FMACC Files: Lot 54D5
The Joint State–Defense MDAP Survey Mission to Southeast Asia to the Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating Committee1
The Joint State–Defense M.D.A.P. Survey Mission arrived in Saigon on July 15, 1950 and departed for Singapore on August 7, 1950. [Page 841] During the three weeks of its visit, members of the Mission visited sectors and installations in the Saigon area, participated as observers in various operational activities, made a comparable tour of the Red River Delta area, including an inspection of the Chinese Border and defense installations in that area and visited installations in Cambodia and Laos. During all its visits, conferences were held with appropriate French, Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian officials as well as with a number of other individuals, particularly in the Saigon and Hanoi areas.
It is a matter of great regret to the Mission that the High Commissioner for Indochina was recalled to Paris for consultation prior to the completion of the Mission so that it was impossible to hold final conversations with him. General Carpentier, the Acting High Commissioner, was, however, most cooperative as were all other officials, both French and local. It is also a matter of regret that General Alessandri, Commanding General in Tonkin, was also absent in France. Conversations with local officials in Cambodia and Laos were somewhat more limited than they might have been due to the absence of the highest officials in France, to attend the Pau Conference. The same limitation applied in Vietnam due to the absence of His Majesty, Bao Dai, and the President of the Council. It is the belief of the Mission, however, that it was able to accomplish its aims.
Tab A is an outline of the political and economic objectives of American policy in Indochina which should govern the MDAP Program for this country. There is also included as an attachment a memorandum prepared by the ECA representative on the Mission concerning the ECA interest in the MDAP Program. It will be noted that this representative recommends consideration of the possibility of utilizing a part of the ECA Program in Indochina for projects which would have military as well as economic utility. The remainder of this report has been prepared by the military section of the Mission and deals with the military aspects of the Program. The Chief of the Military Section of the Mission, Major General G. B. Erskine, has prepared a memorandum in which he summarizes his views on the military situation, including French and enemy capabilities, and the role which the United States can play in order to accomplish American objectives.
It will be noted that the Chief of the Military Section is of the opinion that any detailed appraisal of the French requests for military assistance can only be made by study and on the spot investigation which will require several more weeks of intensive work. The MAAG has, therefore, been instructed to proceed with this study and to report its findings, if possible, before the Mission has completed [Page 842] its work in Southeast Asia. General Erskine believes, in general, that the French requests appear reasonable. The same applies, in general, to the priorities which have been established by the French. It is also noteworthy that General Erskine believes that the French requests conform in general to the capabilities of the personnel presently available in Indochina but that he questions the capabilities of these forces as presently constituted to repel any major invasion by the Chinese Communists.
The major impression of members of the Mission is that although there can be no over-all solution to the Indochina problem without a military solution as a primary requisite, this military solution can in no sense be decisive without the application of political and economic techniques to the problem. It is true that the defense of the frontier against external aggression is in the main a military problem, of which the main burden must be borne by the French. It seems unlikely that an attack from China can be repelled by the utilization of French resources alone, which are already strained to a maximum. Little help, if any, can be expected from Vietnamese sources and certain Vietnamese elements can be expected to exercise positive aid from the rear to the invading forces. For the most part, then, any assistance to France in repelling an invasion must come from the United States. It will, of course, be for the highest American authorities to determine just how far the United States is prepared to go in assistance to the French to repel any such invasion in the light of American objectives and over-all world commitments. The French are, not unnaturally, most interested in knowing just what the United States would be prepared to do.
Intimately connected with the defense of the frontier, as well as constituting a problem in itself in the American objective of containing Communism and wherever possible, rolling back its areas of control, is the problem of internal security in Vietnam which, in the present context, means the Communist-led and Communist-controlled Viet Minh Movement now in open rebellion against the Governments recognized by the United States.
