid. If this is not done, the additional piastre purchasing power which US dollar support of national armies will generate will simply increase already dangerous inflationary pressures in IC and thereby make it even more difficult than at present for IC’s exports to compete in world markets. [Page 893] It makes little difference whether additional foreign exchange be granted in dollars, francs, or other currencies since from US viewpoint dollars spent in IC will eventually be used through Metropolitan French gold and dollar pool arrangements either to finance additional dollar imports from US or other services including retirement debt or for building up France’s dollar reserve. Actually last might be preferable US interests as it would defer drain on US resources with latter’s contributory effect on inflationary situation in US.
Sent Department 546; repeated info Paris 261. Department pass Paris.
- Brig. Gen. Francis G. Brink.↩