751G.00/8–1750
Memorandum by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)
Telegram no. 845 of August 17th from Paris suggests the possible desirability of our working out a tight argument which Bruce could present to the French on the question of building up a strong native army in Vietnam.
My thought is that such an argument might in the first instance relate their particular problem to the general question of Asian manpower which you have discussed with General Merrill1 and which is [Page 862] now being considered also in S/P. The argument might then proceed along the following lines:
First, the French wish to reduce their troops in Indochina as soon as possible. These troops can be reduced in only one of two ways (a) through the elimination of Ho and the danger of Chinese Communist attack or (b) through the substitution of some other force. I exclude the possibility of surrender to Ho. It does not seem likely that alternative (a) can be realized merely through a continuation of present plans. Alternative (b) can be satisfied only through the creation of an indigenous army since no foreign force can be substituted for the French. There may be a danger that the creation of a strong native army would create a new menace to the French themselves. However, if the French cannot count on support from the Bao Dai Government and its military forces it must contemplate an even more extensive military effort designed not only to defeat Ho and keep off the Chinese Communists but also to police the “pacified” areas of Vietnam. This is an impossible burden. The only alternative therefore is by wise political management to keep the Vietnam army on the side of the French. If a program of this kind could be worked out and put into effect we would give every assistance possible. We might want to stress the point frequently made that the primary role of the French Army would be guarding the northern frontier while the local task of fighting the guerrillas would be turned over to the indigenous forces.
- Maj. Gen. Frank D. Merrill (ret.), Deputy Commander of United States forces in the India-Burma theater, 1944; Chief of Staff, United States Tenth Army, 1945; Chief of Staff, United States Sixth Army, 1946–1947.↩