The magnitude of the problem which confronts the French in this respect can hardly be overestimated. As has happened in so many other areas in the Far East, the Viet Minh originated as a nationalist movement dedicated to the independence of the people of Asia and to the elimination of the white man as the ruling group in the area. The Communist movement, as elsewhere, has succeeded in identifying itself with this nationalist movement and in spreading the conviction that non-communist nationalist groups are basically instruments and puppets of the colonial powers. Many elements which have aligned themselves with the Communists are basically hostile to Communism, but believe that the problem of independence must be solved first and [Page 843] other problems subsequently. It should be noted, parenthetically, that no responsible Vietnamese suggest the desirability of the total withdrawal of French forces at present on the grounds that this would only result in an early Communist victory. Rather, they speak of a timetable for independence and assumption by the French of responsibility for defense against outside attack, leaving internal matters to the Vietnamese. Much public opinion which finds itself in open opposition to the Viet Minh secretly supports the Viet Minh as the group which is having the greatest success in opposing the French. These Vietnamese elements, at the same time, are skeptical of French protestations. The great political problem which confronts the French in Indochina, therefore, is to persuade the Indochinese that they will implement their signed agreements; and at the same time, to persuade that cooperation with the Communists will not, in the end, secure Vietnamese independence, but will represent only another form of subjection to an external force. At the present moment, it may be questionable whether the French can do this in view of the long standing suspicion and deep-seated hatred with which the Indochinese regard the French. This much is certain: that in the end, the French will have to make further political concessions if internal pacification is to be realized. It is the opinion of the Mission that unless some agreed political solution can be found, the French will, in time, find themselves eliminated from the scene.
Many Vietnamese also feel that the French are not proceeding in good faith to comply with their obligations. In view of current difficulties, it is difficult to appraise these charges with any reasonable degree of accuracy. Yet, it is the opinion of the Mission that the French could proceed far more rapidly than they are with the establishment of a Vietnamese Army, capable of taking over the internal security problem. On the other hand, the French claim that the Vietnamese, on several occasions, have refused to accept responsibilities offered them and there is some evidence to support these contention. It is by no means beyond the realm of possibility that the Vietnamese, themselves, would not be too reluctant to see the March Eighth Accords fail in the hope of proving that further concessions by the French are necessary. In brief, a certain measure of good faith appears to be lacking on both sides. Just how this obstacle is to be overcome is beyond the scope of this Mission, but the Mission is convinced that it must be overcome if the military solution is to be effective in the long run. This statement applies to the over-all pacification of the country rather than to the immediate defense of the frontier against foreign aggression which the Mission believes can be accomplished in the predictable future with the application of the requisite amount of force.
[Page 844]The Mission also makes its recommendations and observations without particular reference to the internal situation in France or to French commitments in the NATO which lie outside its competence.
From a political standpoint, it is the belief of the Mission that the United States should continue to exercise its influence to the end that mutually agreed political programs be carried out in good faith by the participants most directly concerned. Only thus can the maximum utility be drawn from the military assistance which the United States is prepared to give and only thus can the spread of Communism throughout Southeast Asia be contained. It is almost a commonplace, now, to state that failure in Indochina will make well nigh inevitable the over-all and eventual victory of Communism throughout the area. The French and the Indochinese must be persuaded, wherever necessary, to rise above their own parochial interests by realizing that these interests can be served only by the establishment of a community of interests dedicated to the independence, integrity, welfare, and prosperity of the peoples concerned. Any division in this community of interests is and will continue to be the nourishment upon which the Communists will feed.
It would be appreciated if this report could be reproduced and disseminated to those concerned as quickly as possible. Since Indochina is the first country to be visited by the Mission, the report on it may subsequently be revised somewhat in the light of possible later findings bearing on Southeast Asia as a whole.
Respectfully submitted,
Chairman
Joint State–Defense MDAP Survey Mission
G. B. Erskine
Major General, U.S. Marine Corps
Chief of Military Group
Joint State–Defense MDAP Survey Mission
- Except for this covering letter, the report on Indochina by the Joint Mission is not printed. The report was circulated for the information and consideration of the Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating Committee as document FMACC D–33/6, August 24 (FMACC Files: Lot 54D5). For additional documentation on the work of the Melby-Erskine Mission, see pp. 1 ff.↩