Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

751G.5/8–2350: Telegram

The Minister at Saigon (Heath) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Saigon, August 23, 1950—9 p. m.

265. Personal for Secretary Rusk and Lacy. No distribution. Paris 846, August 17 to Department. Pleven’s important decision press for formation of Vietnam national army has coincided with Legation’s preliminary survey of conditions for American aid to IC following the Korean war. Our conclusions on broad lines are as follows:

1. Since the Korean war began it has become increasingly evident that economic and military aid to IC will and should be on a larger scale than originally programmed. The threat to Vietnam is assuming sharper outline with the concentration of Viet Minh troops in China. The MDAP joint survey mission has not made its final recommendations but it clearly envisions expanded military aid. Plans for French rearmament in Europe must involve at least a compensation increase in the number of Viets under arms in IC as French units are redeployed. US aid will be invoked to finance and equip the new units.

2. American assistance on the scale now in sight will modify the concept that our aid merely “supplements” but does not “supplant” the French especially if it is accompanied by redistribution of French troops to Europe. Our experiences in Nationalist China and the Philippines suggest that we should not commit ourseleves to any substantial expenditures without being satisfied that French and Viets (and Cambodian and Laotian) operations, administration and policies will effectively serve the common aims of rapid extinction of Communist civil war within IC and building up of prosperous progressive and stable Indochinese governments. We should make no substantial new commitment until there is agreement between them and ourselves and unless we are assured of the means of making our advice continuously effective. The French must continue to bear the greater burden in financing the Indochinese states and military operations and will of course have here the greatest voice in any control measures but our influence must also be felt not only through the gravitational pull of our aid program but in actual participation in certain controls and in accelerating certain French concessions. Such participation will be welcomed by the Vietnamese and other IC states.

3. For example with reference to the creation of a Vietnam national army, which has already been linked with US aid by Pleven, Legation believes we must ascertain French intentions and express our views before aid is increased or any commitments given. Our advice on war plans should be sought and heeded. We should give our views on organization and training of army and advancement of senior Viet officers. US aid has such repercussions on Indochinese Government financing that we should participate officially or unofficially in fiscal planning. There should be an immediate sharing and synchronization of intelligence arrangements. We should advise on propaganda and political warfare and should improve Bao Dai’s public relations.

4. As to concessions by the French we agree that the most fruitful and immediate should be creation of the Viet national army. Pleven’s decision to accelerate its formation is a most welcome one even though he contemplates at the same time some withdrawal of French forces here. This decision, quickly exploited and publicized, could effect a very real improvement in the internal political-military situation in IC. Properly developed it would point way out of dangerous situation of political impasse and inconclusive military progress. It might also help convince the doubters of the honesty of French intentions to grant them full independence. The increase in Viet troops should be very much larger and more rapid than the reduction in French forces and with proper training and control of the former the obstacle to Communist invasion of IC might shortly be a more imposing one than now exists. It was evident to Melby mission as it has been increasingly to us that the Viet Minh revolt cannot be extinguished without a very considerable increase in police and troops. The French cannot now increase their forces here. The increase must come from native forces.

5. It may be remarked here that the Melby-Erskine report and recommendations must be substantially restudied, revised and extended. Although recognizing need for getting more Viets under arms, the military aid recommended by the report make practically no provision of an expansion in Viet forces beyond level envisaged pre-Korea nor is any concrete recommendation made with respect to Viet army.

6. The French must make very clear that it is a true Viet army they are forming which after a specified training period, say three to four years, will be under independent Viet command. During the training period the high and intermediate command of course must be French. (In this connection it would be appreciated if Paris could specify just what Pleven has proposed and if possible what Bao Dai now has in mind.)

7. An accelerated recruiting of Viet forces will require an increased financial contribution which presumably France and certainly the IC states are not at present able to make nor has our military aid program contemplated for IC such direct cash assistance. We should grant such direct assistance for a period of two years or longer if we want real results in IC. If within that period French and enlarged native forces could really stamp out the rebellion in the lower Mekong region, the Viets and Cambodians might thereafter be able to meet the pay of the augmented forces from their own increased revenues. The bulk of the normally great IC export surplus comes from this region.

8. Although the creation of a national army appears to be most important immediately feasible French concession, we believe that there are many secondary political measures which can and should be taken and which should constitute not departure from but implementation of the March 8 accords. As we see it in order to be politically effective here, announcement of an increase in Viet national forces and related action should be accompanied by a number of those implementing measures which should be convincingly publicized as “new deal for Vietnam”. Another French concession now fully due would be to turn over the High Commissioner’s palace to Bao Dai. Now may also be time for French to bring forward candidacy of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos for UN.

9. These concessions may require changes in personnel. We have reservations whether General Carpentier would be the man to put through a policy of rapid formation of a Viet Army. His distrust of the Viets as soldiers and officials is in contrast with the attitude of General Alessandri, commander in the north who is rather liked and respected by Viets and who has advocated increasing Viet militia forces in his region.

10. As regards Viet concessions, these should begin with Bao Dai emerging from Oriental seclusion and publicly interesting himself in the welfare of his subjects and the administration of his state. It is also high time or shortly will be, to make some kind of start towards setting up Viet legislative bodies. It is however apparent that such bodies could not at this time be nationally representative nor could initial selection be on basis of unrestricted suffrages. Bao Dai should also not object to some Franco-American control over the dilatory fiscal collections of Vietnam.

11. The policies and programs of the nations chiefly interested in IC were framed prior to the Korean invasion. All of them seem to be undergoing some reassessment of which Pleven’s new approach is an important illustration. The discussions at Pau and the conversations which the French are holding with Bao Dai and Viet leaders will also affect the IC future.

12. We believe the time has now come for a review of IC affairs, appropriately at next Foreign Ministers conference if one to be held at an early date. We should go fully into Franco-Viet policies and give our ideas for a program. US dollar aid alone may not give US all that leverage on Franco-Viet affairs which the situation requires. It now seems to us more than ever indispensable that there should be early strategic US-UK-French conversation on SEA at the highest levels supplemented by frequent theater conferences.

Sent Department 265, repeated Paris 224.

Heath