PSA Files: Lot 54D190
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Secretary of State
Subject: Possible Invasion of Indochina.
The following brief staff study is intended to sum-up the current situation in Indochina for your information:
1. Military
All indications point to a probable communist offensive against Indochina in late September or early October. While there is a possibility that this offensive would be directed by the Chinese Communists, who maintain approximately 100,000 troops on or near the border, we believe it more likely that the attack will be carried out by augmented Viet Minh forces under Ho Chi Minh, supplemented by material and possibly technical assistance from Communist China.
While the Viet Minh’s capability has been increased during the past four months by the cooperation of Communist China, where an estimated 30,000 Viet Minh troops are now in training, there has not been a comparable increase in the ability of the anti-communist forces in Indochina to withstand a possible attack.
In the event of an attack by the Viet Minh, augmented by Chinese Communist assistance, we believe that the northern border area of Indochina could be overrun within a short time. In the event of amass attack by Chinese Communist forces, augmented by the Viet Minh, we believe that by sheer numbers such a force could occupy perhaps the northern half of Indochina within a matter of weeks. In both cases, communist forces would then be in position along the Burma-Laos border; in the latter case, along the Burma-Laos and Thai-Laos borders, both relatively undefended by Burma and Thailand.
American military assistance consisting of equipment for twelve infantry battalions (less small arms) for the State forces, as well as aircraft and naval equipment for the French Union forces will be in Indochina by the end of October. It is expected that further equipment will be in the pipe line as soon as more funds are available.
The impact of the arrival of this equipment will be partially political since the build-up of the States forces by American assistance will have a salutary effect upon the morale of the three State Governments, with a concurrent increase in their abilities to withstand aggression from either internal or external sources. This effect, however, cannot be apparent by October, 1950, since a period of months will be required to train and equip the State forces. The air and naval equipment for the French Union forces, however, will be almost immediately effective since it will be used by trained personnel.
[Page 879]Although M. Pleven has informally suggested that the United States assume the financial burden of raising and maintaining larger State forces which would permit the withdrawal of French troops to Europe, and at the same time satisfy the new States’ appetite for evidence of sovereignty represented by large national forces, such a program, even if adopted immediately, could not have an affect by October, 1950.
2. Political
The anticipated timing of the communist attack would take advantage of a partial political vacuum resulting from the transfer of powers from the French to the new State Governments. The new States have thus far failed to develop a solid anti-communist front. Their efforts and fears remain largely anti-colonial, a form of government which they know and dislike, rather than anti-communist, which is to them still a relatively unknown and unrecognized threat. They have devoted most of the nine months since their formation to gradually and haltingly assuming the powers granted to them. It seems doubtful that by the time of the possible offensive they will be sufficiently strong, or public opinion sufficiently concerned with the threat of communism to become effectively organized against it.
Although the non-communist nationalist leaders and “fence sitters” have continually pressed the French Government for further extension of sovereignty, such as a “timetable” statement promising complete autonomy at a future date, the French have informed us that they are opposed to any further extension of the March 8 Accords at this time. It is doubtful whether France, which is spending $500,000,000 a year in Indochina and has suffered approximately 50,000 military casualties since 1945, would be in a political mood to continue such an effort if a definite withdrawal date of French authority were announced. This view, however, cannot reduce the continuing French responsibility for the defense of the area against communist aggression. It would not seem reasonable or desirable for this Government to ask for the withdrawal of French support and troop strength from Indochina in view of the communist threat to that area outlined above. The presence of French and French controlled native troops in the area represents the only effective bulwark against communist encroachment.
3. Conclusion
The dilemma which has always faced American policy in Indochina is considerably heightened by the development set forth above. If the area of Southeast Asia is to be preserved from communist domination, it appears necessary for continued American assistance to be extended to the forces now opposing that aggression. At the same time the extension of American support to the Governments of the [Page 880] three States, which were established under French patronage, will continue to give rise to charges of imperialism, not only from the Kremlin and its satellites, but by other Asian countries in whose minds the threat of colonialism is still more vivid than that of communism.
By continuing our present policy of assisting the forces in Indochina which are opposed to communist aggression, we will assist in the preservation of the area from communist domination. We note, however, that American assistance alone cannot ensure the area against communist aggression if the desires and capabilities of the peoples and governments do not provide the main effort against it. So far and for the predictable future, French forces appear to be the sole effective guarantee that communist forces will be resisted.