751G.5 MAP/9–350: Telegram
The Minister at Saigon (Heath) to the Secretary of State
305. Although post-Korean events here and in France appear to be overtaking terms and approach of joint MDAP survey mission (JSM) report,1 possibility FMAC [ FMACC ] or other agency might initiate action because of urgency IC situation, on basis report compel Legation to present detailed summary its comments re JSM findings.
We acknowledge some disadvantage in analyzing JSM study as we have not seen full copy of report and its annexes and regret draft was not finished sufficiently in advance departure for discussion, for we feel sure more compatible conclusion might thereby have been reached.
JSM in our opinion performed truly outstanding job in staking ground for MAAG’s subsequent studies. Basic analysis local situation prepared by Melby and Erskine is eminently sound. We agree this [Page 871] finding that: (1) forces now under arms in IC are insufficient to pacify area and offer adequate border defense; (2) some form new political and economic techniques must be injected into local situation before decisive military solution can be reached; and (3) increased US assistance must be made available.
We consider JSM report less satisfactory in respect to short-term aspects of IC defense and in its treatment of longer term politico-military policies.
On short-term defense, we appreciate difficulty formulating recommendations involving of necessity entire SEA on basis study first country visited. Yet all intelligence available to French ourselves and British indicated probability Chinese support Viet-Minh offensive October or November this year.
French repeatedly raised question of systematic intelligence exchanges, theater staff talks, reciprocal visits, and prepared such staff papers as enclosure 4 to Legation despatch 37, July 26, and enclosures 3, 9, and 12, to Legation despatch 70, August 10,2 re “generalities defense of IC” against Chinese attack, French AF operational plans, ground installations program, area logistical base support. In time before it left, JSM did not find it possible to make preliminary appraisal or recommendations with relation to US policies re these French proposals. Sole exception was AF group report requesting JCS study French airport construction program in view its recommendation for ECA counterpart financing approved fields. Interval remaining before expected offensives is short for any effective planning. We can now only suggest importance entire French general staff documentation being screened for FMAC [ FMACC ] and JCS to determine urgently if any extra action can be taken by US or assistance offered by MAAG in immediate future of next 6 to 10 weeks.
On longer term politico-military problems JSM analysis seems to us to rest on 3 misconceptions. First, that political-military policy in IC can be compartmentalized. Thus on one hand JSM urged new political concessions from French guaranteeing eventual independence of States, but on other appeared to accept without question present status of military accords and current levels of organization and command of native forces. There is of course immediate inconsistency in claim that IC peoples are now mature enough to require new grants of purely political power but are incompetent to participate in direction their military affairs. More important, however, in situation where French are resolved against new organic changes in nature French union and where all factors non-Communist native opinion are united behind concept of real national army, no program which is politically [Page 872] unacceptable to French and militarily disheartening to States, is practical or desirable politics.
Second misconception is that March 8 accords between French and States impose static and rigid form on their relationship. These agreements are elastic and permit substantial political evolution. Formation of national army is logical and imperative next step in their liberal implementation. It must, to be sure, be accompanied by other steps of type suggested in my 265 August 23 all of which present treaty relationship between French and States permits. These further measures are both political and military necessities for success in building national army and its future combat quality depend upon native morale that implementation of March 8 accords can alone provide.
Third misconception arises from JSM generalities or uncertainties re worth native forces. The use to be made of native troops is key to situation in IC and indeed in Asia. In 5 years of war the French have discovered that Vietnamese fighting for Ho Chi Minh are tough soldiers, Korea has discovered that continental Asiatics can handle modern weapons and manage a sustained offensive, and now continental Communist China seems to be putting these discoveries together to the benefit of Red imperialism by arming the Viet-Minh, for an all out onslaught.
Western problem is to devise ways to utilize same elements for defense its position in FE while it concentrates its forces on other vital points. We are unable to find just where the Melby–Erskine group stands on arming the Vietnamese. They bow in that direction by criticizing the French for not having proceeded more rapidly in building a Viet army, the army group says they fight well under white officers; the summary report seems to favor speeding up the arming of natives.
None of reports go into mechanics of the project which involve fundamental political relations of French and Viets, problems of inter-service command, feasibility integration auxiliary forces and use be made of village defense units. Instead, reports find that little military help can be expected from Vietnamese sources, that evidence, unreported, exists to effect that Viets have refused to accept what military responsibility has been offered them or having accepted it have made deals with Viet-Minh to avoid fighting. (Legation has no evidence to corroborate this charge.) Service group annexes upon which conclusions main report presumably based, view idea of arming Vietnamese with varying degrees of alarm and contain such opinions as follows:
“Delivery of US military aid matériel and equipment to Associated States except through French and as recommended by them is unrealistic and unsound. To emphasize this vital point attention is invited [Page 873] to internal insecurity and confusion presently existing in Philippines which Government was at time it received its independence much more experienced and able in administration than is any of Associated States today…3 no naval matériel should be consigned to various provinces or Vietnamese.… Should naval matériel be consigned to any one [garbled group] or else it would be wasted. There is even possibility that vessels assigned other than French would be smuggling themselves in less than few weeks ‘or at random’ natives suppletives of doubtful value in offensive operations.… Natives do not like to fight even for Bao Dai let alone for French. Soon as one of them becomes sufficiently educated to be of use to French he quits and goes back to civilian life.… Auxiliary troops are not too formidable beyond maintaining mere local security.… It is doubtful if natives will ever even in distant future be able to handle naval craft by themselves.… Laotians are a lazy peaceful people who want only to be left alone. French entertain considerable doubt as to their combat usefulness even after reasonable period of training.… Natives won’t join navy.”
If natives are neither to be trusted nor permitted to form major military forces, if French forces are insufficient for border defense and internal pacification, if IC is vital to defense of west, final logical implications of JSM report would seem to be commitment American troops in IC. And this implication, made explicit UN Melby–Erskine findings, seems above all to ignore the Korean experience which has demonstrated the capabilities of native forces and the fact that white occidentals cannot permanently police the world.
Now however that French seem prepared to accept principle of national IC armies we believe we can and should move rapidly forward from political morass and military stalemate JSM reported for IC.
I shall shortly forward in some detail our own positive suggestions in the premises.
Sent Department 305, repeated info Paris 129.