751G.00/8–1750: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State
845. Saigon’s 171 and 172, August 7 and 183, August 9 to Department. Embassy has for some time been casting about for suitable starting point from which we could usefully use our influence to alter present stalemate in Indochina.
While appreciating the weight of Melby’s arguments, we are convinced that any major alteration in the organic political relationships between France and the Indochinese states is impossible of realization within the immediate future and that any US proposal to France along these lines would be at very least a waste of time. The same is true of any present attempt to find a substitute for Bao Dai. Imperfect as are the March 8 agreements and lacking in dynamism as is the Emperor, we feel that we must resign ourselves to living with the document and the man for some time to come.
The question of permanent economic relationships, which are now being negotiated at Pan, does not appear to require our intervention at the present time. While progress has been slow at Pau, we have had no indication from the Indochinese delegations that they have serious fault to find with the French negotiating positions. However, our influence may yet be necessary in case of deadlock.
The creation of a strong Vietnamese national army (and armies as appropriate in Laos and Cambodia) seems to us to be the logical starting point to bring an end to the present unhealthy state of affairs. This is one question which has clear legal basis in existing agreements and to which leading French officials, including Auriol, Pleven, Moch1 and LeTourneau, are publicly committed. It is also question which lies closest to Bao Dai’s heart if we are to believe him and his entourage. Furthermore, we have legitimate motive for interesting ourselves directly in this question both because of MDAP aid and because of Moch’s and Alphand’s requests to Spofford in London to help finance such an army. (Deptos 7 and 18)2 and Pleven’s renewal thereof [Page 860] to me yesterday as reported in my immediately following cable.3 National armed forces being one of the principal attributes of sovereignty, creation of such forces in the associated states should go far toward a satisfaction of one of the basic nationalist aspirations.
Obstacles to the creation of effective national forces in Indochina other than financial include French concern at the thought of a powerful army that might eventually be turned against its own and Bao Dai’s fears based on the tradition of war-lordism in the Far East. (There have been reported to us a series of deadlocks between him and French on choice of native commander, Bao Dai reportedly wanting Giao and Giao only.) We have grounds for belief however that under US impetus and influence and possibly some financing, the reticences of both sides could be overcome. It is obvious that both must run these risks. One important element would be Bao Dai’s agreement to be not only titular head but real animator of Viet army.
The above thoughts are necessarily summary. We have not seen the recommendations of the joint survey mission on the creation of national armies in Indochina, nor the possibilities of any US financing (as distinguished from equipment) for such armies. We recommend, however, that the Department, after receiving the comments which Legation Saigon will no doubt wish to furnish, concentrate its attention on the creation of national armies in Indochina as the next step in helping to secure our objectives in the area.
Department pass Saigon. Sent Department 845, repeated info Saigon 32.
- Jules Moch, French Minister of Defense.↩
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In telegram Depto 7 from London, July 26, Charles M. Spofford, Deputy United States Representative on the North Atlantic Council, reported on an informal discussion with British and French officials concerning methods of strengthening Western forces in Europe. During the meeting, Jules Moch, French Minister of Defense, stated that he felt it essential to withdraw some French troops from Indochina as soon as possible, replacing them with indigenous forces. He estimated the cost of such a program at $300 million per year. (740.5/7–2650). Other portions of Depto 7 are scheduled for publication in volume iii.
In telegram Depto 18 from London, July 28, Spofford, reporting on a July 27 conversation with Hervé Alphand, Deputy French Representative on the North Atlantic Council, stated the following:
“Turning to Indochina, Alphand said that this situation was draining life blood from France and could not be dealt with by France’s resources alone. French Army now in Indochina must be replaced to large extent with native forces who must be equipped and trained, and French officers and non-coms brought back to France to help build new French Army. This would require financial resources which, when considered from French point of view, were staggering. Since 1945 France had spent 800 billion francs in Indochina. They must have help if situation were to be maintained. Prime Minister had instructed him to inform me French Government requested financial aid for Indochina in amount of 200 billion francs for next two years. This was essential if efforts referred to above were to be carried through.
“I assured Alphand substance of his statement would be reported immediately and I would let him know instructions received.”
Depto 18 is scheduled for publication in volume iii.
↩ - Infra. ↩